FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 12 JULY 1934 No. 4

THE SETTING FOR THE 1935 NAVAL CONFERENCE

By Admiral William V. Pratt

THE year 1935 will be a critical period in world affairs. For one thing, the importance of the naval conference which is to be held far outweighs that of ordinary naval discussions; the decisions then made will affect not only the participants, but will have world repercussions. The fact is that we have arrived at the forks of the road. One way leads uphill. It is new, tedious and long. It requires patience to negotiate. The old road is direct, broad and well-lighted, but it passes through dangerous country, as the grisly monuments by the wayside bear witness. A choice will have to be made. Bluntly speaking, will the props of the political world structure be forged out of the substance which is called confidence or out of cold steel?

I. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

In any consideration of the naval problems with which this country will have to deal in the near future we must turn back to the naval agreement signed at Washington in 1922 by the five chief naval Powers — the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. The Washington agreement remains in force until December 31, 1936, unless any party to it gives notice of intention to terminate it earlier; and, after notice is given, it takes two years before the agreement ends. Hence, unless notice is given by December 31, 1934, it will still be in effect up to the time when the London Treaty expires.[1] Under the terms of the London Treaty, the five great naval Powers signatory to both the agreements are bound to meet in 1935, unless the earlier

[1] With some exceptions such as Part IV relating to submarines, and certain provisions relating to aircraft-carriers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agreement had meanwhile been superseded by a general agreement limiting naval armament to which they all were parties. At this meeting the Washington naval treaty will still furnish both directive and background.

So much attention has been given to the naval agreement reached in Washington that one is apt to forget that it constitutes only a part of the work of that Conference, and in some ways is not its best or broadest achievement. The Four Power Treaty relating to island possessions and the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China rank with the naval treaty. Taken together they form a series of connected documents which endeavor to set forth in legal terms the purposes for which the Washington Conference was called and the measure of agreement accomplished. It is to be noted that the preamble of the London Treaty starts with the words, "Desiring to prevent the dangers and reduce the burdens inherent in competitive armaments, and desiring to carry forward the work begun by the Washington Naval Conference." This throws the London Treaty back on the Washington Conference for its broad general directive.

The purposes of the Washington Conference were several. It endeavored, first, to smooth the path of peace. It hoped to be able to help stabilize conditions in China and the Orient. It strove to limit the dangers inherent in competitive armaments and to reduce the expenditures resulting therefrom. And it put forth a definite plan for naval limitation.[2]

Thus it would seem as though some of the atmosphere of the Washington Conference must permeate the 1935 meeting. If it does, this should prevent the meeting from becoming a place for the discussion of problems viewed entirely from the technical standpoint. And speaking not as a technician, but trying to look at the problem in the broader way, one must conclude that it is wise to bring as much of the Washington atmosphere into the discussion as possible; for as we follow the course of the various arms proposals made from time to time, we see how many of them have been wrecked on some rather unimportant technical shoal.

A trifle more than thirteen years have passed since the Wash-

[2] At the Third Plenary Session, Secretary Hughes took up the question of land armament also, which resulted in that able speech by M. Briand setting forth France's position and why she could make no further reduction in her land forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ington Conference met first, and in that time we should have been able to judge whether the results have on the whole been good or bad. Can anyone say that the results of the Conference did not for a while drive away the storm clouds in Asia? They appeared again in the shape of internal strife in China and in the Manchurian incident. But would not these same storm clouds have been more forbidding had the Washington Conference never taken place? Though some may not agree, the writer does believe that the general effect has been good and that in a measure the Washington Conference has been the logical successor of the two Peace Conferences which met at The Hague in 1899 and in 1907. And aside from the concrete accomplishments of the naval treaty, the generous spirit developed at the Conference provided the world with something which should not be lost to it now.

II. OTHER CONFERENCES

Of all the many conferences that have met in the last twelve years, which produced any concrete results except those of Washington and London? None. The disarmament meetings at Geneva have been not much more than the motions of a debating society. The efforts there in 1927 resulted, let us say, in a technical victory for those who wished no limitations. It was the defeat of statecraft. Much depends upon the way one sees his problem. The purely military type of mind cannot view even reasonable limitations with anything save fear that his country's safety has been jeopardized. The statesman frequently feels that his case has been won if he comes to any agreement. There must be a happy mean between the two points of view. In 1932 President Hoover proposed to the disarmament meeting at Geneva a plan whereby a one-third reduction was to be made in naval and military forces. It was set aside politely. The plan took into account the inter-relationship between sea forces, land forces and air. This should have been done before. Twice now sea power has agreed to limit itself in the interests of world peace; or let us say impose regulations which each Power participating in the conference agrees to respect. But have there been any agreements on the part of the land forces to respect limits? No. For various reasons the answer is always the same. Security, national defense and other considerations demand that no reduction be made in land armaments by agreement, but the land Powers see no objection to further reductions being made in sea forces. Admitting the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

statement that voluntary reductions have been made in the land forces, we must nevertheless note a concrete difference in principle and in essentials between voluntary reductions and limitation by agreement. One is under national control; the other under control through international agreement.

In the length of time it takes to build one battleship an army can be recruited, organized, mobilized, equipped, and a war fought. Nevertheless, the only force which thus far has made any concessions by agreement is the one which normally is under the greater handicap. Is it any wonder, then, that people regard land force as the more aggressive instrument of the two?

Let us grant the honesty of every motive and admit that we are not the only people that wish peace. It is nevertheless true that sea power is more liberal than military power, is willing to concede more in order to come to terms. But the time has arrived, as will be evident in 1935, when sea power will make no more concessions unless these are met by equal concessions on the part of land power. All countries which rely on sea power as their strong military arm must feel that without some concessions on the part of land power the entire question of limitation is rather hopeless.

Despite all logic, despite pleas for security, demands for national defense, or any other arguments, the movement to stabilize peace through limitation — the "minimum" process — will never get under way successfully until military and air power enter the discussion on the same basis as sea power and walk the same path. If they do not, it will mean ultimately a return to the old process — the "maximum" process — of balance of power. For when it comes to the crucial test of war, which no one, however peace-loving he may be, can afford to regard as outlawed in fact even if outlawed by treaty, then the ultimate decision will rest on the way the pendulum swings, whether it be toward sea power or toward military power. It has been so always. It was true in the Napoleonic Wars. It was true in the last war. It will be true in the next. And this understanding binds all sea Powers together, regardless of any disagreements they may have among themselves individually.

The MacDonald scheme, which is the basis for the British disarmament proposal brought forward a year ago, relegates naval limitation to the next naval conference, but insists that some sort of adjustment, regulation and restriction of military and air forces

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be made now. We are in accord in principle with this proposal.

A nation may be strong on land, or strong on the sea, choosing which arm she deems best suited for her own safety. But beware that country which tries to be strong in all military arms, which demands equality or great power in each. The nation which demands these things may cry peace to the housetops, may insist that the needs of national defense will stand for no less; but watch her carefully, for such action is usually the forerunner of aggressive action or is induced by great fear.

In 1910, Germany had the most powerful army in Europe and was also building a great navy, the second in size in the world. In that year, when Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was trying to secure an understanding with England, Sir Edward Grey had written to the British Ambassador in Berlin: "The mutual arrest or decrease of naval expenditure is the test of whether an understanding is worth anything." In 1913, when the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, proposed a twelve months' naval holiday to Germany, the latter refused. War broke in 1914.

III. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Of the five great sea Powers which have met at the various naval conferences, only three, Great Britain, Japan and the United States, have thus far been sufficiently in accord to permit of their signing the full terms of both the Washington and London Treaties. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that these three are located so strategically that if they were all animated by the same ideals, administered by similar forms of government, held the same liberal and tolerant views, and were adherents of the rule of law, they could become remarkably useful instruments in maintaining world stability and peace. The keynote to the puzzle lies in the word "confidence." France and Italy have never been able to come to terms in all matters. The points where they fail to agree are more political than technical. The greatest divergence in technical views is found between Great Britain, Japan and the United States, yet we three are the only ones to reach complete accord thus far. This in itself goes to show that the real obstacles confronting limitation of armaments are political and not technical, a fact which present world tendencies seem to verify.

Great Britain and ourselves agree that the submarine should go. Japan wishes to keep the submarine on the ground that it is a defensive weapon. Great Britain's plea is that it will be used as it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was in the last war and is therefore an inhuman weapon. We are willing to abolish it, if all others do, on the grounds that it is the least useful to us of all the various types of war craft and costs more per ton to build. There is no special logic in Japan's plea that the submarine is a weapon strictly of defense. It depends entirely upon how it is used; and used as it was by the Germans in the last war it becomes a most offensive weapon.

Here is a point worth noting. Much stress has been laid in recent disarmament discussions upon abolishing aggressive weapons. Aggressive acts can be outlawed, and perhaps on land it may be possible to define aggressive weapons; but on the sea there can be no line drawn between an offensive type of ship and a defensive type, in the classes in existence now. The Japanese have tried to prove that the battleship and aircraft carriers are offensive ships and that the submarine is defensive, but there is nothing to this argument technically. If it is desired to do away with or to limit a type as a matter of expediency, the proper method is to abolish it, or to establish quotas or ratios by simple agreement. There is nothing new in this idea, but to attempt to defend a point of view by unsound argument is not good practice even in negotiations.

Great Britain and ourselves want battleships and Japan is not so keen about them now. They cost much money to build and a poor country cannot afford to indulge in them as well as a rich one can. From our point of view, considering offensive and defensive qualities, first cost of building, and maintenance, they are the cheapest investment we can put our money in and still obtain the best values. It might be interesting to note a few figures. The building costs per ton of warships in the United States are, approximately: battleships $1,050, aircraft carriers $1,280, cruisers $1,500, destroyers $2,500, submarines $3,000. Except in the case of battleships, our building charges are considerably higher than those of other nations. In the same class of ship, a vessel of small tonnage costs more per ton to build than a larger craft. The relative final efficiency merits of the various types can be figured to be about as follows: placing the battleship at 100, aircraft carriers and cruisers run between 50 and 60, destroyers between 30 and 40, submarines between 20 and 30. In the matter of tonnage and calibre of guns, in the battleship class, Great Britain wants smaller ships, with 12-inch guns but more of them. We want the larger ships with heavier guns, and the number we require is possibly less than the number Great Britain desires. The Japanese

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like the 14-inch gun, but whatever we have they want also. Probably in principle they would not object to a smaller battleship than is allowed under the terms of the Washington Treaty.

In the matter of aircraft carriers, Great Britain and Japan would probably be willing to reduce total tonnage allowances. We feel that the allowance established, *viz.*, 135,000 tons, when the art of flying was more in the experimental stage than it is today, is quite small enough. It is already less than the total tonnage allowed for destroyers, which is 150,000 tons.

But the attitude of the different countries toward carrier tonnage depends upon their attitude toward aircraft. This attitude may be defined as regional, the regions being the continent of Europe, America, the Orient. We are naturally one of the most liberal-minded nations about the air. We have nothing to fear. We do not care to place too many restrictions upon the air, but for the sake of agreement are willing to make concessions, knowing that other countries have more at stake than we. We are willing to abolish bombing from the air, though it is more logical to restrict bombing to legitimate targets. The method of restriction is applied to other types of war craft; for example, the submarine may not do certain things, and other craft may not use their guns against unfortified towns. However, all countries are willing in general to do away with air bombing, though they do not all agree in the military uses of the air. Great Britain desires a very drastic cut in the numbers of military and naval aircraft allowed. Under the MacDonald proposal the maximum number allowed was 500. Our total at that time was around 3,000; Japan, France, and Italy were fairly close to that figure; while Great Britain was slightly less than 2,000. In the Orient, Japan is now the strong air Power. She does not object to the legitimate use of air force against others; she does not care to have it used against herself in an unrestricted manner, a sentiment endorsed by the military men of most nations. If Russia gets to be a strong air Power in the Orient, Japan's final attitude ought to be the same as Great Britain's.

There are practically no technical disagreements in the destroyer class. However, since the destroyer is one of the best replies to the submarine, so long as any one country indulges in extensive building of submarines that fact will regulate the total destroyer tonnage considered reasonable. Especially is this the case now that so much pressure is being brought to abolish air bombing. Aircraft have been growing to be one of the most

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

potent enemies of the submarine, and if aircraft are limited more reliance will have to be placed on destroyers. France and Japan continue to regard the submarine with high favor.

In the matter of cruisers, we prefer the larger 10,000 ton ship, and in this class we favor those carrying 8-inch guns. Our allowance in this type of ship is greater than that of any other country, but Great Britain makes up for this by having a superior total tonnage allowance. She prefers the smaller ship carrying 6-inch guns, largely for the reason that she can get more of these on a total tonnage allowance than is the case if she has to build to her quota to equal Japan or ourselves in the 10,000 ton class. Our needs drop from the 10,000 ton ship straight to the 2,000 ton ship in the unrestricted class, of which all countries can build as many as they choose for peace-time purposes. We have no dependencies to defend and our need for cruisers is governed to a large extent by fleet needs. We therefore are inclined to favor a total tonnage allowance which is less than Great Britain thinks necessary. Japan's attitude here is much the same as our own.

In general, we might sum up the attitude of the three countries to be that Great Britain wants smaller ships and more of them; we want larger ships and fewer of them; Japan wants what we are allowed. The technical differences of opinion are many, but there is hardly one which ought not to lie within the range of amicable settlement. It is not in the technical sphere that the real obstacles lie.

IV. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Washington Conference met in 1921–22 in an atmosphere of internationalism and democracy. After the lapse of a short space of fourteen years, its child, the treaty limiting naval armament, will be examined afresh in an atmosphere of intense nationalism and at a time when democracy and the parliamentary principle are fighting to maintain themselves in the face of dictatorship expressed in various forms. We see rule by man, a principle of dictatorship, replacing the rule of law, one of the fundamentals of true democracy. We have only to read the newspapers to know that a large part of the continent of Europe regards democracy's day as over, though, as one leader stated, it may linger on "for a time in some odd corners of the earth."

Looking toward the Orient what do we see? One country professing the democratic principle is torn with internal dissension.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another, intensely nationalistic and maintaining an autocratic form of government, is determined upon a course of action which will give it the place in the sun which it thinks its destiny requires. What is the meaning of the rapid changes of the last few years? Broadly speaking, the most expressive term is "dissatisfaction." It is not enmity; but out of the seeds of dissatisfaction may spring a plant just as dangerous as the growth from the seeds of enmity. In either case, when the plant reaches maturity it is war. This dissatisfaction will be part of the background of the 1935 Conference unless conditions change materially in the meantime. In the face of this, and after the unsuccessful efforts at Geneva, where the League of Nations has failed to accomplish much in the way of disarmament, what nation will have the desire or temerity to put forth a proposal for further limitation of naval armament? What sea Power — and mind you, the two greatest sea Powers are today among the chief guardians of the democratic principle — what sea Power then will wish to reduce its strength further in the face of a growing military spirit, especially when twice before the two sea Powers just mentioned made concessions and reductions in force, and on one pretext or another received no concessions in return? What may we expect then?

France and Italy have never come into full accord in the matter of limitation of naval armament. Italy insists upon the recognition of the principle of equality in naval strength, though she is willing to agree not to build up to the standard set by France. France has not been willing to grant equality for the sake of arriving at agreement. She claims that her greater defensive necessities, in part connected with the defense of her North African realm, give her the right to a measure of greater sea power, a right she does not care to relinquish. France, which we must admit to be a nation of logical thinkers whether or not we agree with them always, has maintained steadily one principle: she will not disarm unless she can be assured of security, and she bases her appraisal of what constitutes security upon past experience.

England has expressed dissatisfaction at being bound by terms which place her at a disadvantage with regard to others which will come to no terms. Although she is one of the foremost exponents of the limitation of armaments idea, she has stated that she no longer intends to carry on in the way of limitation by example; she says that it is a mistake.

What is our stake? Since we are not closely surrounded by real

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or imagined dangers, we look upon disarmament with a broad, generous outlook. We think it a good thing for the general cause of peace, and we think it ought to be pursued. Besides, it has the advantage at the moment of being economical. We have made one serious error, however; and that is, having made arms agreements in the past, we have not lived up to them. We thought it a fine gesture for peace, as well as inexpensive, not to build up to our quotas quietly and systematically. Then when we find we are wrong we are forced to repair the damage — whether the times be propitious or not for such efforts.

Our stake is to prevent war, for looking at the matter even in the light of self-interest only, we see that we are bound eventually to pay a large part of the price of any great war, regardless of any immediate profits which might accrue to some classes of our citizens as a result of our being neutral. All nations through their spokesmen are proclaiming peace; they probably want it. At the same time they are all bent on being strong; they all intend to get their own way. Is the cause of world peace served better by our being weak or by our being firm and strong? This is one of the things we shall have to ask ourselves at the next Conference, and we may as well be honest and face it. The atmosphere is not what it was in 1922.

What does Japan want? Let us admit at once the two objectives — equality and security — stated by Viscount Ishii as the permanent bases of Japanese foreign policy.[3] Although almost universally censured in the Manchurian episode, an old sore, Japan had some rights on her side. From the technical and military viewpoint, Japan had a weak link in her armor unless she had a foothold in Manchuria. Every time she had gained this foothold by war she had been made to give it up by outside pressure. Under these circumstances, other nations might have felt just as she did — previous to signing the Nine Power Pact and the Paris Peace Pact. They might not have acted in the same way after having signed those agreements. They would have tried to find other ways to get their requirements satisfied.

It has been stated openly in the press that Japan at the next naval conference will ask for an increase in the naval ratio assigned her. Is the request logical on the ground of security? It is not, and technical men know it. Listen to the words of Admiral

[3] See "The Permanent Bases of Japanese Foreign Policy," by Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Baron Kato spoken at the second plenary session of the Washington Conference in reply to the American proposal setting forth the 5–5–3 ratio for the first time. Speaking of Japan, Admiral Kato said in part: "She is satisfied that the proposed plan will materially relieve the nations of wasteful expenditures, and cannot fail to make for the peace of the world." And again: "Japan has never claimed nor had any intention of claiming to have a naval establishment equal in strength to that of either the United States or the British Empire. Her existing plan will show conclusively that she had never in view preparation for offensive war." In addition to the ratios established at Washington, the three sea Powers at the London Conference agreed to equality in submarine tonnage. This action more than made secure the Japanese islands themselves as well as the road from the islands to the mainland, even though the total tonnage allowance for each nation was cut to approximately 53,000 tons.

Let us ask ourselves certain questions.

In time of war, does Japan have the seas of the world to cover as a necessary part of her own security, as does the British Empire? She does not, and in addition she has a secure line to the mainland which England has not.

Does Japan have two great ocean fronts and one of the main water arteries of the world to defend in case of war, as does the United States? She does not.

As a neutral in a great war, would the obligations and responsibilities imposed upon Japan put as heavy a burden on her shoulders as they would upon either Great Britain or the United States? They would not.

Is there any nation in the world, which, after taking care of its essential obligations at home and elsewhere, could lay successful blockade to the coast of Japan? There is not.

In the last half century has there ever been any action taken against Japan on the part of the two leading sea Powers which legitimately could be called aggressive? The writer thinks not.

Is a Japanese claim for increase of ratios justified on the grounds of national income? Japan's national income is approximately 16½ times less than ours, yet in the eleven years following 1922 her expenditures for new naval construction exceeded our own during eight of those years, and the ratio of her naval budget to national income is 5½ times greater than our own.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No, the Japanese claim for an actual increase in her naval ratio will not further the purposes of peace, and must find other reasons than equality and security.

However, though Japan has no logical grounds to lay claim to an increase in her naval ratio she has a just claim to equality in treatment in other respects, and until that claim is recognized there will remain a feeling of tension. International relations must be based on a spirit of fair play, equality and justice, if peace is to be kept. Is there any reason why friendly relations should not be maintained between this country and Japan? No. So long as each country respects the other's rights, lives up to its treaty agreements, enters into no trade wars, develops no superiority complex, starts no war propaganda, attends strictly to its own business, is just in its dealings with the other, and truly desires peace — so long there should be no apprehension. The Pacific has not been the breeder of war hurricanes that the Atlantic and Mediterranean have been. Thus far calms or only fresh breezes have prevailed.

V. THE OUTCOME

No one can predict what the outcome of the forthcoming naval discussions will be. The best that can be hoped is that the nations will meet in such an atmosphere of friendliness that the good resulting from the previous conferences may not be lost and may be carried on and increased. If the disarmament efforts of the League of Nations come to naught the world will badly need some relic of the spirit of the Washington Conference.

Meanwhile, there are certain things which seem self-evident. If we and the other nations of the world are actually on the road out of a depression resulting largely from the last war, and if many tariff and financial questions are in process of fair adjustment, this fact will do much to soften the present rather harsh political atmosphere and bring to the next Conference a spirit of greater optimism. If the writer can surmise correctly, it will be a meeting where men and their attitude towards each other will count for more than any logical presentation of facts. No nation would care to be responsible for setting the clock back, for calling into existence again the old system of naval competition, with its attendant evils and balances of power.

But if the ship sinks, the readjustment period should find those with identic interests in the same lifeboat.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE DUCE

By Dino Grandi

IF I had written this article ten years ago I should, no doubt, have sought to show with what lack of understanding Italian problems had been examined and settled at the Peace Conference, and I should have tried to explain the reasons for the deep sense of dissatisfaction with which the Italian people received the results. Today it does not seem necessary to do this. During these ten years the problem of ensuring peace, tranquillity and work, so as to enable a people with limited resources to meet the ever growing demands of life, has gradually come to be universally recognized. The situation created by those who made the peace terms in Paris is such that a detailed review is superfluous. Public opinion all over the world is beginning to ask how statesmen could have parcelled out immense colonial territories without any regard for the only one of the Allies for whom the pressure of population was creating a vital and urgent problem. How could statesmen, when distributing colonial mandates, have seen fit to entrust these to Great Britain, France, Japan, Belgium, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia — and none to Italy? Why, at the risk of deeply offending the Italian people, did they choose to create so many artificial difficulties and obstacles to Italy's national aspirations? Why, in short, should Italy, who had been a loyal member of the victorious alliance in the war, have deliberately been thwarted and made discontented?

No doubt errors were committed by the Italian representatives in Paris. But this does not alter the fact that the men who represented England, France and the United States were fundamentally lacking in any understanding of Italian needs. They failed to realize that Italy was a young and active country, entering on a new phase of demographic and economic development, and that she was animated by new spiritual values which were to take shape in a much more vigorous conception of the future of the nation and the rôle of the state. Their failure seems all the stranger when we remember that they possessed the key to the new Italian political situation. Italy was not driven into the war by force of circumstances. Her intervention was her own voluntary act. Before committing the country to such an enterprise, the Government very properly tried to safeguard Italy's rights

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to compensation at the end of the war. But it was a wave of popular enthusiasm which swept the politicians before it and in 1915 decided upon intervention.

It should not have been difficult to see that this movement, of which Mussolini was the leader, was the outcome of a reserve of youthful energies, capable of giving a fresh and vigorous impetus to national life. The statesmen in Paris, however, were blind to the ideals of the new generation of Italians. They also failed to take a practical view of the Italian question. It was not in the interest of Europe and European stability to debar Italy from the outlet requisite to the growing needs of her population; nor was it a move in defense of the interests of European civilization to offend and humiliate the new spirit of energy animating the Italian people. It was that people, in the sequel, which was destined to make the most vigorous contribution of any single nation to the common defense of European stability and of European civilization.

The greatest lack of understanding of the realities of the Italian situation was displayed by the statesmen of France, and this was the primary cause of the uncertainty and instability prevailing in Franco-Italian relations during the post-war years. The relations of the two countries have been so genuinely improving in recent times that, I trust, I am safe in putting forward these historical considerations without risk of giving offense. There is one page in M. Poincaré's memoirs which it is difficult to read without asking oneself whether political insensibility is not sometimes accompanied by a considerable amount of moral insensibility. I refer to an extract from his 1915 diary, written at the moment when Italy was entering the war as France's ally. After having enumerated the territorial concessions granted to Italy by the Treaty of London, M. Poincaré adds: "*Rien ne prouve, d'ailleurs, qu'au moment de la paix toutes ces attributions puissent être maintenues.*" An obscure phrase, perhaps, but one which can be better understood if we read what Ray Stannard Baker wrote in his book "Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement." In it he records that, a few days after the armistice, the Quai d'Orsay approached Colonel House and proposed "to scrap all the secret Treaties for the sake of curbing Italy." This meant annulling the Treaty of London, which stipulated the compensations due to Italy at the end of the war.

Is it surprising that Italy left the Conference with the feeling

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that she had been injured in her rights and interests, convinced that she had been deceived and defrauded, and determined to correct these errors and right these wrongs? I persist in calling them "errors" because I have always felt that, from their own point of view, French statesmen — Clemenceau and his followers — whose object it was to create a condition of stability so as to protect the Treaty of Versailles, ought at least to have been wise enough to wish to associate a great country such as Italy with the cause of conservation. It was evident that Italy, being a country in a phase of dynamic development, would otherwise be inevitably drawn towards a revisionist policy.

I do not wish this statement of mine to be misunderstood. Mussolini's foreign policy, in the matter of the revision of the Versailles Treaty as in other questions, rests on a much wider conception than the mere correction, in Italy's interest, of certain of the diplomatic results of the Paris Conference. But the fact that the Italian people has of recent years been peculiarly interested in the question of the revision of treaties is assuredly due in part to its own painful experience at the Peace Conference — an experience which, notwithstanding the radical change that has taken place in Italy's international position during the last few years, is not yet forgotten. The Italian people has always considered that the peace settlement, both as a liquidation of the World War and as a foundation of the new institutions which were to guarantee the future political stability of Europe, was based on an insufficient and erroneous view of the facts. On this point the Duce has expressed himself with his usual clearness and straightforwardness.

Coming into power in October 1922, Mussolini was faced by two exigencies of foreign policy: the need to rouse the European Powers to a sense of Italian realities, to a recognition of the new creative forces inherent in the national rebirth; and the necessity of incorporating the Italian question in the vaster and more general problem of a revision of the principles upon which the peace settlement had been founded.

One episode of Mussolini's foreign policy has often been misunderstood both in the United States and in England. Indeed, my American and English friends have always advised me not to talk about it. I frequently bring it up, however, because I believe in the eloquence of examples. I refer to the Corfu episode. There is a sentimental aspect to this incident, and apparently that is the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only one which struck the imagination of most people: namely, the guns of a great naval Power were trained against a lesser one. This fact is certainly not new in history, nor can it be suggested that Mussolini invented the procedure. Not unnaturally, however, every time it occurs it arouses a reaction of public feeling. But the real importance of the Corfu incident was quite different. The Duce, by the concrete example of the Corfu expedition, called Europe's attention to the respect due the new Italy and to the reawakened energies of the Italian people. That is to say, it called attention to a fact that had been ignored at the Paris Conference.

According to international custom, when a warship wishes to order a vessel suspected of carrying contraband to stop, she shall fire a warning gun. At Corfu the Duce fired his gun, not to intimidate Greece, but to intimate to Europe that it was time to halt for a moment in order to consider Italy's international position, before the tension created in Italy by the wrongs done her at Paris reached the danger point. By so doing, he made the first real contribution to European peace. A few months later the question of Fiume was peacefully settled by a direct understanding with Jugoslavia, the independence of Albania was secured, and the relations between Italy and Greece themselves entered upon a phase of friendship and collaboration. This led to the Italo-Greek Treaty of 1928 — an event which I regard as particularly fortunate, and one that displays the intelligence of Greek statesmen, who realized that the Corfu episode was not an Italo-Greek incident, but a stand made by Italy *vis-à-vis* Europe — a somewhat strong one perhaps, but very illuminating. So illuminating was it, in fact, that since then Mussolini has not found it necessary to fire any warning guns against anyone.

He has had other means of recalling Europe to a sense of reality, since Europe — harassed by political instability, divisions and conflicts, revolutions in many of its leading states, and urgent claims beating against the fragile structure of the peace treaties and the League of Nations — has itself come to demand that revision of principles and methods which the Duce for ten years has advocated and fostered.

The Peace Conference bequeathed to Europe two tendencies, both divorced from reality: the apocalyptical ideology of which President Wilson was the primary interpreter; and an out-of-date reactionary spirit whose principal exponent was Clemenceau.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One of these tendencies seeks to immobilize Europe in a network of theoretical formulæ, the other to force it into an iron frame based upon past events.

While one of these tendencies reflected the past and the other faced towards the future, both, however, had a common significance: the immobilization of history — Wilson by the optimistic notion of universal peace, and Clemenceau by the pessimistic notion of French security. Their aims were different, but the starting point, and I might say the initial illusion, were the same. For both sought to suppress the realities of history by denying the free play of the forces of movement and development that make history. The Powers in Paris attempted to force the peace problems of Europe into this duplex structure of unreality. They regarded them not as dynamic problems of the future, the settlement of which demanded careful study and preparation, but as static questions to be definitely settled by legal and coercive means.

Ever since 1919, Europe has dwelt in this fantastic structure of prophecies and armaments. But while the force of arms has steadily increased, the force of prophecy has dwindled. The League of Nations exists at Geneva; but despite all the trust we may place in it, and all the good will with which we uphold it, it is a fact that the League now stands on the defensive; and all the efforts made for a reduction of armaments have led to no results. Indeed, the Disarmament Conference has meandered into a legal quibble on "parity of rights," from which we are seeking to extricate ourselves by an effort of diplomacy; which all goes to prove the need of reforming the methods with which the League of Nations has worked up to the present.

These methods do not respond to the exigencies of international life. They are derived from those ideological formulæ which attended the League's birth, and from the experiments of the parliamentary system. I do not mean here to discuss parliament as a constitutional institution in Europe or America. It is a fact, however, that the parliamentary system no longer enjoys unanimity of consent nor inspires the universal confidence accorded it in the nineteenth century. But even were this otherwise, the fact of having transplanted the system from national life into the international domain was a performance that calls to mind the act of the Roman general, who having been struck with admiration for a wonderful sun dial at Syracuse, had it dismantled and removed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to Rome, only to find that the dial did not work in a different latitude. Parliamentary institutions, in fact, are quite out of keeping with a League of Nations. The League does not correspond to any parliament, because every parliament is connected with an executive power, and the League of Nations possesses no executive worthy of the name. If we are to seek an historical comparison, we should turn rather to the Continental Congress — but American historians have dealt too severely with the Continental Congress for me to dare to do so.

Putting aside these theoretical arguments, we are faced at Geneva with the following reality: that the Powers — large and small — carry their difficulties and their conflicts of interests to the League of Nations. These conflicts do not shrink at Geneva: they expand. The Great Powers, in conflict with one another, seek for allies among the lesser Powers and form hostile groups which complicate and aggravate the situation; the small states court the support of the Great Powers, who in order to maintain their diplomatic combinations at once take sides. Thus all the disputes brought to Geneva finish sooner or later, either directly or indirectly, as conflicts between the Great Powers. During my stay in Geneva I never saw a dispute of any importance settled otherwise than by an agreement between the Great Powers. They alone are responsible for the situations that arise. A few states that remain outside of fixed diplomatic combinations, and are therefore able to maintain an independent attitude, have from time to time exercised a conciliatory influence at Geneva. But this only happens in the case of secondary disputes, and, moreover, these lesser Powers, not having at their disposal the forces that might become necessary to back their action, are themselves compelled to have recourse to the Great Powers.

The whole of the Geneva procedure is, in fact, a system of *detours*, all of which lead to one or other of these two issues: agreement or disagreement between Great Britain, Italy, France and Germany — the latter now formally absent, but not yet entirely detached from the League.

Experience and common sense alike prove that political institutions live and function only when they respond to the realities of a situation and are able to adapt themselves thereto. The real situation in Europe is this: the four Great Powers have it in their power to realize a policy of effective collaboration, not only among themselves but also among the lesser states. Every time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the problem has been envisaged in this way — at Locarno in 1925, at Lausanne in 1932, and at Rome during the negotiations for the Four Power Pact — something definite has been achieved. Whenever — as at Geneva during the Disarmament Conference — the Western Powers have departed from this position, the results have been negative, or practically so. It is from this point of view that we should consider the Four Power Pact and the policy defined therein; and it is for this reason that the Duce discerns a close connection between the Four Power Pact and the Locarno Treaty.

"In the Locarno Treaty," he said recently in an historical speech in the Italian Senate, "the position of the four powers was clearly defined and a basis was established from which in the course of time certain results might ensue. In the years following, European policy has too often departed therefrom.

"It was high time that the four western Powers should return to the principle that had preceded the 1925 agreements and solemnly pledge themselves to collaborate and act in concert and mutual understanding in all questions concerning them; that they should make every endeavor to realize a policy of effective collaboration, not only among themselves, but also with the lesser Powers. It is this pledge that the new Pact solemnly undertakes by Article I, which is the corner stone upon which all the other clauses are based."

Several political observers have thought to discern in the Four Power Pact certain principles tending to reform the League of Nations, and League zealots have criticized it mainly on this ground. It must frankly be admitted that these elements are there. They were already present in the Locarno Treaty, which, after all, created a procedure extraneous to the League, and they are to be found again in the Four Power Pact. Each of these great international treaties sought to establish a system of relations between states which had been paralyzed by the vast and heavy mechanism of the League; and they corrected, or at least they aimed at correcting, those deviations from reality inherent in the universality of the League and in its abstract and ideological character. They sought to remove the League from the world of prophecy to the world of hard facts, from purely theoretical and universal affirmations to the immediate guarantees necessary to satisfy the craving for safety and protection — these are the very words of the Locarno Treaty — that animate the countries who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were victims of the war scourge of 1914–1918. Both treaties are the logical expression of the need for common agreement between the four western Powers in order to impart vitality and efficacy to Articles 10, 16 and 19 of the Covenant, and in order to restore the equilibrium that must exist between them if constructive and lasting results are to be obtained.

All this involves a constant effort to adapt the peace treaties to the actual conditions of Europe. For ten years this has been one of the Duce's main preoccupations. For ten years he has constantly sought to convince Europe that the real menace to peace consisted in the excessive rigidity of the endeavor to maintain a system of international obligations, on a basis of psychological and political conditions which were changing from day to day. This is, and has always been, Mussolini's thought. I summarize the matter in what are his own words, so far as my memory serves: "From the moment of the cessation of war — of this war, as of all wars that preceded it — the process of adapting the peace treaties to the changing situation commences. It would be useless and dangerous to conceal the fact that this process exists, and that it has often gone on amid far greater difficulties than would have existed in an atmosphere of greater reciprocal trust and understanding. During the years following 1919, rigid conditions have been enforced and have created an atmosphere of tension; while adaptations and revisions have taken place almost unawares, under the pressure of circumstances that have often threatened Europe's stability, and without producing in the relations of the several states and in the general situation that organic improvement which was aimed at and which ought to have ensued."

In maintaining this attitude, Mussolini has often found himself in open disagreement with those French statesmen who regard peace and security essentially in the same way that Clemenceau did: as a system of juridical engagements and a system of military alliances to maintain rigidly the structure of the peace treaties. An understanding with Italy on these lines was difficult. Nor is it hard to see why. A policy of intensive armaments, completed by a foreign policy of alliances, has been constantly explained by French statesmen as designed to give France military security. I avoid saying that it has been essentially directed against Germany, but certainly it has been based upon the hypothesis of a possible new conflict with Germany. French statesmen, with whom I have on many occasions discussed the question, have con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stantly said to me: "Our armaments do not concern you; why do you worry about them?"

Herein lies the fallacy. The concentration of a great military force in the hands of a single country — whatsoever the specific purpose for which it has beeen formed — is in itself a fact of political importance, and therefore it concerns everyone. It may be destined, in the intention of the government concerned, to be employed for a given object and in the hypothesis of a particular conflict; but in everyday life it resolves itself into a form of political pressure which cannot be ignored by any of the peoples or states with interests in the continent of Europe. I have never understood how anyone could possibly imagine that the Duce — who has a big pair of eyes, very wide awake in Italy's interest — could close them to this most obvious fact.

The French themselves, moreover, have done everything in their power to make us consider the question from this standpoint. Why did they in London in 1930 obstinately refuse to recognize the principle, laid down by the Washington Treaty of 1922, of naval parity with Italy? If they had wished to make the political purpose of French armaments quite clear to us, it was only necessary for them to come to a fair naval agreement with us. It is not surprising that the refusal to come to any such agreement — following upon the substantial concessions on our part agreed upon with Mr. Henderson in Rome, and embodied in the so-called Basis of Agreement of March 1, 1931 — should have been unfavorably interpreted. More recently, that is to say after the Lausanne negotiations and during the preparation of the Four Power Pact, French statesment have displayed a better understanding of the Italian point of view. Relations between the two countries have consequently improved. The general function of Italy in the balance of Europe is perhaps better understood now in France.

This function is dictated to Italy by her geographical position and her Mediterranean interests. With her natural frontiers, Italy has no dreams of continental conquests; but she must be safe in the continent to which she is attached and on the seas that surround her. This security can only be guaranteed by the equilibrium of European forces. Italy's freedom is compromised the moment this balance is disturbed. Thus Italy cannot be other than adverse to the formation of military alliances, political blocs, and closed systems, which seem to translate into present

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reality an old civic law of Manu: "Your neighbor is your enemy, but your neighbor's neighbor is your friend." Nor, indeed, do these systems serve to secure the safety of anybody, since by splitting Europe up into so many armed camps they merely exacerbate relations between countries and widen the zones of conflict.

It is to be hoped that with the Four Power Pact — in which the spirit of neighborly collaboration is unequivocal — Europe may take a new turning, and that we may attain a proper balance. I mean a positive, political and military equilibrium, to be realized first of all between the Great Powers, solely because if it is lacking between the Great Powers it is impossible between the lesser. This applies primarily to the question of disarmament.

It is generally known that the Duce holds that disarmament should be achieved by a fair distribution of armaments, which on the one hand would gradually eliminate the great inequalities, both legal and technical, now existing, and on the other would deter Europe from plunging into an armament race. Nor can there exist juridically two different orders of states, one free to arm and the other bound by treaties to a limitation of armaments. Armaments must be placed on a single juridical basis and be equally distributed.

This has been and remains the basic principle underlying Italian policy on disarmament. In which way this principle can be practically applied is a matter of method. In other words, it is necessary to find what immediate and concrete results it is possible to achieve in the actual political situation of Europe. The Duce, in laying down the terms of Italian policy in this field, was inspired by the following principle: that once equality of rights in favor of Germany has been recognized, this principle must be applied. It is necessary to meet Germany's legitimate demands for defensive rearmament. On the other hand, it is also necessary to consider the position of those Powers like France which possess a superiority of armaments; one cannot ask them to renounce immediately and unconditionally all those advantages which they actually enjoy. To do so would be running after shadows, and it would be a departure from and not an approach to that unity of views among the Great Powers without which Europe will find itself shortly plunged into a new armament race like the one which preceded the World War. The Italian Memorandum of January 4 must be read with this fundamental consideration in mind. It tends to prevent the race to armaments,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to develop a policy of fair distribution of military strength amongst the Great Powers.

In order that such results should be achieved, it is further necessary that the political atmosphere in Europe should become one of confident coöperation between the Great Powers; it is therefore essential that these should renounce all attempts to modify to their own advantage the political balance which has been established. The tendency to concentrate forces — in any form — is equally dangerous. It interrupts the slow, arduous and painful work of reconstructing the political texture of Europe, and it paves the way to a régime of strife and anarchy among the Great Powers. This is exactly what those who drew the Locarno Treaty and the Four Power Pact endeavored to avoid. Attempts to concentrate power — an attempt by Germany to annex Austria would be an example — are the exact antithesis of the Locarno and Four Power Pact policy. They would represent a set-back instead of an advance in the policy of revision and would retard coöperation and pacification in Europe.

I think I can express this feeling with all the more frankness inasmuch as everybody knows what cordial and friendly relations exist between Italy and the German Government and people and how actively Italy has worked in every field (reparations, armaments, etc.) in favor of Germany's equality of rights. This equality should represent an element of balance and of adjustment in the interest not only of the German people but of the whole of Europe. An independent Austrian state is a most essential element in this equilibrium.

In asking for this, Italy does not ask for a guarantee of equilibrium for herself only, but for Europe as a whole. Austria holds a key position on the continent which can be compared only with that of Belgium. There are three crossroads in Europe: one is Belgium, between England, France and Germany; another is Switzerland, between France, Germany and Italy; the third is Austria, between Germany, Italy and the Slav states of southeastern Europe. It is in the interest of Europe that these crossroads be maintained intact, that they be allowed, as political units, to perform their function — that of separating and conciliating the Great Powers, giving them thereby that tranquillity and security which are the only foundations upon which a policy of collaboration and peace can be based.

From the North Sea to the Danubian Basin there exists today

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an uninterrupted chain of political and diplomatic guarantees: the independence of Belgium; the guarantee of the western frontiers of Germany, as stipulated at Locarno; the independence of Switzerland; and the independence of Austria. The preservation of this chain is an essential condition of European collaboration. It is of common interest to the four Great Powers. Hence the close connection, in the mind of the Duce and in Italian policy, between the Locarno Treaty, the maintenance of Belgian, Swiss and Austrian independence, and the Four Power Pact. This is the only system by which the peaceful coexistence of the Great European Powers can be ensured.

There are two countries within this system which are in a similar position and whose interests coincide: Italy and Great Britain. This fact has become more and more manifest in the course of recent years, but I remember the Duce pointing it out very clearly at Locarno, as far back as 1925. "Italy," he said, "occupies the same place as England as guarantor of the agreement, and therefore of the general peace."

It is by no mere chance that Italy and England are entrusted with the same responsibilities in Europe under the Locarno Treaty, and that they constantly find themselves side by side. We have often had differences of opinion with both France and Germany. But on all important questions, such as debts, reparations, disarmament, and reconstruction of the Danubian States, the policies of Italy and Great Britain have always been substantially in agreement. There are permanent interests binding Italy and England together in Europe. These interests are dictated by the geographical position of the two countries, which makes each an interested but detached element of the European situation; by the necessity felt by both countries alike to maintain a certain balance on the continent; and by their respective positions in the Mediterranean.

These interests were realized by far-seeing English statesmen as far back as the beginning of the eighteenth century. England, already in the Mediterranean, sought then to establish closer relations with the Italian states, and more particularly with the House of Savoy; the latter, in order to defend itself against the territorial ambitions of Louis XIV, whom Spain was no longer able to withstand, had for some decades been turning towards England. It is from this period — not as is usually supposed, from the time of Palmerston and Gladstone — that we can date

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

England's first concern for Italian independence. It is from the early days of the eighteenth century that we can trace the English idea of turning to Italy for those elements of guarantee of the European balance which she so anxiously sought.

The affinity of Italian foreign policy with the foreign policy of England grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century and during the early years of the twentieth. The decisive moment in Italian foreign policy, in the early years of the new kingdom, was when, at the moment of the signing of the Triple Alliance (1882), the Italian Government insisted upon the insertion of an additional clause clearly stating that under no circumstances should the Triple Alliance be considered as directed against England. Nor did this suffice: we further demanded a special protocol whereby the Triple Alliance should be left open for British adhesion, at any rate enabling England to adhere to the articles relating to mutual neutrality. This Bismarck opposed, fearing the treaty might take on an anti-Russian significance. Such are the ironies of history! The important point is that the additional clauses, upon which the British-Italian agreements of 1887 were later on to be based, permitted Italy to restrict the importance of her continental engagements, and established the Italo-British understanding which has always been maintained.

This understanding has been renewed of late years by the similarity of our views as to the best way of facing Europe's political exigencies, a common dislike for the rigidity of abstract formulae, and an innate sense of justice in the two peoples — justice based on an understanding of mankind, which alone makes it possible to settle problems in reality and not merely in form. Justice and legality are not identical. There are treaties, pacts and agreements which must be respected and honestly carried out; but over and above treaties, pacts and agreements there are the claims of good sense and equity which must be satisfied. International problems are not merely matters for legal and coercive settlement; they are essentially problems of social order, and social order is maintained only by an earnest effort to satisfy the needs of the peoples.

We are satisfied that during these last years Italy has made this effort. No problem has left us indifferent or lacking in zeal, still less, hostile. Never has Italy refused to recognize the just rights of others. Ever since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, France has insisted on her need for security. We did not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hesitate to guarantee this security, and took a solemn pledge to this effect by signing the Locarno Treaty. The German nation has claimed and still claims freedom. From the close of the war to the present time it is true to say that Italy has never neglected any occasion, however slight, to help Germany to get a term put to international control over her domestic concerns, to remove over-burdensome obligations in the political military and financial domains, and to assist the German people to resume its place on an equal footing in the consortium of free nations.

But Italy also has her own problems to solve, and ones no less formidable than those of safety, liberty, or the resumption of economic relations with neighbouring countries. Ours is a vital problem that involves our very existence and our future, a future of peace, tranquillity and work for a population of 42 million souls, which will number 50 million in another fifteen years. Can this population live and prosper in a territory half the size of that of Spain and Germany and lacking raw materials and natural resources to meet its vital needs, pent up in a closed sea beyond which its commerce lies, a sea the outlets of which are owned by other nations, while yet others control the means of access — the Caudine Forks of her liberty, safety, and means of livelihood — the while all the nations of the world are raising barriers against the development of trade, the movement of capital, and emigration, denationalizing whoever crosses their frontiers to enter, I do not say their own homes, but even their protectorates and colonies?

During the eleven years that Mussolini has been Head of the Italian Government this problem has grown steadily more acute. Eleven years ago it hardly existed in the consciousness of Europe, which regarded our foreign policy as permanently bound up with and circumscribed by the Adriatic conflict. Today it forms part of the general situation of European reconstruction, which nobody is any longer able to envisage without taking into account the satisfaction of Italy's vital needs.

Thus the first constructive phase of our foreign policy is closed. Fascism has placed Italy's problem before Europe, not as an isolated one to be considered apart from others, but as one factor of the comprehensive European problem, which demands a single organic settlement. In this, I think, consists the deepest and more real significance of the Duce's foreign policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE COST OF PEACE

By Allen W. Dulles

THERE is one subject in the field of our international relations on which all Americans are in agreement. We wish to keep out of war. We are somewhat vague as to how this is to be accomplished, and divergence of opinion immediately arises when we discuss the form our insurance against war should take. Also, we are too apt to jump to the conclusion that our aims can be achieved without much thought or planning on our part. Quickly forgetful both of the immediate past and of the lessons of history, we assume that we blundered into our wars largely because of the mistakes of our leaders. We are tempted to believe that the World War finally taught us a lesson, that we have achieved a kind of immunity from war as the result of our disillusionment over that experience and its effect upon our domestic and international relations. Finally, we assume that, with proper respect for the rules of neutrality, we can without much difficulty keep in the straight and narrow path of peace.

The facts hardly justify any such complacency. The country was certainly as peacefully-minded in 1914 as it is today. Further, our whole past history shows that the American people, even more than many other peoples, have those temperamental qualities which make it particularly easy for the war fever to spread as an epidemic in the face of provocation. In the past we have engaged in our share of wars, and more, and in most instances not because war was brought to our own shores but because we were goaded into making war outside of our territorial limits.

If the situation is looked at abstractly, it is true that no country is better situated than the United States to keep out of war. It is almost inconceivable that anyone will attack us as long as we maintain the present policy of adequate defense at sea. Unfortunately, however, this is only a very superficial view. The interests of the United States are not territorial — they are world-wide. Our citizens reside, have property interests, and carry on business in and with every country of the world. The maintenance of our place in foreign markets and our access to these markets has always been considered an important element of our foreign policy and essential to our prosperity. So long as we show any disposition to protect our foreign trade and our citizens, or to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defend our manifold interests abroad, which are both material and sentimental, the outbreak of a major conflict will bring the United States face to face with the same problems we met in the past, both in the period 1807 to 1812 and before we entered the World War.

It is therefore high time to consider what progress we may have made in the last fifteen years, or what program we have for the immediate future, which would give us greater immunity from future than we have had from past wars. Despite the cynics, something real and substantial has been accomplished toward the organization of peace during the last fifteen years. We see only the troubles which have occurred despite such institutions as the League of Nations and such agreements as Locarno and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. We cannot estimate the troubles we might have had without these agreements. At the same time, we know only too well that the peace machinery has not been perfected, and consequently it is of vital importance to consider now whether any preparation could be made to help keep us out of war in the event of the breakdown of that machinery.

The ancient formula *Si vis pacem, para bellum* can hardly give us much comfort. The days of a Roman peace when one Power imposed its will on the civilized world by force of arms are over. Certainly the United States does not aspire to any such rôle and has long adhered to the policy of providing only for its own defense and not the conduct of hostilities abroad. Tempting as it might appear in theory, the often-suggested program of a peace insured by the Anglo-Saxon peoples is not within the range of practicable politics. If we sincerely wish peace for ourselves, we are therefore thrown back on a policy which should include first of all the element of coöperation with other Powers who have the same interest and ideals as ourselves in the maintenance of the peace and, if these efforts fail and the peace is broken, we should prepare ourselves for that course of conduct which holds out the best prospects of keeping us from being drawn into the war.

If the United States could be sure of effectively maintaining a policy of neutrality, this would furnish the solution. From the domestic point of view, our position, as long as we are able to remain a neutral, while difficult and embarrassing, would not necessarily be a disastrous one. It is true that during the period of neutrality in the World War our commerce was interfered with and the lives of our citizens abroad were jeopardized. On the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other hand, certain of our industries flourished and we were then powerful enough as a nation to prevent that total disregard of our rights which drove the country to desperation prior to the War of 1812. If we could with honor have kept out of the World War we might have emerged with a strong economic and financial position and enhanced power in world affairs. This is, however, a shortsighted point of view. It does not take into account that the ultimate effect of the World War by impoverishing other nations eventually impoverished us through the destruction of foreign purchasing power and international trade.

The real question, however, is not the economic or social results of a policy of neutrality but whether the United States can remain a neutral in the event of future wars. There should be no insuperable difficulty in remaining neutral in the event of a conflict which does not involve any of the major sea Powers, or which is of brief duration. In particular, if there is a war in the Atlantic-Europe area, and England is not involved in this war, we would probably find that the interests of the United States and of England in maintaining trade would be somewhat similar. In such a situation, without too great risk of becoming involved we might be able to win respect for the so-called traditional rules of neutrality, and continue our trade. We would likewise have the same general interest as the British in protecting our nationals and our interests in the area of conflict. On the other hand, in any major war in the Atlantic in which England is engaged, or in a war in the Pacific involving Japan, our position would be very different and the difficulty of affording effective protection to our nationals or to our interests in the war area would be great. Further, if in any such conflict we attempted to follow out the so-called traditional policy of neutrality as expressed in our correspondence during the period prior to our entry into the European conflict in 1917, and as developed more than a hundred years before, we would again risk becoming involved in war with one or the other of the belligerents.

This view of our position as a neutral is not based on theory; it represents conclusions forced upon us by our experience in the period 1807 to 1812 and again prior to 1917. On both of these occasions the country was fortunate in having leaders who were not only popular and powerful but who were also passionately devoted to the cause of peace and whose one aim was to keep us out of war. Each started out to accomplish this purpose by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a rigorous neutrality: the type of neutrality which countless numbers of unthinking Americans today believe would be a panacea for future trouble. Jefferson left office under a storm of popular disapproval caused by the measures he had taken in the hope of maintaining our neutrality, only to see his successor forced into war a few years later. Woodrow Wilson, after a determined effort to maintain a strict neutrality, turned to preparedness and what might have led to an attempt at armed neutrality, if war had not come in the midst of this second phase.

Such has been our experience in the past. It brings us face to face with the problem as to our attitude for the future. In the case of major conflict, to what extent should we go to protect our overseas interests, our overseas trade, and our nationals abroad? If we were prepared to extend no protection, that fact would certainly help to keep us from becoming involved. This in effect would mean a policy of non-intercourse with the belligerents. We would then "batten down the hatches" and wait until the storm had blown over. It is futile to discuss any such fantastic hypothesis, for the American people would never be willing to do anything of this kind. In the first place, our people at the outset of a war would see no need for so extreme a position, and would undoubtedly exercise effective political pressure to prevent a prohibition of their normal course of business. We would not foresee at the outbreak of war all the complications which would result from continuing our commercial activities. Each trader would see only his particular cargo, would weigh the possibilities of getting it through safely, and would clamor to take the gamble.

But even if we should ever again start out with a policy of non-intercourse, as we did in 1807, we would soon abandon it or it would fall by the wayside through our inability to enforce it. Further, this would still leave us with the problem of protecting our citizens on the seas and in the area rendered dangerous by the action of the belligerents under the conditions of modern warfare. It is inconceivable that as soon as a war broke out we would attempt to prevent our citizens from travelling abroad, and even if we should do so we would have no means of repatriating thousands who are living abroad. The suggestion that we should automatically withdraw all protection from our citizens because they venture within the danger zone of war has been greeted in the past with a storm of popular disapproval, and the same would probably be true in the future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Non-intercourse is impracticable; isolation is impossible; and the particular type of neutrality to which the United States is now more or less committed by law and by practice has not in the past furnished any solid basis for a national policy in case of a world crisis. This is the situation as it appears today. It forces to our attention the urgent necessity of considering how our policy can be shaped so as to give us some further measure of protection in the event of war.

In a striking article in the issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS for April 1934, entitled "Troubles of a Neutral," Mr. Charles Warren has demonstrated the fallacy of reliance upon the so-called neutral rights which have not been admitted by belligerents in the past and give us no sure basis for enforcing respect for our nationals, our trade, or our foreign interests in the future. From the point of view of avoiding a conflict, if that rather than the protection of our interests is our primary aim, our neutrality policy is subject to criticism from two angles. In the first place, we tend to be committed by our past policy to support our nationals in maintaining trade and in carrying on their normal activities in belligerent areas to an extent that is likely to bring us into conflict with the belligerents; and, in the second place, we permit belligerents too many liberties on our own territory. Both these conclusions have been effectively brought out by Mr. Warren. If we wish to build up a policy which might be of some value in keeping us out of war, our neutrality laws should be made more stringent, both to prevent the belligerents from activities on our territory which might inflame our own people and to restrain our own nationals from becoming too deeply involved in the cause of either.

In the event of a war involving a great sea Power in a life or death struggle, that Power would most certainly take all possible steps to prevent any substantial aid, whether contraband or non-contraband, from reaching its enemy, unless it was persuaded that the neutral Powers were prepared to fight to maintain this trade. In the latter event, the belligerent would weigh the relative risks of incurring the enmity of a neutral as against the importance to it of preventing the trade. Certainly in this situation any neutral which makes the maintenance of its trade a matter of national honor or prestige would run the risk of becoming involved in the war. The safer course of action for us in this situation would be to make clear both to our own nationals and to the belligerents that, without admitting the right

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to interfere with our legitimate trade, we would make illegal interference with such trade a basis for a claim for money damages, and keep the issue a pecuniary one rather than a question of national honor. This, of course, is much easier said than done, and the inherent disadvantage of any such policy is that if we relieve the belligerents of the fear of our intervention, the result would probably be that they would play fast and loose with our trade. The smaller neutrals, caught between the Allies and the Central Powers, found it expedient during the World War to take a very limited view of their neutral rights.

Even if this presents a possible attitude toward trade and property rights, it is more difficult to deal with the protection of the lives of American citizens on this basis. Property damage can be measured in money, but not loss of life. Some steps could be taken to deal with the situation where our nationals in an unnecessary and foolhardy manner risk their lives, so that such risk should remain personal and not one involving the honor and the prestige of the United States. It is already the law that if our nationals enlist in belligerent armies they assume the risk of their action. If our nationals propose to travel indiscriminately on ships laden with munitions for belligerents, or in the war zones, or engage in other activities of this general nature, it is fair to ask whether our government is bound to consider that any harm which befalls them involves the honor of the United States. It is one thing if a foreign government deliberately sets out to attack American nationals. It is different if American nationals voluntarily put themselves in a position where they suffer as result of action primarily directed against one of the belligerents. We did not go to war over the *Lusitania*, despite the popular demand in the East; and the fundamental reason why we did not go to war then was because this act was not primarily directed against American citizens. Their death was incidental to a blow struck at one of the belligerents. On the other hand, we did go to war following the declaration of the unrestricted submarine warfare, because that warfare was directed indiscriminately against all who ventured within the forbidden area except on the terms prescribed by Germany.

As the situation stands today, the United States is quite free not only to revise its domestic neutrality laws, but also to readjust its conception of its policy as a neutral. Our citizens are not interested in the technicalities of the question. When the man

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the street refers to the necessity of maintaining neutrality, all that he means is that the United States should avoid being drawn into war. He is not primarily interested in the enforcement of any particular body of neutral rights, or in any particular code of neutral obligations. Of course, after war once breaks out, and our citizens see rich opportunities for profit unless they are restricted by our national laws, they object to the imposition of prohibitions at that time. In time of peace, however, our public could probably be brought to acquiesce in the formulation of a new national policy of neutrality and a stringent revision of our neutrality laws, if they had any assurance that these steps would help to any real extent in preventing us from becoming involved in war.

If this is a fair analysis of our problems as a neutral, the following conclusions might be drawn:

First: Our traditional policy of neutrality is possibly adequate to meet our problems in the case of a war which does not involve the major sea Powers of Europe or of the Far East, or which could be localized in those areas.

Second: In the case of the two major conflicts in Europe since our independence, namely, the Napoleonic Wars and the World War, we were forced to abandon our neutrality. There is no reason to believe that the situation would be different in the future in the face of any like catastrophe. The practical difficulties of our position as a neutral would be greater today than ever before because we might be faced with Far Eastern as well as European complications and because modern war would mean a much greater dislocation of our manifold interests than was the case in 1807–1812 or even in 1914. To balance against these added difficulties of our position as a present-day neutral, we have our enhanced strength and prestige as a World Power which any belligerent or group of belligerents would be reluctant to provoke.

Third: In the event of a prolonged and general conflict in Europe or in the Far East, the prospects of keeping out of war might be increased by a modification of our past attitude toward so-called neutral rights and a decision on our part that the danger of war involved in the defense of all such alleged rights was too great to justify the maintenance of our traditional position in this regard. Whether such an attitude is consistent with our national dignity and honor, or with our position as a World Power, is a serious question. It is easy to foresee circumstances where the sacrifice involved would be too high a price even for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peace, and the temper of the American people is such that they would probably reject such a policy if carried to any extreme.

Fourth: Without abandoning the protection of our foreign interests in case of war, we could somewhat improve our position and somewhat lessen the danger of becoming involved in war by a thorough-going revision of our neutrality laws. This must be viewed as an added insurance, but is far from being a measure of complete protection against war.

The time to weigh these problems and to start shaping our policy is now rather than after war has broken out. At that time we are too deeply engaged in dealing with particular incidents as they arise to be able to formulate a policy. Further, any revision of our neutrality laws becomes increasingly difficult after war breaks out, as any change in existing laws under the particular conditions might be deemed to prejudice the position of one or the other of the belligerents.

If it is correct that no conception of a neutrality policy which has any prospect of being adopted by the United States would give us satisfactory assurance against being involved in war, there is certainly every reason, on the ground of self-interest, to reëxamine our policy of coöperation for the better organization of the peace machinery. Programs of this character are often attacked as altruistic gestures, involving serious risk to ourselves with no commensurate advantages. If, however, a major conflict — and any minor conflict in almost any part of the world may develop into a major conflict — involves the serious risk of forcing us to choose between abandoning our interests or intervening in the war, we would be justified, from the point of view of self-interest alone, in taking what has been referred to as the "risks of peace;" that is to say, it would be worth our while to take some risk in collaborating with others in the maintenance of peace if in this way we can prevent a situation from developing which might eventually involve us in war. This is not meddling in what does not concern us. It is merely paying a premium to minimize the risk of war to us.

It has been suggested as consistent with this enlightened view of our own self-interest as well as with many of our treaty engagements that we should consult with other nations for the maintenance of peace, reserving our full freedom of action if such consultation fails. This, however, does not directly bear on a discussion of neutrality. The suggestion has also been made, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

here the neutrality question comes in again, that under certain circumstances we should not adopt the same attitude toward both groups of belligerents where one was taking collective action against a treaty-breaking state, and where, for example, we considered that a treaty to which the United States is a party, the Briand-Kellogg Pact for example, had also been violated.

This difference in attitude might be shown in various ways short of engaging in the hostilities. We might embargo munition shipments to one group of belligerents and not to the other. We might close our ports to importations from one group and, as suggested during the Geneva disarmament discussions, we might take the position that the government should not assert the right of our citizens to trade with a treaty-breaking belligerent; that is, trade in such a case would be carried on at the risk of the trader and without expectation of government support. We might also refuse to recognize the results of an aggression.

The threat of any such measures by the United States would be a real factor in the prevention of war. Their actual adoption in case hostilities break out is fraught with difficulties. To distinguish the guilty party from the innocent in order to know when to apply pressure of this nature is, at best, a difficult task. In most cases the United States would probably decline to assume it. In many other cases the Powers primarily concerned might fail to agree among themselves on a common course of action. On the other hand, it is a mistake to condemn a policy solely because it does not represent the easiest course — which is rarely the safest in the long run — or because it does not fit all situations. In any emergency where the United States is disposed to lend its influence for the maintenance of peace through frankly stating what its position would be if the peace is broken, this would certainly be a factor in rallying other states more nearly concerned to take timely and effective action for the maintenance of peace. If we assume that wars are to some extent avoidable, certainly the most effective way to prevent them is to give those who propose to embark on a warlike program some clear idea of what attitude they may expect from the rest of the world.

Let us assume, then, that as a result of consultation in time of a world crisis the nations propose a peaceful method of adjustment which is acceptable to all except to one of the threatening belligerents, and that the United States takes the position that if the Power threatening the peace proceeds to war and the other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states collectively decide upon measures of prevention, the United States would adopt what, for want of a better term, we might describe as a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards this collective action. Our benevolent neutrality would consist in adopting one or more of the various measures suggested above. Of course, if we did not agree with the judgment rendered or if the collective action against the disturber of the peace did not follow, then there would be no reason to distinguish in any respect between the two opposing belligerents. The same would be true, of course, where both of the parties to the dispute refuse any peaceful settlement. In such a case the other states should certainly consider how far it would be fair and equitable to withhold from both sides certain rights which belligerents in the past have expected to enjoy at the hands of neutrals — such, for example, as the right to purchase arms. The proposal to embargo arms shipments to both belligerents in the Chaco conflict is an interesting and useful precedent.

A benevolent neutrality would of course involve a modification of our traditional position. Some of our international jurists suggest that it means complete abandonment of neutrality and that, to adopt the words of John Quincy Adams, neutrality must recognize the cause of both parties to the conflict as just — that is, avoid all consideration of the merits of the contest.

We should not mislead ourselves, however, to believe that neutrality in the legal sense necessarily leaves us in a position of real impartiality as between the belligerents. Our Government can, of course, remain impartial in the sense that it would enforce the laws equally with respect to the belligerents. But if either our geographical position or the fact that one belligerent controls the seas creates a situation where our citizens send their goods and munitions and money only to one belligerent, our legal neutrality may become rather a hollow sham. In the World War, the Central Powers finally decided that our neutrality was more harmful and hampering to them than our belligerency was likely to be. They badly miscalculated the situation, but it is the type of miscalculation that any belligerent in the heat of war is likely to make.

If we propose to draw any practical conclusions from the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and unless it is to be only a self-denying covenant which loses all effectiveness as soon as violated by others, can we escape the conclusion that the United States as a party to this Pact has the right to draw a distinction between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the nations which respect the Pact and the nations which violate it, if such a violation can be established? In the present Far Eastern controversy the nations, including the United States, have taken a position which has been based on a judgment of the merits of the controversy. The fact that hostilities have been carried on without a declaration of war, and hence no questions of neutrality have been raised, does not alter the fact that in connection with these hostilities we have not taken a position of disinterested impartiality.

As a matter of international policy, we can, of course, if we wish, ignore a violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. We are not obliged to show resentment because others violate their obligations towards us. It is enlightened self-interest which should be the test of our action. It is this which should determine our course in the face of a threat to the peace and our policy as a neutral if war breaks out.

It is impossible to determine in the abstract where in a given state of facts this policy of enlightened self-interest would lead us. Different situations call for different remedies. In one case a traditional neutrality might suffice; in another, it might be necessary to fall back on a neutrality which laid emphasis upon avoiding conflict rather than upon enforcing or exercising all our rights or what we may believe to be our rights; and finally, there may be situations when the boldest course would be the safest, when our collaboration with others for the preservation or the restoration of peace would be the only course which holds out any real hope of preventing a world crisis from developing into a world war in which sooner or later we would probably be driven to intervene.

It would be the part of wisdom to leave the door open to follow whichever course seemed best under the circumstances.

The first course requires no change in our position or in our present laws.

The second would mean that in certain emergencies the President should have the power under permissive legislation, to be passed now, to put into effect further neutrality measures and to regulate our trade with the belligerents and other neutrals. One group of such regulations might provide for a measure of collaboration with other Powers in preventing aid — for example, munition shipments, loans, etc. — from reaching all belligerents; another group of regulations should be drafted to be put into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effect only when hostilities reach a point where the attempt to protect our overseas trade and our interests abroad in the traditional manner was likely to force our intervention and where a policy of limited or modified enforcement of our so-called neutral rights would be the safest course. Further, such regulations should be broad enough to permit the President to negotiate with belligerents at the outset of war for an agreement which might help to define neutral rights. Our neutrality policy could in this way be made more flexible so that we could adapt it to the facts of the situation. It is unreasonable to suppose that neutrality regulations which would be quite adequate for a war in the Chaco would suffice to keep us out of trouble if again confronted with a world-wide conflict.

It is a much more difficult task to prepare ourselves for the third alternative course of action, that is, for some measure of collaboration where one of the belligerents has been found responsible for a breach of the peace. As the Far Eastern precedent has shown, the Executive, through the control of foreign relations, can bring the influence of the United States to bear in such a situation to some extent at least. The Executive has the right to consult with other Powers, to give or withhold recognition, and to extend or withdraw protection for our trade and our nationals abroad. Legislation to supplement these existing powers may come when the American people are more keenly aroused to the difficulties and dangers of our past policy of neutrality and more convinced than they are today that our peace and welfare may depend upon our ability and our willingness to make it known to treaty-breaking belligerents that our economic and our financial strength will not be available to help them to wage a war.

At least we should now realize that we cannot find safety solely in avoiding entangling alliances and through a traditional neutrality. There is no thought of any alliances or other types of political understanding which would prejudice our freedom of decision in a given emergency. The fact is, however, that no nation can reach the position of a World Power as we have done without becoming, in fact, entangled in almost every quarter of the globe in one way or another. We are inextricably and inevitably tied into world affairs. We should not delude ourselves that like Perseus of mythology we can put on neutrality as a helmet and render ourselves invisible and immune to a world in conflict around us.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HAPSBURGS AGAIN?

By John Gunther

THIS, it would seem, is a bad age for kings. In most countries royalty is out of power or out of fashion, and monarchs have been replaced as real rulers by proletarian or bourgeois adventurers, Hitlers or Mussolinis. Divine right, based on spiritual submission by the people, has given way to the right of the common man with a fist. Modern science, modern economics, have destroyed the will of the masses to have a Father, *viz.* King.

Nevertheless the imperial family which most signally incarnated the virtues and vices of old-style kingship, the House of Hapsburg, is entering the arena of practical politics again. It would be rash to say that a Hapsburg restoration in Austria is imminent. But it is not excluded as a bizarre contribution from the Dollfuss dictatorship to its supine electorate. Europe, to paraphrase Heine, is the continent with its future behind it, and everywhere the forces of reaction march full strength these days, especially in Austria.

The Hapsburgs are more than a family, they are a sort of organism — a resplendent fungus long attached to the body politic of Europe. They are as prolific as mice and as international as counterfeiters. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand, murdered at Sarajevo, had 2047 ancestors, including 1486 Germans, 124 Frenchmen, 196 Italians, 89 Spaniards, 20 Englishmen, 52 Poles, and 47 Danes. The Hapsburgs ruled in Europe for some sixteen generations. Their polyglot and bulbous holdings included at one time or other twenty countries, but never, one might say, a single country. The family was always superior to the state. Family laws in old Austria-Hungary had precedence over state laws, and the provisions of the Family Charter, drawn up in 1839, are still unpublished and secret. When he heard of Franz Ferdinand's death in 1914 (which removed uncertainty in the succession), old Franz Josef, who had been emperor for 66 years, said, "Ah! A higher power has restored the Order that I was unhappily unable to maintain."

The Hapsburg power toppled at the end of the war in 1918, but not the Hapsburg dynasty. When the last emperor, Karl, was asked to abdicate, his Empress Zita replied, "Rather will I die with you here. Then Otto will come. And when all our own family

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have gone there will still be Hapsburgs enough." Karl, indeed, never abdicated, although he renounced all participation in the governments of Austria and Hungary on November 11 and 13, 1918. He and Zita fled to exile. Twice Karl made an abortive *Putsch* in Hungary, in March 1921, and October 1921. He died in Madeira in 1922. Ever since ex-Empress Zita has trained her eldest son, Prince Otto, for kingship.

Otto was born near Vienna on November 20, 1912, the son of the Archduke Karl (eldest son of the Archduke Otto, a nephew of Emperor Franz Josef), and Zita, Princess of Bourbon-Parma. He has four brothers and three sisters. He reached his majority in 1930, and became legal head of the House of Hapsburg in all its multifarious ramifications. By direct lineal descent he is the great-great-great-grandson of the Emperor Francis, last Holy Roman Emperor and first Emperor of Austria.

A diffident, sensitive boy, strikingly handsome, gravely schooled by his heredity, well-educated and intelligent and ambitious, fully conscious of the tragic imperial burden he inherits, Otto at the moment is a vital question-mark in the future development of Central Europe. For circumstances have made him, besides an ancient Hapsburg, a modern weapon. He is the last club Dollfuss can use to drive Hitler out of Austria. The Hapsburgs, like the Catholic Church of which they are such faithful servants, exist in terms of decades or centuries, and it is by no means improbable that "Hapsburg versus Hitler" will be a main motif in the future Central European struggle for power.

Otto has become a live issue because the Dollfuss régime, for all its nimble efforts to build up a patriotic Austrian spirit symbolized by the little chancellor's Fatherland Front, is fatally handicapped in that its general tendency is so negative. It has destroyed the Social Democrats and kept the Nazis out. But these are not exactly positive achievements. The government needs badly some flaming symbol as an offset to Hitlerism. It needs the attractive force of some rallying point, some promise of permanence and vitality, some fixed and positive pole. This the Hapsburgs might provide.

In addition there has been much growth of monarchist sentiment for its own sake. The whole trend and temper of present affairs in Austria is legitimist. The Dollfuss dictatorship not only revives the mediæval *Staende;* it stands for all the things the Hapsburgs stood for: centralization of authority, "benevolent"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

despotism, above all the Church. Hints are constant that the present complicated constitutional fabric is transitory; much leeway is given to the President as head of state under the new constitution; it is not difficult to bridge the gap to an "elected" king. Some 150 Austrian towns and villages have spontaneously granted Otto honorary citizenship in the past year or two, and one of the powerful Austrian private armies, the Ostmarkische Sturmscharen, is pronouncedly legitimist. Chancellor Dollfuss, it is true, although monarchist in general sympathy, is not actively in favor of the return of the Hapsburgs — yet. Questioned about a possible restoration, he evasively says that it is not a "practical" issue. But almost all the important members of his entourage are emphatic legitimists: Prince Starhemberg (head of the Heimwehr), Prince Schönburg-Hartenstein (the Minister of War), Dr. Schuschnigg (the Sturmscharen leader and Minister of Justice and Education), and Dr. Schmitz (the new mayor of Vienna). And the name "Republic" is being struck out of the constitution as the official designation of the country.

Otto himself has broken the long Stenockerzeel silence by a remarkable letter addressed to one of the Austrian towns which granted him honorary citizenship:

> I absolutely reject [Nazi] fascism for Austria and see the solution only in a constitutional monarchy along democratic lines similar to that in England. I hope the Hapsburg [exclusion] law will soon be revoked by emergency decree, but I consider that the moment for a successful restoration is not yet ripe. . . . I absolutely refuse to be drawn into any adventurous *Putsch* attempts. . . .
>
> An un-Austrian movement has lately been created [National Socialism] which promises everything to everyone, but really intends the most ruthless subjugation of the Austrian people. . . . The people of Austria decline such aims, as they know that real German culture was at home only in Austria. The Austrian people will never tolerate that our beautiful fatherland should become an exploited colony, and that the Austrian should become a man of second category. . . .
>
> It is my wish and holy duty to be with my people in these days of danger. I trust that the present just, manly, and truly Austrian régime will understand the clamors which one can perceive from your and many similar municipal addresses, and that they will shortly repeal the [exclusion] law, which only dishonors Austria.[1]

Finally the Dollfuss government has crushed the two political parties in Austria which would have fought a restoration to the bitter end, the Nazis and the Social Democrats. The bloody collapse of Viennese social democracy in February did in effect

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, September 25, 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mean the end of the Republic, even if an actual restoration is considerably delayed.

II

The obstacles to restoration in Austria — as distinct from Hungary — are mostly domestic. There is no mention of the Hapsburgs in the Treaty of St. Germain. In November 1920, Italy and Jugoslavia agreed in the Treaty of Rapallo to take any political measures necessary to prevent a return of the Hapsburgs to Austria, and in December 1921 Austria and Czechoslovakia promised in the Treaty of Lány to coöperate against a revival of the "old régime;" but both these instruments have long since lapsed.

The last emperor, Karl, Otto's father, issued a proclamation on November 11, 1918, as follows:

> Still, as ever, filled with unchanging love toward all my people I will not oppose my person as an obstacle to their free development. I recognize in advance the decision which German-Austria will take on its future form of state. The people have assumed the government through their representatives. I renounce any share in the affairs of state. At the same time I remove my Austrian government from office.

The first National Assembly in Vienna, on March 12, 1919, incorporated this declaration in its statement of policy. But Karl, be it noted, did not abdicate. Therefore the republican government, on April 2, 1919, passed the Hapsburg Exclusion Act. The provisions of Section 1 are as follows:

> LAW OF APRIL 3, 1919, NO. 209.
>
> Section 1.
>
> 1. All sovereign rights and privileges of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine as well as those of its members are forever declared null and void.
>
> 2. In the interests of public security, the former bearers of the crown and all other members of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine are hereby expelled from the country, unless they shall expressly resign their membership in the said house and all their rights of sovereignty deriving therefrom, and unless they declare themselves faithful citizens of the republic.
>
> 3. The use of titles is forbidden. Oaths sworn to the former Emperor in his character as a sovereign are not binding.

Section 2 of the same law provides for the confiscation of all the imperial property (with a few minor exceptions) and its transfer in perpetuity to the title of the republic. The realizable assets were utilized for relief of soldiers wounded in the war and for families of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dead veterans; castles like Schönbrunn and the Hofburg were taken over as government offices or let in part to private tenants. A government-owned restaurant in the Hofburg sells wines and liqueurs from the imperial cellars, and thousands upon thousands of bottles are still left.

Law No. 211, also passed on April 2, 1919, removes privileges of rank and title from the nobility. Both these laws were given constitutional validity by terms of Article 149 of the republican constitution. This means that they were not designed as simple statutes, but were part of the basic charter of the state.

The immense hierarchy of the Hapsburgs and their henchmen was thus denuded of power and privilege. The family scattered. A very few young archdukes renounced their titles and thus were permitted to continue to live in Austria; Archduke Franz Salvator took up farming in Wallsee, Archduke Leopold Wölfling ran a grocer's shop in a Vienna suburb, Archduke Leopold Salvator went into the malt-and-hops business. Princess Elizabeth Windischgraetz, the only child of Crown Prince Rudolf, who killed himself at Mayerling in 1889, divorced her husband, turned socialist, and taught school in a Vienna working-class district. But almost all the others fled and took up residence abroad.

About a year ago agitation began for repeal of the Hapsburg Exclusion Law. It was convenient to the legitimists that the government at the time was beginning to tackle the question of constitutional revision. The issue of repeal became actual, not only because the Hapsburg question was getting hot, but because the whole constitution was being overhauled. Laws 209 and 211 stuck in the gullet of monarchists in the cabinet like Schuschnigg and Schmitz, and it was determined to get rid of them.

The legitimists wanted the Exclusion Law abolished unconditionally. This was not done. Austrians love to do things by quarters and halves. They adore legal complexities, and a clear-cut decision based on realities is abhorrent to their gentle juridical natures. So a compromise was reached. At the moment this article is written the new constitution is on the point of promulgation, but the actual text is not yet available. Official information, however, forecasts it. Laws No. 209 and 211 will not be actually rescinded, it has been decided, but will be reduced in quality from constitutional to simple civil statutes. They no longer have basic juridity, and they may be repealed at any time henceforward by ordinary or emergency legislation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is not all that the legitimists wanted, but obviously it is an immense step forward. The chief obstacle to restoration, the constitutional force of Law 209, is removed. The legitimists promptly set up a committee for correspondence with the government, headed in person by Prince Max Hohenberg, the son of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and in spirit by Baron Friedrich von Wiesner, an amiable and clever diplomat who for many years has been the ex-Empress' legal representative in Austria. The government has intimated that settlement of the imperial family's property claims against the state must precede restoration, and that the family, if it returns to Austria, must undertake certain promises not to indulge in political activity. Another step forward came a few days before promulgation of the constitution, the announcement that permission had been granted by the government for the return to Austria of Archduke Eugen Hapsburg, cousin of the last emperor, title, privileges, and all. This was open disobedience of Law 209 by the government itself. Eugen, who has been living in Basle since 1919, is freely mentioned as possible President of Austria when the new constitution is in force.

Disadvantages to restoration are largely the international complications that might result. The legitimists assert that Austria is not bound by the famous declaration of the Conference of Ambassadors[2] of November 10, 1921, forbidding a Hapsburg restoration in Hungary, and that although the countries of the Little Entente are pledged to prevent a Hungarian restoration, Austria is quite a different matter. Nevertheless a return of the royal family to Austria would provoke a serious international storm, as Chancellor Dollfuss well knows. Perhaps the government is holding Otto as a concealed card up its sleeve. Should the Nazi attack on Austria recur on a serious scale, then Otto may be produced. It is seemingly with this strategy in mind that the government so obviously opens the path to restoration, but delays restoration itself.

Another obstacle to restoration is the expense it would entail. There are some 160 surviving Hapsburg archdukes, and they would flock to Vienna like bees to an open jar of honey. The cost of maintaining an imperial court would severely strain Austrian finances, which are sagging anyway. Revolutions cost money, and so do the private armies that make them; the February *Putsch* has plunged the budget deep in deficit.

[2] See below.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If Law 209 becomes a dead letter, as seems certain at the moment, there is nothing to prevent Otto and Zita from catching the next train to Vienna and living there — as private citizens. This seems to be the plan of the more important legitimist camp — invisible restoration by gradual means.[3] Otto's return as a simple commoner, they say, cannot possibly be regarded by Czechoslovakia or Jugoslavia as a *casus belli*, and once he is within the country his elevation to kingship becomes a "domestic" matter. The legitimists hope to give their enemies no specific pretext for intervention, no single extra-legal act to pounce on. Restoration may be gradual even within Austria, with Otto successively assuming the old Hapsburg dukedoms of Tyrol, Salzburg, and Carinthia.

III

So much for Austria. Hungary is quite a different story. Here obstacles to a legitimist return are almost prohibitive, both because of the international commitments of the Hungarian government in respect to the Hapsburgs, and on account of the distinct anti-legitimist bias of the present Horthy-Gömbös régime. If a successful restoration occurs in Austria, one in Hungary may follow. But a direct approach to the Crown of St. Stephen is at the moment a virtual impossibility.

Oddly enough, the Hapsburgs are not mentioned in the Treaty of Trianon. No bar to their return was formally incorporated into the peace treaty structure. But in 1919 the Allied Powers insisted on the withdrawal of Archduke Josef Hapsburg as White "Administrator" of Hungary, and in February 1920, while discussing the Treaty of Trianon, the Conference of Ambassadors declared that a Hapsburg restoration in Hungary would be a matter of international concern and that the Powers would neither recognize nor tolerate such a restoration.

Karl, as in Austria, did not abdicate in Hungary. He never surrendered his right to the Crown of St. Stephen. Hungary remained a kingdom, and Admiral Horthy assumed the regency. Twice Karl tried to regain his Hungarian crown. In each case the Horthy government was forced by the international position and by direct pressure of the Powers, particularly Czechoslovakia, to throw him out. After the second *Putsch*, the Hungarian Govern-

[3] See "Will the Hapsburgs Return?" by G. E. R. Gedye, London *Daily Telegraph*, April 17, 1934.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment passed (November 8, 1921) the following Dethronement Law:

LAW No. XLII, 1921.

Concerning the cessation of the sovereign rights of His Majesty Karl IV and the rights of succession of the House of Hapsburg:

I hereby inform all whom it may concern that the National Assembly of Hungary has passed the following law:

1. The right to reign of Karl IV is terminated.

2. The Pragmatic Sanction and all other stipulations of Law I and II of 1723, regulating the rights of succession to the House of Austria are hereby for all time annulled, and the privilege of electing a king is returned to the Hungarian nation.

3. The nation resumes the Kingdom's ancient form of government, but postpones the occupation of the royal throne until a later date. . . .

4. This law takes effect on day of publication.

I hereby order that the foregoing law be published and this law being the will of the nation, I obey it and shall see that it is obeyed by others.

NICHOLAS HORTHY,
Governor of Hungary.
COUNT STEPHEN BETHLEN,
Royal Hungarian Prime Minister.

Dr. Beneš, the Czechoslovak foreign minister, at whose dictation the decree was virtually drawn up, instantly spotted a loophole in this text in that, dethroned by terms of the law, a Hapsburg might nevertheless be *elected* to the crown. He protested to Paris and the Conference of Ambassadors referred the matter to the Hungarian Government. As a result the Hungarian Government bound itself to abide by the decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors of February 4, 1920, and April 3, 1921, forbidding the restoration of the Hapsburgs; to elect no king without coming to a previous understanding with the Conference of Ambassadors; and to pass a law forbidding propaganda in Hungary for a Hapsburg restoration. These promises were embodied in a formal declaration on November 10, 1921, with which the Conference of Ambassadors declared itself satisfied, and which was recognized as an international obligation by the Hungarian Government. Finally, when Hungary entered the League of Nations in 1922, it submitted a document confirming the obligations of the November 10 agreement.

It was largely out of fear of a Hapsburg restoration that the first Little Entente treaties were negotiated and signed. They do not mention the Hapsburgs specifically, but they pledge the signatories to concerted foreign policy in regard to Hungary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Karl's mildewed bones crumble in the church of Nostra Señora del Monte in Funchal, Madeira; the Little Entente is still a very live concern. The Polish Government declared its solidarity with Czechoslovakia on the Hapsburg question on October 24, 1921, and so did France in the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of April 1926.

But these international obstacles, severe as they may seem to be, are not the chief bar to restoration in Hungary at present. The Little Entente might fight now; but it might not. Blood is not so warm today as it was in 1921, and the moral authority of these old engagements is considerably blurred. It would be very difficult for Czechoslovakia to undertake the moral onus of invasion and war today even if the 1921 treaties were flagrantly violated. The principal obstacle to the return of the Hapsburgs to Hungary is the attitude of the Hungarian Government itself. Otto is outside Hungary today not so much because the Czechs want him out as because Horthy and Gömbös do not want him in.

Their motives are not exclusively personal, although Otto's return would lose them their pleasant jobs; Zita in particular could never forgive Horthy for what she considers his betrayal of the principle of legitimacy, and Gömbös for having fired on her (on the occasion of the second *Putsch*) at Budaörs. They feel that a restoration would still be internationally dangerous for Hungary; that although the bulk of the people are legitimist the question of restoration is not ripe; that Otto and Zita are not, after all, Hungarian and that the House of Hapsburg has brought more ill to Hungary than good, particularly during the "Dualism" of the last phase of the old monarchy; that, in short, restoration is an inexpedient, unproductive, and perilous idea.

The Crown of St. Stephen dates from the year 1001 A.D. It has an honorable history. Kings came early in Hungary, but parliaments too, and the Hungarian Magna Charta (the Golden Bull of 1222 A.D.) authorizes armed resistance by the commons to the crown if the king's behavior is unconstitutional. By Hungarian tradition the crown is a fixed point; kings do not place the crown on their heads at coronation; they raise themselves under it. The crown is in the perpetual keep of a royal guard under the authority of two custodians, one of whom must be a Catholic nobleman, the other a Protestant; significantly enough, the third key — there are only three — is in the possession of the prime minister.

The Hapsburgs assumed the Hungarian succession only in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1687. "By Hungarian custom the eldest lawfully begotten son of a crowned king of Hungary becomes King of Hungary on the death of his father. According to the Pragmatic Sanction of 1723, the Holy Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, accept the Right of Succession of the male descendants of the daughters of Charles III, Joseph I, and Leopold I, so long as these lines shall not have been extinguished."[4] By both these criteria, Otto is the rightful pretender. Indeed, he has had no rival since the oath of fealty to him of his erstwhile competitor, the Archduke Albrecht, who removed himself from royal grace in 1930 by marriage to a commoner.

Hungary, although it keeps Otto out of the country, supports him. Hapsburg *private* property in Hungary has never been expropriated. For some years payments were suspended, but now the royal family is believed to receive the revenues from Raczkeve, a 40,000 acre estate in central Hungary, and from various properties in Budapest.

Legitimism in Austria and Hungary present some curious contrasts. Austria is a republic (at the moment of writing) but it smooths the path to Otto's restoration; Hungary is a kingdom but will have none of him. Austrian monarchism is deeply seated in the Catholic peasantry of the Tyrol and the mountain districts, backward and isolated; Hungarian legitimism is the hobby of a clique of immensely aristocratic noblemen. In Austria Otto is on the point of being summoned by a corporative fascism; in Hungary he is rejected by a monarchical parliament.

The Hungarian legitimist leaders, like Count Sigray, Count George Apponyi, Count Josef Karolyi, find a certain amount of backing in the ranks of the church and army as well as the aristocracy. The "legal" basis for their program is their belief that the Hungarian Dethronement Act and the subsequent communication to the Conference of Ambassadors are both null and void because they were voted under duress, *i.e.* threat of Czech invasion. Their views on the question of restoration in Austria are sharply divided. Some think it would be a good thing, a prelude to inevitable restoration in Hungary too. Most of them, however, oppose it. Their Magyar pride is hurt that Otto should find his eventual path to Hungary through another state; they feel that the Crown of St. Stephen in future should matter more to him than Austrian enthronement now; they consider that his possible

[4] London *Times*, November 20, 1930.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

return as a private citizen would irreparably damage his imperial prestige; they think, in short, that he should take Hungary first or nothing.

The attitude of Otto himself and his mother seems to be quite clear. It is that Hungary sacrificed its claims to priority, not once but twice, by repelling the Karlist attempts in 1921. Crowns are rare these days. When one is as temptingly close as the Austrian, it should be plucked while the plucking is good. Certain it is that the whole orientation of Zita's policy has remarkably turned in the past few years toward Austria and away from Hungary.

There is no provision in Hungarian law for a successor to the present regent, Admiral Horthy. This means, obviously, that the restoration problem in Hungary, no matter how remote it may seem now, is bound sooner or later to come to a head. Horthy is 66. When he dies the League Council (successor to the Conference of Ambassadors as trustee of the peace treaties) may exert its right to veto Otto's restoration — or maybe will not.

IV

The Hapsburg question is an international question. Let the imperial title of the House be recalled:

> We . . . by God's grace Emperor of Austria; King of Hungary, of Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodomeria, and Illyria; King of Jerusalem, Archduke of Austria; Grand Duke of Tuscany and Cracow; Duke of Lorraine, of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Bukovina, Grand Duke of Transylvania, Margrave of Moravia; Duke of Upper and Lower Silesia, of Modena, Parma, Piacenza and Guastella, of Ausschwitz and Sator, of Teschen, Friaul, Ragusa, and Zara; Royal Count of Hapsburg and Tyrol, of Kyburg, Goerz, and Gradisca; Duke of Trient and Brixen; Margrave of Upper and Lower Lausitz and in Istria; Count of Hohenembs, Feldkirch, Bregenz, and Sonnenberg; Lord of Trieste, of Cattaro, and above the Windisch Mark; Grand Voivode of the Voivodine Serbia, etc.

Letting Jerusalem and Lorraine go, this title includes claims to sovereignty over territory in five countries besides Austria and Hungary, *viz.* Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Poland, and Italy. The claims may be dismissed as mere grandiose verbiage; but listen also to the royal oath, an indispensable part of the coronation ceremony:

> We . . . by God's grace the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc.; the Apostolic King of Hungary in our quality of eternal and Apostolic King of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia swear to the living God, the blessed Virgin Mary, and all the saints to attach ourselves to the maintenance of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rights, prerogatives, liberties, and privileges, to the maintenance of the laws, of the good old customs established by the Churches of God, of the sovereignty of Hungary, Croatia, Dalmatia, and all the ecclesiastical as well as lay populations of this country; to serve everybody with justice; to watch over and maintain the integrity of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, of their constitutions, of their legal independence and territorial integrity as well as of the integrity and constitution of Hungary and of *the political unity which this country forms with Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia;* not to alienate or restrain the frontiers of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia . . . but to enlarge and increase them; to accomplish everything We can do in just title for the common good, and in the interest and glory and consolidation of this country; may God and all Saints help Us therein.[5]

The Little Entente fears a Hapsburg restoration, in Austria or Hungary or both, for the simplest of reasons: the enormous magnetic attraction which a Catholic monarchy in Central Europe would exert toward Catholic Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, Catholic Croatia in Jugoslavia, and partly Catholic Transylvania in Rumania. It was long a dream of that great clerical, Monsignor Seipel, to create such a Danubian papal bloc. Undoubtedly Slovaks and Croats and Transylvanians remember the absolutism, the parochialism, the oppressive reaction of the old empire; the Croats have not forgotten the Friedjung trial and the Slovaks know that President Masaryk is one of them; the minorities have not forgotten the Hapsburg policy of national enslavement. Nevertheless a reconstituted empire would be a mortal affront to the unity and happiness of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Jugoslavia.

The attitude of Italy, on which much depends, is obscure. The Italians still adhere to the sound and mellow foreign policy of sitting astride the fence as long as possible. Much rumor has gone about that Otto may marry the Princess Maria, the King of Italy's youngest daughter; Italy might seek to cement its political ties with Hungary, as with Bulgaria, by a marital connection. The Vatican undoubtedly supports a restoration. The Pope and Mussolini are all-powerful advisers of Chancellor Dollfuss, and already Italy, Hungary, and Austria are bound by a sort of would-be Triple Alliance. On the other hand, the Hapsburgs have been the hereditary enemies of Italian expansionist policy in the Balkans. Italy fought to destroy the Hapsburg empire, and officially, up to the present, Mussolini has frowned on Otto's claims.

[5] "Central European Observer," November 14, 1930 (italics mine).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France, it is commonly said, would not object too hotly to a restoration, even though the allies of France in the Little Entente so decisively oppose it. The French feel that Otto in Budapest and in Vienna would be a permanent dam across the Danube, preventing German encroachments in middle Europe. Return of the Hapsburgs would — theoretically — be the best possible antidote to a Nazi revival of the theme of *Drang nach Osten*. To keep Hitler out of Austria, France — and even Italy — might consent to a Hapsburg restoration. But this would mean sacrificing the Little Entente.

"It is not sentimental reasons or feelings of hatred to, or aversion from, this Dynasty which dictate our standpoint of uncompromising opposition to a return of the Hapsburgs," Dr. Beneš said in a speech on the Austrian problem not long ago. "It is our conviction that a Hapsburg restoration would signify a permanent, never-ceasing struggle for the heritage of the former Empire, everlasting intrigues, the persecution, bribery, and corruption of the population of the former territories of the Empire, the development of new forms of irridentism and revision campaigns, attempts to win Croatia from Jugoslavia, numbers of Slovak districts from Czechoslovakia, and Transylvania from Rumania — in short, a never-ceasing struggle and nowhere peace. I repeat: The Hapsburgs in Central Europe mean that there will never be peace or quiet. That is the final word of the Little Entente countries."

It is possible for a legitimist sympathizer to say, of course, that Otto locally restored in Austria would mean nothing of the sort. Otto in Austria, the only place where a restoration is at the moment possible, would not mean — necessarily — recreation of the empire, either in spirit or substance. Otto in Austria, if he is sensible, will be quiet internationally as a mouse. Nevertheless the recrudescence of the Hapsburg movement is a distinct reversion to a past Europe had hoped it was rid of. To brandish Otto as a stick against Hitler is like mobilizing the sixteenth century to fight the twentieth. A Hapsburg king in 1934 in Vienna is an almost grotesque anomaly. It is a depressingly backward gesture. Let Dr. Beneš have the last word: "The World War was not waged that we might go back to former times."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



WHERE RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE INTERESTS MEET

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE STRATEGY OF ANOTHER RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

By T. J. Betts

THE inevitability and the imminence of an armed conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union are both of them matters open to doubt; and this writer is among the most skeptical. But if such a war comes, its initial course can be predicted with considerable confidence. Three underlying factors would in particular condition its character.

First of all, the initial blow would be struck by Japan. From the Russian point of view, delay is most advantageous. Each day that the stroke can be averted means a stronger, more efficient Red army at the front and a more solid industrial organization at the rear. In addition, the Soviet leaders know perfectly well the domestic advantages of a defensive war, as well as the international value of establishing a clear-cut case of aggression against their opponents. It is obvious Russian policy to postpone and await the shock.

Secondly, a Russo-Japanese war would have few naval implications. Japan's fleet is dominant in the Far East; and Russian activity at sea would be limited to minor submarine operations out of Vladivostok. Under-sea craft are reported at that port, and their forays would have considerable value in keeping Japanese war vessels at a distance, particularly aircraft carriers, and in raiding the water communications between Japan and the mainland. On the other hand, Russia's European coasts are plainly beyond Japan's reach. The two countries are alike invulnerable by sea. Thus, in the broadest sense, neither antagonist can apply military-economic pressure on the other, and any blockage of imports must be achieved through political, not armed action.

The third point requires more elaboration. It turns about the fact that the potential theatre of war is dominated by what is called the Baikal region. Lake Baikal is nested in a complex of mountains stemming out of the mid-Asiatic ranges, which in turn have to their east the dry moat of the Central Asian deserts. The Baikal mass is prolonged to the north-east by the Vitim plateau. Parallel to this massif, and hovering above the Trans-Siberian railway, run the Yablonoi mountains, vulnerable to flank attacks, but still a formidable strategic obstacle. Japanese

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military tenure north and west of Manchuria would be insecure so long as hostile forces could roll out from or around this barrier. A Japanese victory without its possession would be sterile. On the other hand, there is no conceivable need of Japan's advancing further afield. The Baikal region is just as effective a barrier against an advance from the west as it is against a thrust from the east. To push west of the mountain mass would lengthen Japanese communications without any compensating strategic advantages. For the Japanese, then, a successful war means the prompt capture of the Baikal region. For the Russians, the essentials of ultimate victory are contained in the defense of this territory. It is the decisive zone of a Russo-Japanese conflict.

The picture is both clarified and elaborated by an understanding of conditions east of the Baikal region and north and west of the Manchurian border. This vast territory has practically no industrial development and is served by a single railway, the Trans-Siberian, and its extension the Ussuri railroad. No unified system of motor roads exists and the capacity of air transport is slight. Over the railway must be transported practically every weapon and every pound of powder used by the Russian army in Eastern Asia. If the Trans-Siberian is cut permanently anywhere east of Baikal, the resistance of the Russian troops eastward of the break is limited to the duration of their munitions supply; for there is no reasonable likelihood of its replenishment. Now this section of the Trans-Siberian is peculiarly vulnerable to Japanese thrusts. Vladivostok itself is only a hundred miles from the Korean border. At Pogranichnaya and Manchouli Japanese-controlled railways stand ready to pour armies into Siberia. Another railroad is creeping toward Aigun. The natural corridor of the Sungari river is pointed squarely at Habarovsk. The plan of the Russians to construct a railway from Verkhne-Udinsk southward toward Kiakhta indicates how sensitive they are to the threat of an advance across the Mongolian plains. Eastern Siberia cannot be held by the Russians against a Japanese advance in force. For the former, as for the latter, the Baikal region is the decisive zone.

Does this mean that, in a war with Japan, the Russian army would retire incontinently to the mountains, giving up a thousand miles of foreground without a blow? Hardly. Elementary strategy rules that an opponent should be brought up against the final defense position as late and as badly mauled as possible; and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia, committed to a strategy of attrition, would seek all the more to defer the decisive battles. How can the Russians accomplish these missions? Primarily, they can fight a gigantic rear-guard action up the Pacific slope of Siberia. It is certain that they would do so, but the battle, or rather series of battles, would be hampered by the difficult geographic situation already described. In the second place, and at the same time, the Red Army can defend Vladivostok.

That city is strongly fortified; and its mere retention by the Russians would necessarily occupy a Japanese besieging force at least half as large again as its garrison. Blockaded and isolated, its eventual fall would be certain; the length of time it could hold out would be determined primarily by munitions stocks rather than man power. But a prolonged defense there would do much to slow up a Japanese advance to the mountains. Furthermore, Vladivostok's superb harbor with its numerous approaches is a splendid base whence submarines can at least annoy and perhaps seriously hamper the water transfer of troops and munitions from Japan proper to the Asiatic mainland. Finally, Russia's retention of Vladivostok, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian railway, would effectually block an important communications route. And the possession of it by Japan would distribute the military load to be borne by Dairen and the Korean ports. Its importance as fortress, sea-base and terminal is clearly indicated by the steady reports as to its fortification in the last two years. In terms of the old bi-dimensional warfare, it is reasonable to suppose that there would be created here a rough analogy to the first Russo-Japanese war, with Vladivostok taking the place of Port Arthur. The injection of aviation into this situation serves to intensify it and to modify it, not fundamentally but still profoundly.

It is here necessary to digress and to compare the rival air forces of the Soviet Union and of Japan. Russia is able to concentrate (and apparently has sent to the Far East) some five hundred airplanes, of which more than forty and less than a hundred are heavy, long-distance bombers. Japan has in the neighborhood of a thousand military and naval planes ready and suitable for combat. Both forces are unproved, but their quality may be assumed to be good. While the two nations are deficient in anti-aircraft weapons, it will be shown that the lack weighs more heavily against the Japanese.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Much has been said about the vulnerability of Japanese cities, built of wood and paper. Significantly enough, this danger of incendiarism via the air, afterwards dwelt upon so elaborately by the whole "horror school" of writers on modern war, was first pointed out by Japanese who were interested in increased military budgets. In the opinion of this writer, wholesale and indiscriminate bombing of Japanese population centers may be discounted. None can be more deeply versed in the psychology of peoples at war than the rulers of present-day Russia. None can attach more importance to this factor. The cardinal aim of Moscow should be not the defeat, but the repulse of the Japanese armies. It should look for victory, not on the field of battle, but in the hearts of the Japanese people. Its aim should be to create a war-weary and demoralized nation, ripe for a social upheaval, rather than to break the Japanese armies in action. It should seek to numb its opponents rather than to sting them into a passionate resistance. Air attacks from Vladivostok against Japan proper eventually must cease with the fall of that stronghold; freed from the aerial menace, the citizens of Nippon would remember past Russian "outrages" without fear of their repetition. And on the absolute scale, the ability of a hundred bombing planes to destroy even one city in the period of their tactical life cannot be conceded. For these reasons, the indiscriminate unleashing of aerial destruction against the civilian population of Japan seems most unlikely.

Furthermore, the potential theatre of war offers splendid opportunities to an alert Russian air force based on the Vladivostok area and operating against purely military objectives. In that region it is on the flank of the whole Japanese communications zone. Munitions factories in Japan proper (as distinguished from towns as the object of indiscriminate attack), the Korean ports, Dairen, the railroad ganglions of Mukden, Hsinching (Changchun) and Harbin, all these are within its range. By properly selecting points of aerial attack, the Russians could seriously impede, if not dislocate, the smooth forward flow of Japanese supplies, munitions and reserves. More than that, if they were skilfully led the Russians might be able to immobilize for the period of their action most of the Japanese aviation. Japan's deficiencies in anti-aircraft material have been noted already. Given a few successful air attacks on scattered vital centers, the temptation to Japan would be to use aerial units for local defense, resulting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the dispersion of forces, the ineffective protection of any one locality and the possible crippling of Japanese aviation in the fighting zones. Finally, Japan cannot be sure of being able to coop up the Russian air forces in the Vladivostok area. As the Japanese ring closes in on the fortress, they can always fly away, even if not at their pre-war strength.

The potentialities of aviation thus enhance the value of the Vladivostok area to Russia. The necessities of air warfare also complicate the problems of the defense. Military airplanes spend three-fourths of their time on the ground. When not in flight they are peculiarly vulnerable to air attack. The result is that they must be dispersed in small groups, usually of twenty or thirty planes, to evade observation, to assure quick take-offs and to minimize losses. This means the provision of a large number of flying fields — already occupied, ready for occupancy, and even dummy fields to mislead the enemy. The fields must be near railways or motor roads if the planes are to be fueled and munitioned. They cannot be too close together, or the effects of defensive dispersion are lost. Consequently, the maintenance of a Russian air force around Vladivostok implies the defense of a whole area rather than of a fortress. Where possibly 50,000 soldiers could fulfill the mission of Vladivostok in bi-dimensional war, its defense as an air base should require in the neighborhood of three times that number of troops.

While Russia's air objective clearly would be the Japanese supply and transportation systems, equally obviously Japanese aviation would seek to find and destroy the Russian air force. If the Soviet flying fields were widely dispersed, that fact would tend to prevent any sweeping blows; and Russian anti-aircraft defense, being limited to relatively small areas, should be more intense and hence more effective than Japan's. There always remains the chance already suggested that the initial air attacks from Vladivostok might be so effective as to pin the Japanese aviation down to local defense missions at a great number of scattered points; but this is an ultimate possibility and by no means probable. Some may hold that Japan's first move, coinciding with or preceding the declaration of war, would be a swift blow at the Russian air bases, that the torpedo boats which crept into Port Arthur harbor on February 8, 1904, would have modern counterparts in wheeling squadrons of sun-blazoned attack planes which would carry the news of war in the fragmentation bombs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that they drop on a grounded Russian aery. Such a belief is logical, but it overlooks the fact that the Soviet air force is not tied down to the Vladivostok area until it commences operations. Before that time it is only necessary to have flying fields in readiness; they do not have to be occupied. So far as can be ascertained from press reports, the bulk of Russian aviation is at present held well to the west and north of Kavarovsk.

On the basis of the foregoing data it is now possible to envisage the first phase of a Russo-Japanese war, on the assumption that conditions were substantially what they are today and that no other Power were involved. The task is undertaken in all diffidence. Men do not plan alike, and nothing is more certain in war than that events seldom happen as planned. The best that can be claimed for the next paragraph is that it is rational; but for that very reason it can predict neither blunders nor inspirations on one side or the other. What is related is what could happen, not what would or should happen.

The war opens with a Japanese aerial attack on what Japan hopes is the grounded and defenseless Russian air force. Some destruction is effected, but the Red aerial fleet is not crippled. Japan blockades Vladivostok and institutes a naval patrol of the whole eastern Siberian coast. Almost simultaneously the ground forces come into contact. The Russian mobilization is revealed as having two centers of gravity. One is around Vladivostok, and defends certainly as far north as Pogranichnaya, possibly to Kavarovsk. The second pivots around Chita, but its lighter concentrations extend to the east of Blagoveshchensk. From the Korean-Siberian frontier, along each of the railways radiating out from Harbin, through Jehol and Urga toward Kiakhta, Japanese columns plunge outward. From Japan proper her mobilized armies stream across the sea, first reinforcing the columns on the march, then forming a strategic reserve to exploit any crack which may be opened in the long Russian line. Despite aerial and submarine interference, that tide flows on. Russian resistance is fiercest around its two centers of gravity. The Red armies roll back sullenly, toward Vladivostok and the Baikal massif respectively. There is much hard fighting, no disaster. Finally the Japanese are fifty-odd miles from Vladivostok. The Russian air force, worn down to half its initial strength, leaves the doomed fortress. Japanese generals heave a sigh of relief. After hardships and uncertainties, the Russian air force, still a coherent entity, rejoins

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the main Soviet army now concentrated in the Baikal area. That army has been hard pressed but not disorganized. It has inflicted greater losses than it has received. The Trans-Siberian railway, under full load and overload, rushes replacements of men and supplies. Against it is arrayed the maximum power of Japan. It is now at least six months, at most a year, since the outbreak of hostilities. The armies are in the decisive zone. Now, and only now, can the answer be sought to the question: Can Russia hold Baikal?

The completion of the series of operations which may be described together as the battle for the foreground of Eastern Asia necessitates no evaluation of the relative strengths of the opposing forces. This is for the simple reason that the Russians, being concerned with prolonged resistance, delaying actions, and possible ruptures of communications, would seek naturally to allot the minimum of man-power required to utilize the munitions and equipment in the area. Meanwhile the Japanese find their forces strengthened by their favorable strategic situation. It is unnecessary to delve into either the dynamics or the psychology of war to perceive that they can sweep the Russians back to the main battle position. But once there, the adversaries are arrayed against each other and committed to the maximum sustained effort for decision. What are their relative effective strengths?

Qualitatively there is little to choose between the two armies. With the exception of aviation, neither is modern in the complete sense of the word. Each is short of artillery, mechanical combat vehicles and motor transportation; each has an imperfectly developed staff and command system. Both are traditionally brave and devoted, so far as individual soldiers are concerned. In a struggle such as is being considered, each army would assume the rôle for which it is best qualified by psychology and training: the Japanese on the offensive, the Russian in defense. In doctrine, the Japanese propensity to emphasize personal factors to the detriment of material is counterbalanced by a certain rigidity in current Russian tactical practice. All in all, man for man and unit for unit, the balance hangs very true.

The quantitative analysis of the opposing forces is another story, and that story cannot be told by a simple reference to available man-power. It is estimated that Japan, with two million trained men, can maintain at most a fighting force of some nine hundred thousand. At the outbreak of war she would logically set aside some three hundred thousand as home garrison, as stiffening

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for Manchurian troops along her communications, and as a potential expeditionary force to keep China quiet. Probably this initial subtraction from the field armies could gradually be made good. If the garrison troops were not called upon for operations, did not expend ammunition nor wear out equipment, the munitions, material and supplies produced for them could be devoted to the mobilization of an additional three hundred thousand for service in the theatre of war. Again, the Vladivostok operation would call for a detachment of from 150,000 to 250,000 men, with a tendency toward the higher number. The initial force deployed in the westward thrust would thus be from 350,000 to 450,000 men, probably nearer the former than the latter figure. But as the war progressed, the flow of reinforcements to the main army would continue. The replacements of the home garrison would come in a steady stream. Commitments around Vladivostok could be reduced to 50,000 men. As the Japanese prepared for the crucial assaults around Baikal, their man-power at the front might be prophesied to be 750,000 (a figure reached by subtracting the 50,000 men in the eastern Siberian garrison, and the wastage of 100,000 due to casualties not immediately replaced, from the 900,000 available in the theatre of war).

It will be noted that no provision has been made for Manchurian, Korean or colonial levies. The reason is clear. Japan is not limited by man-power but by her ability to maintain soldiers. The bottle neck by which her men must pass to the armies is economic, or rather fiscal. She can keep only 900,000 effectives in the combat zone and obviously would choose them from her own rather than from subject races.

Russia, too, has a bottle neck, but it is physical rather than fiscal. The Red army at peace strength numbers in excess of 700,000. Presumably a complete mobilization could bring six million men to the colors. Nor can there be any question of her ability to arm, supply and equip soldiers by the millions, given her control of industry, her ability to disregard the orthodox problems of finance, and her urge — her mania — for production. But before these millions may fight, they must reach the front; and once there they must be munitioned and supplied. Practically every man, some of his food, and all of his weapons and their missiles must travel on a narrow double strand of steel. The strength and efficiency of the Russian army in the decisive zone is a function of the capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now this capacity is something which it is very difficult to estimate. In its calculation there must be included many other factors than the sheer ability of trains to shuttle back and forth between Lake Baikal and the Soviet centers of war industry and population. Car and locomotive supply, operating efficiency, the friction attendant on long hauls and, above all, terminal and unloading facilities, all play an enormous part; and about these there is little accurate information available. In the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05, the then single-tracked Trans-Siberian operated with great skill and raised the Russian forces in the Far East from approximately 100,000 men to a strength of 300,000 in a period of less than a year. The latter seemed to be a saturation point; Kuropatkin had some 310,000 men for the final battle of Mukden. The recent double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian should at least quadruple its capacity. Moreover, the hauls are shorter: the center of gravity of the Russian munitions industry has moved appreciably to the eastward since the fall of the Romanoffs, and the Baikal area is a good 1200 miles west of the theatre of the earlier conflict. On the other hand, the demands of modern war for material have also jumped three- and four-fold. With full consciousness of the likelihood of error, the writer nevertheless suggests that Soviet Russia can maintain approximately 400,000 effectives in the Baikal area. The current Russian concentration in the Far East, made in the shadow of war, comes well within this figure.

Let us assume that Russia can maintain and munition a field army 400,000 strong astride the Trans-Siberian. At once the question arises as to why she could not equip a large garrison nucleus of say 150,000 men in the Vladivostok area and cut it adrift; and then, while this detachment was occupying the attention of preponderantly larger Japanese forces, why could she not with her mobile army of 400,000 fall upon the Japanese in northern and western Manchuria while they were numerically inferior or at best of only the same strength? The answer lies on the map. Such an attack, to preserve its communications, must be frontal, down the Chinese Eastern Railway. It would be asking the Russians to batter against the Khingan mountains with certainly inadequate numbers, to place themselves in the position which they hope the Japanese would assume with reference to the Baikal area. In the operations in the Asiatic foreground we can expect local Russian counter attacks certainly, a counter offensive only

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

if justified by events, and an initial offensive not at all. The more the problem is examined, the more clearly its basic elements stand out: a successful, if arduous Japanese advance to the Baikal region and there the battle, or rather a series of battles, for the decision.

What can be said of these culminating operations? Can the Russians make good their stand around the great lake? Numerically they would be inferior, the odds against them ranging from at least three to two to almost two to one. In aviation also they should be weaker if they have used their air force boldly in the first phase of the war. They are committed to the defense of a single area, and it is a military truism that any one position can be captured. But they would possess the advantages of position, of being on the defensive in rough and broken country, with great opportunities for organization in depth and for powerful counter attacks. Also, the communications dilemma of the first phase is partially reversed. Japanese supply movements would be constricted by the bottle neck of a captured section of the Trans-Siberian, and their lateral road net, north and south, would have to be improvised. On the other hand, with the Okhotsk railway creeping away from the Trans-Siberian to north and east, and with at least the temporary use of a line from Verkhne-Udinsk to Kiakhta, the Russian reserves and supplies could be shuffled rapidly and scientifically between critical points. All in all, a certain superiority must be assigned the Japanese; but it is far from overwhelming and it must be remembered that wars are not fought *in vacuo* nor decided in staff map rooms.

In a war in the near future between the Soviet Republics and Japan the military objectives of both Powers are not orthodox or identical. Neither seeks the classical formula, "the destruction of the enemy's will to resist." The Japanese must achieve the conquest of a single section of terrain, vast and distant, yet limited. There can be no question for them of the annihilation of Russia's armed power or the overawing of her continent-wide populace. The Russian aim is simply to cripple the Japanese will to attack, to sap Japan financially, economically and morally as well as militarily. If they attain this they have victory, even if their lines rock and stagger around Baikal. For the Japanese, then, even from the purely military point of view, there must be combined with the chance of defeat on the battlefield — unlikely but still possible — another chance, more formidable, of defeat by attrition.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We have now reached the boundaries of the military province in considering the potentialities of a Russo-Japanese war. Beyond lies the domain of the political writer. Yet perhaps a soldier may be permitted to look across that very narrow and badly delimited line. It would seem that, as things stand today, Japan holds a certain balance of force and a likelihood, but by no means a certainty, of victory in battle. Against this she must weigh, if not her existence, at least her institutions and her social order. The odds are disproportionate to the stake. A chance which it seemed obligatory to take when the Tsar's bayonets sparkled on the shores of the Gulf of Pechili does not invite to action, least of all single-handed, when the Soviet war planes drone no nearer than the Amur.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FUTURE OF FRENCH DEMOCRACY

By Edouard Herriot

IT IS easy enough to understand why friends of liberty and of democratic institutions all over the world should be looking anxiously in the direction of France. Since the early part of the year our country has been racked by such a serious crisis, there has been such an uproar, discussion has been so violent and bitter, that people abroad must quite legitimately wonder whether liberty is not in danger. That would be a matter of grave concern not only to France herself but to all Europe — even, I might say without exaggeration, to humanity at large. If the parliamentary system, if democratic institutions, were to go bankrupt in the homeland of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, so spectacular a reversal would have a profound effect on the very fabric of the modern world.

Despite all appearances to the contrary, I may hasten to give assurances that no such peril is really to be feared. To be convinced of the truth of what I say, one must try to grasp — coolly, objectively, apart and aside from political passions — what the crisis of the Sixth of February really was. The fact that emerges not only from the mass of testimony collected by the Investigating Commission but from my direct personal observation, is that the movement which that evening developed such violent pressure in the Place de la Concorde was brought on by *two distinct forces* which at that moment happened to come together and act in the same direction.

One of those forces was unmistakably hostile to the Republic. It inspired and brought together elements centering around the *Action Française*, men who have never concealed their hostility to the present régime. But if the demonstration had been confined to those elements, which at the most represent a few thousands of individuals in the whole of France, it could have been handled very easily. The trouble came from the fact that the other force, a force of far greater weight, was backed by large numbers of citizens who were disgusted with the impotence of Parliament and had been aroused to indignation by recent scandals. For days previous, the mails had been bringing me stacks of letters which made me quite aware of the state of mind of that important body of citizens. The people turned out into the streets

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at first because they were feeling the pinch of the business depression. When human beings are unhappy they readily become mischievous. The French masses wanted Parliament to do something about their distress — just what was not so clear. They had been observing that for almost two years ministry after ministry had been overthrown without succeeding in balancing the budget, the basic premise of public order in a free country. When they discovered that mistakes in policies, untimely quarrels, party bickerings had been aggravated by downright dishonesty, their rage exploded.

Whatever one may say of the French people, it is an honest people, an upright people. It can be misled, and I believe it was very much misled on the matter of the war debts. I paid for its ignorance on that score by the fall of my ministry. But the French are accustomed to hard work and to saving. They very properly demand strict honesty on the part of their representatives. The Stavisky scandal outraged them; and their feelings were exaggerated and embittered from day to day by partisan quarreling. At last the middle-class Frenchman "went out into the street." He was represented there by those who had fought in the war, who were unwilling that their sufferings should have been in vain and, who insisted on a change. The placards carried in the demonstrations read "We want a clean Republic!" and "Down with corruption!" As I see it, the crisis of February sixth was brought on by the very attachment of the majority of Frenchmen to the republican ideal. Instinctively, vaguely, but no less resolutely, the rioters in the vast majority were defending the indisputable thesis propounded by Montesquieu long ago when he said that a republic must rest on the application to public life of the great laws of morality and have at its core — virtue.

I have had to make this diagnosis in order to determine by impartial analysis the actual truth about the present state of mind of the French people. One further observation will be in order. In February certain differences both of feeling and conduct were to be noted between the French capital and the French provinces. Those differences were real enough, and became apparent as early as February 8 and 9. Believing that the Republic was threatened, the *départements* began organizing. Meetings were held all over — the first, I think, being those in the south, at Auch and Lorient.

In case fascism, the spirit of dictatorship, had made a real

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drive for power — which in any case the absence of any recognized leadership rendered virtually out of the question — we can feel quite sure that the French provinces would have reacted vigorously. That was the import of the demonstration of February 12; the deliberate cessation of labor could only be taken as a warning on the part of the French democrats to anyone who might try to promote trouble from fascist motives. However, even if one must note climatic or temperamental differences between Paris and the provinces in the strength of democratic convictions, I do not believe that the Republic was seriously — much less permanently — threatened on February 6, even in Paris.

It would have been if measures had not been taken to meet public demands and calm public exasperation. The appeal to M. Doumergue to take charge, and his acceptance, enabled the government to avoid a breakdown which in the prevailing state of mind might have entailed serious consequences. The personality of the former President of France played a distinct part in the direction of quiet. There was nothing instantaneous about it. The "de-effervescence," so to speak, was much less rapid than had been the case in 1926, in the time of M. Poincaré — a time that is, when the country was prosperous. But M. Doumergue's good nature, his imperturbable coolness, his refusal to get excited, his shrewd and farsighted wisdom, gently lowered even the oratorical tension, and from day to day excitement gradually died away.

I must not be misunderstood. The optimism I voice in these pages does not blind me to the dangers that democratic ideas are called upon to face in many countries, ours included. The concept of democracy is at the same time juridical and moral. Its ideal is equality; it proclaims justice; it is based on the enrichment of human personality. Unfortunately, for a century or more, machinery (a slave that is today in revolt), money, the power of the economic factor in human life, have been entangling human liberty in an ever and ever tighter net. Facts, figures — things without souls — have been tending to stifle ideas. The people publicly expresses its desires through its assemblies. The power of money and business seems momentarily to be vanquished and to submit. But let the apparently favorable moment come — financial difficulties, as in 1925 and 1926, scandals, as in 1933. At once it resumes its offensive and drives forward; and the drive is toward dictatorship. The invisible is ever threatening the visi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ble. That is what has made the victory of the Left so precarious in France, though it was a triumph expressly willed by the majority of the country. A pessimist might say that political liberty, in the full meaning of the term, has ceased to exist. The news that is given to the public is itself colored and doctored. How many Frenchmen are there today who have any accurate knowledge of the essential elements in what has been called "the Roosevelt experiment?" It is a sad thing to note that the powerful instruments that have been devised by science for the dissemination of knowledge have at times tended to serve and strengthen falsehood rather than truth.

If they are to hold their own, our democracies have a great effort to make. They must, first and foremost, maintain order. They must fight against their worst enemy, which is demagoguery, elder sister to dictatorship. If legislatures are not far-sighted enough to discipline themselves, if they refuse to bow to the exigencies of the times, dictatorship will triumph. Liberty must learn to be more courageous than dictatorship. It was in deference to that truth that, in the government at present in power in France, men who were adversaries yesterday joined hands to make a common defense of two essential things: the maintenance of the Republic, and the security of France.

That association has so far yielded excellent results. The strength of our government bonds is enough evidence by itself. But we cannot stop there. We cannot stop even at planning and executing far-reaching social reforms. We must go deeper. In order that the Republic may live beyond peradventure we must transform it, rejuvenate it.

That is not an easy task. Last year M. Raymond Poincaré set forth his ideas on that subject in a magazine article.[1] He expressed his hostility to any revision of the Constitution of 1875 — as the phrase goes, "the trip to Versailles," where the French constituent assembly meets. Why? Because, said he, even those who agree that the Constitution has to be revised do not agree as to the nature of the revision. M. Poincaré, for his part, is unwilling that the deputies should be deprived of their right to initiative in matters of finance. "In both England and France," he notes, "the question of budgetary prerogative has always been the main cause of revolutionary movements. Are we to be set back hundreds and hundreds of years? Few re-

[1] *L'Illustration*, April 29, 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

publicans will lend themselves to any such reversion to habits of the past." M. Poincaré thinks, and courageously says, that it is the duty of the executive to oppose abuses and mistakes on the part of the people's representatives, but that "the prerogatives of the Chamber in matters of finance constitute the very essence of democratic and representative government." Once again I find myself in agreement with M. Poincaré. As he sees it, the main cause of the difficulties we are in at present does not lie in the Constitution. It lies in the rules of procedure in the Chamber, in the practice of giving excessive powers to big committees and commissions. All we have to do is change those rules. In addition, I can see great advantages in reducing the number of deputies. A Chamber of six hundred members is always in danger of turning into a mere public meeting.

And shall we demand a new election system? I am very skeptical, personally, on that point. What is involved here is a question of forms rather than of substance. I have seen our electoral laws changed many many times and never with any appreciable advantage. A country that looks for a cure in a new method of balloting reminds me of a person who has serious trouble with his stomach and hastens to change his cook.

I attach much more importance to a regulation of the relations between government and business. In the severe international competition that prevails today a country cannot hold its own unless it subjects itself to a nation-wide discipline. The Soviets have grasped that fact and have proceeded to a methodical and rational organization (as I tried to describe in my recent book). There can be no doubt that France is suffering from an excess of individualism incompatible with the necessity of regulating the general organization of the world. In 1929 I created the "Economic Council." Its work still remains uncoördinated with the economic activity of the nation at large. Yet the political world and the economic world have somehow to be brought into communication.

In that indispensable association, I believe, the leadership should lie with the political. If the statesman ignores the economic field a lack of balance at once occurs, and economics takes its revenge and sets up a dictatorship. On the other hand, if economics gets the superiority, then statistics, facts, money, machinery, soon come to oppress human individuality. The outstanding problem of our time, in an intelligent effort to safeguard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civilization, is to find a place for economics in a broadened and renovated governmental system.

Political power must keep its eye upon the different aspects of that process of integration, it must find ways to reconcile the rights and duties of its executive agents (in other words, of the public officials) with the higher rights of the state. "*L'état, c'est nous!*" It must find the proper place for those trade or syndical organizations which guarantee protection to the workingman against possible abuses by the employer. Nothing, however, can lessen or eliminate the governing statesman's need to grasp situations as a whole, intelligently and with a sense of responsibility.

If France recognizes the force of those laws, as I believe she is willing to do, there is nothing to fear as regards the future of the Republic. We had the Boulangist movement, and it passed. We had the Panama scandal, and it passed. We had the Dreyfus affair, and it passed. Now we have the Stavisky scandal. It will pass. It will never be said that a rascal, halfway a lunatic, was able to decide the destinies of France. France still remains ardently and deeply republican; and that is a good thing for many countries in Europe that need her example and her support. And there is one more truth that must not be forgotten: the Frenchman is a creature who finds it hard to do easy things, and easy to do difficult things. When all is said and done, the crisis through which the Republic has just passed will prove to have been good for it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FRENCH FINANCIAL OUTLOOK

By Paul Reynaud

IN a period that offers a spectacle of constant and dramatic changes, and charges us a good price for the entertainment, France is contributing an original note. The unexpected and almost offhand rapidity with which she is able to recover her balance is a source of unending astonishment to the world.

Last summer an authoritative American critic voiced the fear that France would be unable to balance her budget and save the franc. Well, within a period measured in weeks, we found the French budget balanced, the railroad deficit halved by the stroke of a pen, French government bonds again soaring, gold streaming back into the Bank of France, American eagles and British sovereigns dropping on exchange as a result of decreased hoarding, and industrial securities again finding buyers in the stock markets. Confidence, in a word, had been restored. And it was done by simple, nay classical, procedures.

Much the same thing has happened again in the three months since the events of the Sixth of February. Then many people abroad felt that an era of unrest and bloodshed might be opening in France. But lo! within two days the "Sage of Tournefeuille," M. Gaston Doumergue, had a national coalition government organized, calm had been restored, and a Chamber that had been upsetting cabinet after cabinet on the financial question was getting ready docilely to authorize the ministry to do by proclamation things that it had been refusing for over two years to do itself.

The matter-of-fact way in which France gets onto her feet after an apparent collapse is somewhat irritating to foreigners who do not grasp the underlying causes of her conduct and are inclined to see something shocking to established usage in her impulsive reversals of form.

II

The present situation goes back to the Sixth of February. A tragic day — and a turning point. That evening a Left majority in the Chamber was giving an impressive vote of confidence to the Daladier ministry. It was its first contact with it. It had done the same with the five preceding ministries, and was again all primed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to overthrow the new government a few weeks later when it would have to deal with the financial problem and try to take action. At that very moment lines of war veterans were marching down the Champs Elysées carrying their battle-flags and singing the Marseillaise. They were headed for the Pont de la Concorde beyond which lay their goal, the Chamber of Deputies. They were young men, afraid of nothing. Unarmed as they were, they dashed upon the cordons of police that were guarding the bridge. The police fired. Blood was shed. The people of Paris turned out *en masse* for the funerals of the victims. There were wounded besides. The notion that unarmed men should be ready to risk their lives for an idea came as a shock, and as a decided comfort, to those who loved France but had come to doubt her.

The thing that was stirring in the veterans was above all a sentiment of outraged honesty, a very powerful emotion in the French population. A fifteen million dollar "swindle" had been made possible, so it seemed, by political complaisance on the Left. A Left ministry had declared itself opposed to the usual investigating commission on which all parties would be represented — the only way of guaranteeing the seriousness of the effort to fix responsibilities. The sense of national pride is strong in Paris, and most of its deputies sit in the Center and on the Right. Paris was disgusted with the impotence of a Chamber that had overturned five governments one after the other in rapid succession. Paris rose in wrath, and the wrath was the more violent because the city had been suffering severely from the dropping off in the tourist trade.

The Daladier ministry collapsed before a wave of popular indignation. And the Left majority, which had broken five governments in twenty months, now was itself broken. The Left majority had held together largely on romantic grounds. The two parties on which it rested — the Radical-Socialist and the Socialist — were in disagreement as to ways and means of dealing with the problems of public finance. The Radical-Socialists had been for some time shifting back and forth between the Right and the Socialists. In the general elections of May 1932 they had made the mistake of striking an alliance with the Socialists without coming to an agreement on the issue of financial reconstruction. After the Sixth of February, they abruptly deserted their allies and combined with the previous opposition to make up a new majority of so-called National Union (it does not include the Socialists, with 130 votes, nor some 20 Communists and others). The manœuvre

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was made possible by calling in an ex-President of France, M. Doumergue. The same thing had been done in July 1926 by calling in M. Poincaré. The Doumergue ministry could boast the two party leaders of Right and Left, M. Tardieu and M. Herriot, both former premiers and now ministers pompously styled "without portfolio." Marshal Pétain became Minister of War. The portfolio of foreign affairs went to an ex-premier, M. Louis Barthou, who away back in 1913 had met the increase in the German army with the three-year service bill.

The first act of the new government was to appoint one commission to get to the bottom of the Stavisky scandal and another to fix responsibilities for the casualties of the February riots. While these commissions were getting to work, a budget was voted in a matter of days instead of a matter of months; then the Government sent Parliament home for a two months' vacation and attacked the problem of balancing the budget, plying the axe of executive decrees to effect reductions in public expenses, the blows falling on office-holders, retired public officials and war pensioners who had been drawing $40 a year in the case of men of 50 years of age, and $80 in the case of men above 55. The war veterans had been accounted the most dangerous, especially after their victory of February 6. M. Doumergue handled them successfully with his smiling good-nature, and the Government was strong enough to issue the decrees which reëstablished budgetary equilibrium.

The Socialist Party had constantly maintained that the reduction of public expense by cuts in the wages and pensions of government employees and veterans would tend to augment the depression by lowering the buying power of those portions of the consuming public. The *C.G.T.* (*Confédération générale du travail*), which is closely connected with the Socialist Party and counts more office-holders than workmen in its membership, opened a campaign against the executive decrees and in favor of organized resistance to them, even making veiled threats of a general strike in the public services to force a reconsideration of them by the Government or Parliament. Some disturbance of routine work actually occurred, particularly in the postal and telegraph departments. The Government was at first considerate, then more or less inclined to be harsh. The agitation came to an end once it became clear to the leaders of the government employees and the *C.G.T.* that public opinion was hostile to any movement of protest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That hostility was natural enough. All producers are having a hard time in France, whether in the mills or on the farms. Wages have been cut to the bone in most branches of industry and commerce, so that a miner today is being paid less than a farm laborer. The young people who are graduating from school, with their diplomas all in order, are finding places closed to them. State employees, on the other hand, are drawing salaries in paper francs that are seven times larger than their wages in gold francs before the war, whereas the franc has fallen only four-fifths. The purchasing power of money has so increased during the past four years that, even with the cut of 10 percent which the decrees made effective, public employees are better off than they were four years ago. Of this they were in general aware, and they also saw that the purchasing power of their salaries would be safeguarded if the budget could be balanced and the franc saved from a new depreciation.

Once the danger of a revolt in the public services had been averted, the effects of the executive decrees began to become manifest. On the Bourse, French government bonds rose rapidly in value; and indeed a continuation of that improvement would seem justified, for whatever one's guess as to the future of the franc, it unquestionably is as solid as the Dutch florin and the Swiss franc. Now Swiss and Dutch government bonds are yielding 4 percent while the French yield 5 percent, which is another way of saying that by comparison the French are undervalued by 25 percent. Foreign gold is meanwhile coming in to the Bank of France, especially from countries such as Italy that belong to the gold bloc. Confidence is returning.

III

Can one therefore conclude that the government of National Union, acting under the aegis of a former President of France, has succeeded in repeating in 1934 the manœuvre which was carried out in 1926, saving wholly and permanently the bad situation created by the mistaken financial policies of the Left? What the National Union has achieved, by the same tactics used in 1926, has been a balanced budget, a revival of confidence in the public finances, and a lessening of tension in the political atmosphere that will be favorable to a resumption of business.

From a technical standpoint, there can be no doubt that the recovery in government bonds means a lower interest rate which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will help manufacturers by lowering manufacturing costs. Holes in the budget had been plugged by preceding governments with a steady stream of loans issued at higher and higher rates of interest. The effect had been not only to increase the fiscal burdens of manufacturers, but to raise interest rates on the money which they had to borrow from the banks. Long-term loans cost almost twice as much in France as in England. Where a French business-man could get the use of a million francs for an interest charge of 80,000 francs his English competitor could get two millions. That handicap on French manufacturing will be reduced in proportion as the restoration of confidence results in lowered interest rates. Meantime, with deposits in the Bank of France increasing, and hoarding coming to an end, the franc is beginning to glitter with a new lustre. The franc is the only stable currency that rests today on a gold reserve of any very considerable proportions; and the stability of French currency and confidence in its future are contributing an atmosphere of security to domestic business.

Such are the immediate advantages procured by the political right-about which France has made in these few weeks past, and by the resultant budgetary reform. The causes of the rejuvenation of spirit have been both political and technical.

All the same, there is no escaping the fact that the situation that M. Doumergue faces today is not the situation that M. Poincaré successfully dealt with in 1926. Then there was no danger in the foreign field: the French treasury was in difficulties, but France was a particularly prosperous country in a prosperous world. The monetary readjustment effected by M. Poincaré doubled the value of the franc within the space of a few months (125 to the pound sterling instead of 248). Nevertheless, the purchasing power of the franc was small abroad and great at home. French industry was therefore well situated for export, since France was the cheapest country in the world to live in. That was a time when it was good luck to be earning dollars in New York and spending francs in Paris.

That situation has now been reversed. France is a ruined country in a ruined world, the ruin in both cases coming from the depression. It is one of the most expensive of all countries to live in today, the purchasing power of the franc being great abroad and small at home. Today it is an advantage to be earning francs in France and spending dollars in New York. The results have been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so disastrous for the French export trade that France showed an unfavorable trade balance of 10 billion francs in 1932 and a similar one in 1933. In certain respects France may view the currency situation with pride, since she is the last large country to possess a stable currency and to allow free entrance and export of gold. But in other respects she has good reason to worry. Her unimpaired franc is a handicap to her in competition on the world market. The dollar has lost 40 percent of its value, the pound 37 percent, the German mark, really, 40 percent, to say nothing of the yen, the drop in which temporarily reinforces the permanent factors now aiding Japanese industry.

A number of people in France, and many abroad, view with alarm the predicament in which French industry is placed by reason of the different levels of manufacturing costs prevailing in France and in other countries. France, they argue, is making a mistake in doggedly holding the franc up instead of bringing it into alignment with other currencies. It is thought that the policy will entail a long period of hardship, and might even eventuate in social disturbances which could easily be avoided by following the example set by many other large countries. An example quoted in this connection is the story of the British seamen who rose in mutiny because of a threat to reduce their pay by 20 percent, while their salaries were cut 37 percent by the devaluation of the pound without their noticing it. How miss the point of such an interesting example, and how fail to follow it? If France does not bow to plain facts, it is said, her gold reserve will gradually be depleted to cover her unfavorable trade balance; this can no longer be made good by coupons collected abroad and by the invisible exports resulting from tourist purchases in France. The franc can not forever bear up under this hemorrhage of gold. What a pity that Frenchmen inevitably associate currency devaluation with their ghastly memories of inflation! The conclusion reached by these observers is that France had better come to her senses and undo a mistake which bleeds her economic system and risks involving her in social disorders.

IV

This thesis of the devaluationists is met with the official French thesis, which runs as follows: It is necessary not to think only of the advantages that would accrue to the Government or to this or that portion of the French population from a policy of devalua-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion, but to view the problem as a whole. Devaluation would undoubtedly be a gain to some; but to the great majority of the French public it would amount to sheer confiscation.

In the first place, it is pointed out, the objectives supposedly to be attained by devaluation are in some degree contradictory. If devaluation is, as many hope, to cause a rise in domestic prices, that will not mean any appreciable or permanent gain for exporters, since the latter will at once find their costs going up. Many industries have to buy their raw materials abroad; indeed, that is so in most cases, the iron industry being a notable exception. Devaluation of the franc will increase the costs of raw materials. Then again, given the way in which labor is at present organized in France, and the fact that most labor agreements are more or less directly based on cost-of-living indices, a rise in domestic prices will force manufacturers — and manufacturers of exports in particular — to raise wages.

But suppose devaluation could be brought about without inflation and without any rise in prices? That, evidently, would put a premium on exporting, and the theoretical result would be to facilitate the sale of French products on foreign markets. But that advantage may prove illusory. It must not be forgotten that if French exports are now in difficulties the fact is largely due to the innumerable restrictions (tariffs, embargoes, quotas, transfer restrictions) in force against French products. Devaluation of the franc would tend to make those burdens heavier and so to prevent the premium on exports from materializing.

Furthermore, the export trade of a country is not the only thing to be considered. The measure proposed would certainly result in a falling off of imports, French purchasing power being reduced. Now is that result altogether desirable? Leaving aside the damage done to importers and to ports of entry, we can be sure that exporters would also be hit before long. In the last analysis, in all international trading, products and services are matched against products and services. If imports fall off, foreign purchasing power as regards French products is bound also to fall off, and French exports will eventually — in fact very soon — fall off in their turn.

But, as a matter of fact, the assumption that the franc can be devalued without any rise in domestic prices is purely theoretical. The example of the United States does not apply in this connection. To be sure, American prices have not risen in any degree

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

corresponding to the devaluation of the dollar; but that fact is determined by two circumstances peculiar to the American situation:

1. The raw materials which the United States is obliged to buy abroad are relatively insignificant in comparison with its domestic supplies. In a country like France, on the other hand, where raw materials are largely imported, any lowering in currency values would at once show its effects in the prices of raw materials and consequently in the prices of finished products.

2. The American public has not yet realized clearly the consequences that will follow the devaluation of the dollar. The American experiment is still in its initial stages, and no one can foresee what the reaction is going to be when the costs involved in the Roosevelt experiment become apparent in an increased public debt, an unbalanced budget (with a tendency to remain so permanently) and a depletion of the nation's liquid funds.

In France, then, a devaluation of the franc, even if not accompanied by an increase in the volume of money in circulation, would result in higher prices on all articles containing imported raw materials. But that is not all. The French public has not forgotten the effects which inflation and the drop in the franc had on prices between 1919 and 1926. Everybody remembers that currency devaluation meant an increase in the cost of living and that its practical effect was to lessen the bank note's purchasing power. In these circumstances, any devaluation of the 1928 franc would be interpreted as a prelude to a new period of depreciated currency. The psychological reactions of that are beyond prediction. The public would have a right to conclude that if a devaluation of 5 percent or 10 percent was possible, there would be nothing to prevent a new devaluation if the first did not achieve all that was expected of it by those who stood to gain by it — as would certainly be the case. That feeling would be very hard to overcome. Thus devaluation would profoundly disturb the mechanism of exchange.

Undoubtedly the paper notes now being hoarded would issue from their hiding places, and the holders would try to forestall further reductions in money values by purchases of real values. So far as such notes were applied to the purchase of merchandise, they would contribute to a rise in prices; but a considerable portion of them would doubtless go abroad in the form of foreign securities, and the nation's liquid funds would be reduced by that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much. There can be no assurance that hoarded savings would be spent. On the contrary, experience proves that the threat of monetary depreciation provokes an active search for investments in real values, especially abroad.

Even assuming that hoarded money would go into consumption, the advantage could only be temporary, based on an extravagant use of purchasing power long held in reserve. Meantime, new savings would be going abroad and so depleting the volume of floating capital. In order to keep the balance and to replenish the supply of ready money, notes would simply have to be printed without real security — in other words, there would be inflation pure and simple. All that one can at present make out from the first results of devaluing the dollar confirms the impression that the effects of such measures on a nation's economy and on the general trend of business are on the whole disappointing.

Partisans of devaluation might, to be sure, meet the argument just outlined with the objection that prices might nevertheless be maintained with a much lower volume of money in circulation, since the velocity of circulation would be speeded up. That is very doubtful. Though the flight from money might increase the velocity of circulation, the creation of monetary suspicions would damage private credit, in other words, diminish the circulation of capital. Who would lend money when values might fluctuate widely between the time the loan was made and the date of repayment? And the weakening of credit, meantime, would occasion serious embarrassments to banks and savings' funds, which would be asked to repay depositors. As a result, business concerns would be unable to make loans, interest rates would rise, and that would not only increase production costs, but in many cases put enterprises out of business and contribute to unemployment.

Even that is not the whole story, nor the worst of it. Devaluation would reduce the assets of everybody who heretofore has made loans either in France or abroad. In the case of credits to French citizens, the creditor would lose while the debtor would gain, and that would involve a mere transfer of purchasing power from creditor to debtor. But in the case of credits to foreigners, the operation would represent a loss to the French community as a whole and an advantage to the debtor, who could clear himself in depreciated currency. Devaluation would pare down the assets of everybody living on fixed incomes, and especially of bond-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

holders, who are not in a position — as salaried people are — to exact compensation.

In general terms, and quite aside from the moral effects, devaluation would reduce the purchasing power of a large group of consumers, both by the rise in domestic prices that would result from increased interest rates and by the failure of fixed or semi-fixed incomes to adjust themselves. So the effort to procure new outlets for French products abroad would only close ready-made outlets at home.

In a word, currency devaluation would not, by itself, solve any of the problems that face the country at the present time; it would merely shift them about and aggravate them. For anybody at present holding francs it would be outright confiscation; and it would destroy the confidence required for the normal functioning of credit. It would strike such a devastating blow to public and private credit and occasion such an exodus of capital from the country that one may well ask whether, after such a shock, the gold standard could long continue to function at a new level of parity. Devaluation would therefore involve the risk of placing the country on the road to a period of monetary disorder, monetary anarchy, from which, in the final accounting, the speculator would be the only gainer. It would put the seal of ruin on everybody who has hitherto trusted the honesty and the pledged word of the state.

Devaluation of the franc would, finally, encourage other countries to devaluate their moneys and start a race in depreciation which would tend to intensify the present confusion. Those who look with favor upon a devaluation of European currencies on the basis of the pound, and especially of those currencies that do not suffer from the causes that weakened the pound in 1931, fail to perceive that this policy would involve England, for example, in very serious embarrassments. British prices would again become too high as compared with continental prices, and England would be faced with the same problem of adaptation which she encountered between 1925 and 1931 and which she solved very unsatisfactorily by cutting her domestic prices and costs of production. If one compares export percentages for the various countries between 1929 and 1933, one notes that England has barely held her own, improving her figures from 10.74 to 10.93, and the United States has experienced a falling off from 15.61 to 11.53; whereas the countries of the gold bloc all show improvements,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France moving from 5.95 to 6.50, Germany from 9.72 to 10.40, the Netherlands from 2.43 to 2.62, Belgium and Luxembourg from 2.68 to 3.52, Italy from 2.42 to 2.80 and Switzerland from 1.21 to 1.48.

We have a choice, at bottom, between two systems only: between an effort to stabilize prices by dint of monetary manipulations (managed currencies) and — the principle we are defending — a permanently stable currency. What Frenchman could we ever persuade that if we resorted to monetary devaluation now we would not be tempted to resort to it again some years hence on the pretext of new economic difficulties?

v

That is the thesis of the French Government.

The partisans of devaluation reply that the recent example of Czechoslovakia proves that the catastrophes predicted for countries which devalue a second time are imaginary. As regards public credit, is it not better in England, where there is a mobile currency, than it is in France, where money is convertible into gold? They add that it may be that by a policy of sheer heroism France can get along without currency devaluation, but that it will be at the cost of untold sufferings: for if French prices were to fall to the level of world prices, the French taxpayer, in order to meet the accrued public expenses of 1934, would have to contribute twice as much merchandise to the treasury as he did in 1928. As a matter of fact, the technical situation of the franc is so strong that, in our judgment, the question would really arise only if world prices, instead of rising in terms of gold, were to continue to fall, a contingency that might result from any further drop in dollar and pound. In that case the partisans of devaluation would launch a new offensive. Meantime, the governmental stand against devaluation is being supported by the important newspapers and is accepted by French public opinion, in spite of wistful longings on the part of our farmers and the small traders in the towns for the high prices of 1928.

The National Union ministry has adopted the expedient of large public works as a means of fighting the depression. This is the suggestion of the Minister of Labor, who represents the new-style Socialist Party inside the cabinet. Public opinion has been much struck with the slogan that the state might as well pay a man to work as pay him to do nothing. Better informed people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are inclined to think that, as regards France, public works managed by the state are not a specific for the depression but a sedative that may ease the patient's nerves temporarily but will none the less impair his general condition.

Such is the economic and financial situation in France as we approach the end of the first half of the year 1934. With her balanced production, half agricultural, half industrial, with her currency stabilized and delicately gauged, with a spirit of economy and saving in her hard-working population, with a colonial empire that is absorbing a third of her production, with a line of fortifications on the east barring the road to the periodic invasion she has known in the past, France seems to be one of the fulcral points of resistance in a world sorely beset by the depression.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FRENCH NATIONAL REVIVAL

By B. de Maud'huy

ON THE Sixth of February the divorce between French public opinion and the French world of politics became manifest for all to see. It had been so complete that down to the very last moment Parliament and the Government had failed to perceive the extent and the violence of public dissatisfaction. Wholly engrossed in parliamentary manœuvres and election worries, they had lost touch with the people. They did not know how devastating the depression had been, that the people gradually were coming to feel that the mere casting of a ballot was not the way to express themselves clearly, and that stronger measures would be required if they were to make their voices heard through the partitions separating the political world from the rest of the country.

All through January the passions of Paris had been mounting as the scandals in the courts, in politics and in finance were brought to light. The members of the Government had so little perception of the public state of mind that they looked upon the restlessness in the streets as a demonstration engineered by the extreme Right. Then on the evening of the Sixth of February it added a technical blunder to its psychological misapprehensions. It crystallized the vague sentiments of 90,000 people who were out in the streets looking about for a way to express themselves, and at one stroke transformed them into 90,000 rioters.

The Sixth of February was the day of the middle classes. The depression reached France somewhat later than other countries, and so did not attain its peak till late in 1933 and early in 1934. Its effects were not as visible in France as elsewhere, since the number of unemployed in proportion to the general population was not so high as in the United States, England or Germany. That was partly due to the fact that large numbers of foreign laborers who had come from Poland, Czechoslovakia or Italy during the "boom" years simply were dismissed and sent home. The depression fell most violently upon the middle classes, upon the masses of small traders and clerks. What happened on the Sixth of February was not a revolt of the unemployed. It was a demonstration by people who were threatened with insolvency in their various lines of trade. It was directed against a government

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

engrossed in its manœuvres and struggles for place, careless or not aware of the fact that the middle classes were faced with ruin, and doing nothing to help them.

This was the first occasion where the war veterans took a hand in public life in France on some other issue than the defense of their rights and pensions. In Paris the veterans largely belong to the middle classes. There being no middle class organizations, as such, to defend middle class claims, the veterans' associations stepped into the breach.

Though the discontent of the middle classes crystallized in Paris, it soon extended to the large towns; and today it is spreading to the rural districts, where the soil is ready because there also the depression has been causing much distress. The middle classes and the peasantry are traditionally the backbone of the moderate parties and of the Radical Socialist Party. But today those party alignments are breaking, and there also is dissension among the leaders. Can they be regenerated, and go on living and governing? Or are they to disappear in favor of some new political alignment? That is the question which the Sixth of February has brought before the people of France.

Since the Sixth of February the old parties have been falling to pieces. In spite of the urgency of the situation they have been unable to gain a new outlook or find new leaders. The old leaders seem to have no idea but to take advantage of the breathing-spell provided by M. Doumergue to lay plans for battle on the one terrain they know: elections. When the rank and file show impatience with the old patter and open hostility to the old groupings and alliances they are simply bewildered. They rummage about for new combinations that will satisfy the new aspirations that they hear expressed. They do not find them.

In all the different parties there are minorities made up of young men who are tired of the old leaders and are ready to desert them the moment they see the right reason for doing so. It is significant that the demands and platforms of these active youthful groups are virtually all the same, from whatever point on the political compass they happen to come.

Under what form and on what basis can a remodeling of French political life be brought about? The middle classes are becoming more and more aware that they have been paying the piper, that the old political parties have not represented and protected their interests adequately, that they are being squeezed between, on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the one hand, the interests of capital and big business (which also control the French press), and, on the other hand, the interests of organized labor, with its powerful unions and organizations of public employees. The middle classes see that they must get together and organize if they are to make themselves heard. Traditionally they have been divided between the Radical Socialist Party on the Left and the moderate groupings of the Center. The ministries that have succeeded each other, whether preponderantly Left or moderate, have deceived them, impoverished them, neglected them. Now, disgusted with parliamentary manœuvres, they are beginning to organize on an extra-parliamentary basis. They are out-and-out republicans, and deeply attached to their individual liberties. But they are beginning to see that as things are they will always be sacrificed to the great concentrations of economic interests. They want a change. But they are still uncertain just what sort of change it should be. They dislike vague and romantic adventures, and instinctively they are against the proposals of extremists. But they are ready to rally to a formula that seems likely to protect their interests.

The working classes are very much divided. The old syndicalist leaders are standing loyally by the platform of the Second International, but their troops are disintegrating. A certain number of workers are turning toward communism, and the communist labor organization, the *Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire* is being reënforced by a considerable influx of socialists. On the other hand, the younger syndicalist leaders are developing a realistic outlook which makes them incline to consider coöperation with the middle classes in order to achieve a certain number of basic reforms. In their minds, of course, these reforms would be mere steps toward the ultimate goal; in the meantime, however, they would involve important compromises as regards the immediate future. So also within the socialist labor organization, the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, a movement is on foot to break with the Socialist Party. At the general conference the dogma of the class struggle was dropped and various groups of workers expressed themselves in favor of a program of planned economy, though without the nationalization of the means of production.

The new ideas found today in all classes in France are especially in evidence among the young. Their attitude may be summed up as open-minded: they sense the prevalent feeling of moral, social and economic unrest, and are uncertain what the future has in store.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France is an old country governed by old men whose ideas in no way correspond to the exigencies of the modern world. The old men of the bourgeoisie are still liberals, the old men in labor circles are still Marxian. Parliamentary and economic liberalism has created a general skepticism that spells death to enthusiasm and has made any sort of constructive effort impossible. As a result, the younger people have begun to acquire a collective sense. They are becoming aware that the main inspiration of human activity must gradually pass from eagerness for individual profit to the concept of social service. To facilitate that development, which will take a long time, a whole series of reforms is required. The younger generation sees that the more immediate reforms can be brought about only through the coöperation of different social and political elements. They therefore feel the necessity of agreeing on a minimum program, leaving for the future the discussion of principles that are not immediately realizable.

In the economic domain, for instance, they reject almost unanimously the anarchical, disorganized capitalism of the liberals just as they reject Marxism. What they want is a national economy organized in a corporative form, where the state will arbitrate labor conflicts and guide the development of production but will not exploit the public nor itself own the instruments of production. Those who come from the bourgeois capitalist parties regard this as the only way of saving capitalism; others who come from the working classes regard it as the first step toward a more complete economic reform. Each is free to keep his own ideals and his program for future action. But for the moment all, whether they are young men of the bourgeoisie or young men of the working classes, agree in demanding that the first steps be taken to reform the French economic system.

It is much the same in the political realm. Parliamentary liberalism simply has no adherents left. Dictatorship by a man or a party is itself in complete disaccord with French ideas; but the young people of France have seen that it will be necessary to surrender certain powers of criticism and control in order to secure a strong government. That, they believe, is the one possible way of safeguarding those individual liberties to which all classes of Frenchmen are so strongly attached; for to defend the parliamentary system in its present form would inevitably lead to a dictatorship, and that would be the end of it entirely.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A common basis for agreement exists, then, not perhaps as to the ideal theoretical forms to be given the constitution and the economic organization of the country, but as to the basic reforms that must first be achieved if the country is to meet the demands made by the conditions of modern life. The national movement in France is not fascist, and it is not Hitlerian. It would be childish, of course, for it not to learn by the things that have been happening in neighboring lands. But France is an old country, deeply attached to her traditions. No reform can be certain and lasting unless it accepts the deep-lying principles of French national life and tries to develop and adapt them to new circumstances. The task is to work out a form of government where management and authority will take the place of anarchical individualism, governmental weakness, "muddling along." But if French liberal ideas have to be modified, the Frenchman's love for individual liberty has to be respected. No régime could endure in France if it tried to enforce any brand of *étatisme*. Intellectual *étatisme* would go even more against the grain of French character than economic *étatisme*. The national movement in France must solve the problem of combining the authority necessary for the political and economic organization of the country with the freedom of individual thinking which the Frenchman finds indispensable to his moral life.

The platform common to all the reformist elements should aim at enabling the country, still in the throes of individualist anarchy modified by an arbitrary and rigid state control, to find her balance in a world where collective organization based on economic nationalism is becoming more and more the general rule. Its purpose must be to restore independence and effective authority to a government which now is being exploited by special economic and social groups. Those groups today form the outskirts of public power, and through their financial and other forms of influence they are able to make the state act to their selfish advantage. To carry out the necessary reform a spirit of close-knit solidarity must be established between the social classes, which must be shown how to coördinate their activities in the national interest, how to reinvigorate public morality by restoring to the individual, under collective discipline, initiative and responsibility in work and independence in thinking.

In the economic field, this means the development of a corporative system that will establish a community of interest between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the people as a whole, as represented in its political assemblies, and the people as an active producing entity organized in its unions and corporations. At the base would be the individual, free and responsible in his own enterprise — with the single proviso that his initiative be in the national interest. Corporations, grouping individuals of like category, both employers or workers, would coördinate their efforts and would in turn act as arbiters through regional councils and a National Council which would adjudicate economic and social conflicts and guarantee that the producing elements had representation at the source of public power. At the top would be the state, controlling the activity of the nation, acting as arbiter in the general interest, assuring an equitable distribution of the products of the country's labor and capital.

The corporative régime would respect individual liberties and would not in any sense dry up the fountainheads of individual initiative. It would not be obligatory; but it would bring to those who accepted its discipline such advantages that the healthy elements in the nation's economic life would rally to it out of enlightened self-interest. Since the corporations would be entrusted with the regulation of the relations between capital and labor, they, and not the state, would be charged with the application of social laws and laws relating to professional training and education.

From the constitutional standpoint, the reform would consist in reorganizing the premiership so that the head of the government would have control over his ministers, and in regrouping departmental activities in a reduced number of ministries. Parliament would revert to its rôle of audit and criticism. The national will would find its expression in a democratic government, issuing from a parliament elected by universal suffrage, and strengthened technically by the advice of the corporative organizations.

The incapacity of the old parties to carry out any such program is manifest enough. The present moderate parties, and the Radical Socialist and Socialist Parties, have too long a past behind them, they have too many responsibilities on their conscience. Any constructive program they undertake necessarily becomes a justification of their actions in the past. Above all, their counsels are too divided. The old alignments are a thing of the past. No new crystallization of opinion will ever take place about them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the present moment a slow fermentation is going on in French opinion. M. Doumergue's ministry having restored a certain amount of domestic calm, various groups are taking advantage of it to try to piece together some of the scattered débris from the old political craft which have gone on the rocks. All sorts of programs are being put forth, some vague, some definite. All one can say of them is that they have certain basic aspirations in common. With so many groups imbued with vague but similar ideals, the political situation is necessarily obscure. But the condition is evidence, too, that at a given moment, under the pressure of events, opinion in a very large majority in the country could rapidly come to a head.

If one examines the platforms of the *Fédération des Anciens Combattants*, of the *Syndicats Agricoles*, of the *Etats-Généraux du Travail*, of the Neo-Socialist Party, one notes that they are all in agreement as to fundamentals: a strengthening of governmental authority, coöperation between classes, a more even distribution of social justice. But all these various organizations, embracing between them a vast number of members, lack cohesion and discipline. To effect the indispensable and inevitable fusion of these scattered elements in French opinion some nucleus of crystallization has to be found. It can only be found in some extra-parliamentary formation. Here is where the *Croix de Feu* can play a rôle. The *Croix de Feu*, originally an organization of war veterans but now enlarged by the addition of a junior branch, has come to the fore in French political activity since the events of February. Independent of the old political groupings and the "big interests," well organized and capably led by Colonel de la Rocque, its membership is drawn from all parties and classes. In the eyes of the country it enjoys great moral prestige. At the proper moment it may constitute the nucleus around which the elements of a new political order may concentrate, replacing the old parties and achieving the union of the living forces of the French nation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A MORAL PROGRAM FOR EUROPE

By Julien Benda

I. PEACE IS A MORAL PROBLEM

FIRST, what is peace? Peace is not merely the avoidance of war by the European nations as a result of the skill of their diplomats, even over a considerable period of time, the while armaments grow and mutual suspicions flourish and national prides smart — the while, in a word, war hovers over the Continent as it has since 1918. That is not peace. I adopt Spinoza's definition: "Peace is not absence of war, but a virtue that springs from strength of soul." [1] In other words, the problem of peace is more than anything else a moral problem. It is a problem of moral reformation. That of course is not to say that it is not *also* an economic problem, a problem of statesmanship, a problem of law. What I mean is that in addition to being those things, and more distinctively, it is a moral problem, and especially therefore a matter for our moral educators.

II. THE TEACHING REQUIRED

What is the moral reformation which educators should preach to the peoples in order to create in them such a state of mind that they are ready to come together? The answer is obvious. They should be exhorted to banish from their hearts the religions of force, "will to power," "dynamism," and other Nietzscheisms which they have been worshipping since the middle of the nineteenth century, and go back to the cult of universality, rationality, harmony, moderation, which they have been neglecting for the same length of time. They should be urged to abandon the German ideals which they — France included — have been honoring since Germany took the lead in Europe in 1870, and go back to the cult of the Hellenic-Christian. They should be told to take back their allegiance from the gods of the North Sea and give it again to the gods of the Mediterranean. Such is the reversal of values that the educators of Europe should propose, if they would not have Europe continue to be a field of hatred and see it again become a field of carnage.

Let no one misunderstand me on this point. I am not denying

[1] I put this definition of peace as an epigraph to my recent book, "Discours à la Nation Européenne" (Gallimard, Paris, 1933).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the value of the "will to power" or the value of "dynamism." They are of the essence of human progress. The thing to teach, rather, is that those values are not the *supreme* values, that above them there are other values, that above human values which are necessarily struggle-values there are divine values which are values of peace and serenity. There is no question of destroying a *this* to keep only a *that*. We are to keep both the *this* and the *that*, teaching, however, that *this* is higher than *that*.

III. WHO SHALL DO THE TEACHING?

Who are to be these educators, the evangelists of this gospel? First of all, the clergy, the ministers of the divine, whatever their creed. Are they doing their duty? Are they imparting this teaching? No, certainly not. One has only to read the declarations of certain German pastors who kowtow to Hitlerism to be convinced of that. For that matter, we in France have churchmen who energetically propound the morality of war. Anyone interested will find plenty of examples cited in my books.[2] I have shown, furthermore, that God, who since Plato's time had been a principle of peace, of *non-agitation*, has become today, with Hegel and Bergson, a "fighting" principle, a "dynamic" principle.

Another preacher of pacifist morality might be the League of Nations; but to be that the League would have to conceive of its function in much higher terms than it does at present. I could not express my thought better than by quoting a beautiful paragraph from a Jesuit father, who grasps the present-day rôle of the educator in its full grandeur: "One may criticize the Christian unity of the Middle Ages for confining itself a little too strictly to religious and intellectual spheres, for not coming down to the solid earth and more thoroughly organizing the material interests of humanity. But the League of Nations seems to be drifting into the opposite error. Born of economic progress and of the disappointments of nationalism, it is striving to organize humanity on a temporal basis, and may well be taking too little interest in the frightful spiritual and moral anarchy in which the modern world is floundering. May it succeed, in accord with the religion of Christ, in instilling in human society that spirit of peace, that moral and spiritual unity, without which all the legislating, organizing and policing in the world amount to nothing." [3]

[2] "La Trahison des Clercs," and its continuation, "La Fin de l'Éternel."

[3] J. Leclerc: "Chrétienté Médiévale et Société des Nations" (*Études*, August 5, 1932).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV. THE RÔLE OF MEN OF LETTERS

Other preachers — ready-made, as it were, for the teaching I have in mind — would be the writers of Europe. Of them too I ask: "Are you doing your duty? Are you educating the peoples in such a way as to create in them a spirit favorable to peace?" Some are — men like Jules Romains or Thomas Mann. But in all countries there are many others — and these not the least important — who do not, but who on the contrary are furiously nationalistic. May I go so far as to say that I am not really convinced of their sincerity? The nationalism of a man like Maurras undoubtedly has something deeply true about it. But Barrès? His *Cahiers* are now being published. They reveal in him a constant thirst after new sensations, an inability to fasten on any faith, a relentless basic skepticism that does not spare even his nationalistic patriotism.[4] In a Bourget a deep strain of cosmopolitanism comes constantly to the surface, though it is the fashion to describe it as "enlightened nationalism."[5] Further, it seems to me that sincerity in nationalism presupposes a virtue which, all will agree, is not exactly characteristic of men of letters — naïveté. I often have noted among my friends that many who are fire-eating nationalists when they have a pen in hand become in private, when they are most themselves, quite pliant and reasonable — proof enough of the insincerity of their hyper-nationalist explosions.

If our men of letters do not believe in nationalism, why do they pretend to? The answer is easy — to please the bourgeoisie, which makes reputations, dispenses honors, and is, as it happens, nationalistically inclined. However, here again I must distinguish: there are the men, and there are the women.

Many men of the bourgeoisie, those who are engaged in banking or manufacturing or ordinary business and who thus come into touch with economic problems, are often able to have at least a vague conception of internationalism. They incline to admit the possibility, even though remote, of something like a European union. But the women know no economics, and in the richer classes they have a genius for what we call *snobisme* — for posing. If the women are nationalists, we have a right to say that the bourgeoisie is nationalist. For, as everybody knows, the whole

[4] I have debated this point with an ardent defender of Barrès, M. François Mauriac, in the *Nouvelle Revue Française* (October–November, 1932).

[5] I quote from Bourget, and comment on his views, in "La Trahison des Clercs," p. 101 n.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spiritual direction of the French home belongs to the woman. The total abdication of the Frenchman in everything pertaining to moral life, in the education of the young, in the political color of the guests he receives, in the families with which his children intermarry, in the publications that are read in the home, is something incomprehensible to foreigners. Going back to our writers, it is for the women that they write, women being the only ones who read and who make reputations.

The nationalism of the bourgeoisie — or at least of the French bourgeoisie, which is the most representative of all the European middle classes — derives from what seem to me fundamental instincts in that type of people. I have just mentioned one: *snobisme*. In the eyes of the French bourgeois, to be nationalist means to belong to an ultra-select circle presided over by Du Guesclin, Jeanne d'Arc, Richelieu, Louis XIV (not Napoleon), and from which everything and everybody not French — Goethe, let us say, or Lincoln — are automatically barred. To be a nationalist is at once to decorate oneself with something that the French bourgeois regards as the essential of essentials: a "title of distinction."

I will mention another and still more fundamental instinct: hatred of the democratic spirit, so far as the latter smacks of anything not respectful of authority, not submissive to one's betters.

It is often overlooked that the nationalism of the French bourgeoisie is of very recent date and does not reflect the historic tradition of that class. During all the Restoration period and under the July Monarchy the advanced parties were the backbone of nationalism. They were the ones who wanted a war to vindicate national honor and tear up the treaties of 1815. They were the ones to cry shame and point the finger of scorn at the men like Villèle, La Ferronaye, Guizot, who were for peace. The conservative elements, on the other hand, would hear of nothing that spelled military action. Chateaubriand had the greatest difficulty in making them swallow the war in Spain. During the Second Empire, too, the champions of order were bitterly opposed to any law that suggested reënforcing the army. That was how Prince Napoleon could exclaim hotly (August 1859): "Here we are riveted to this cowardly conservative party which will have peace at any price!"

From 1875 all that changed. The bourgeoisie began to heckle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those in power because they were not preparing for the *revanche*, or at least were thinking of something else besides war. What happened? The German Empire, of course! But that is not the whole story. Democracy too had come to the fore, and now in order to maintain the spirit of class distinctions and keep everyone in his place, the interested classes felt that they could do no better than stimulate nationalism, which in turn fosters a permanent military spirit in a people, makes it more inclined to recognize the advantages of taking orders from above, the legitimacy of superiorities and inferiorities — which, in a word, puts it in the frame of mind that best suits those who are interested in having it as their servant.

Hence the bad humor shown by certain of the bourgeoisie — one might almost say systematically, quite apart from any study of the evidence — whenever a statesman, a Briand, a Herriot, a Boncour, makes some move in the direction of an international understanding. They explain their opposition on the ground that to believe that international hatreds ever will vanish is foolish and dangerous. The truth is that they do not want those hatreds to vanish. They recognize that to cherish them may some day cost them the lives of their children. But that risk they will take, that sacrifice they will make, if it is the price which they have to pay in order to keep their comforts and their hold on those who serve them.[6] That reaches a sublime height of selfishness which ought to receive fuller recognition.

V. ERRORS IN PACIFIST DOCTRINE

A number of writers preach peace in perfectly good faith, but meantime say things which I believe are false and which do actual harm to the cause of peace. In the first place, they lead people to expect too much of official organizations devoted to peace. They fail to lay enough stress on the fact that such organizations can prove effective only to the extent that they have public support; that peace will be achieved only through the desire of the peoples for peace, through a change in their moral outlook in the world; that peace is a gift that the peoples must make to themselves, that it will not be handed down to them by some power from above, that their governments can be nothing more than their intelligent agents, not their transcendent benefactors.

[6] "Above all," says Machiavelli ("Prince," xvii), "do not rob your subjects of their property; for men more readily forget the loss of their fathers than the loss of their inheritances." For "fathers" substitute "children," and we get a truth emphasized by the last war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When I point out how far the moral conceptions of the peoples — even the best of them — is from what it must be if peace is really to be established, I hear answers from all sides that improvements are to be the work of time, of "evolution," that new economic conditions will bring men to peace just as the old conditions have brought them to war, in short, that peace will be bestowed on humanity by the fatal trend of history, by the automatic functioning of the world, that is to say, mechanically, without anybody's doing anything to obtain it.[1] Such a doctrine merely encourages people to neglect the one factor which can bring them peace, the very one which they are only too willing to neglect: an effort of will.

Others preach that men must abstain from war because it is contrary to their interests, because even when victorious it necessarily represents a loss, because it "does not pay." We may overlook how base this argument is; it is on a par with a dictum I used to hear in the barracks, that "you had better not steal because if you do you get punished." More important is the fact that it is false. Who could hold that Germany made a bad bargain in fighting the war of 1870, or Russia with her Turkish war, or England in the war in the Transvaal? I am told that today, in view of the enormous sacrifices involved, war is ruinous whatever its outcome, and that the war of 1914 amply proved the fact. But that was because it lasted five years. Had it ended in a few weeks, as those who began it hoped, it would certainly have benefited the conqueror. Nor is it inconceivable that a rapid victory might occur even today — Germany failed of one in 1914 only by a hair. To say that her defeat proves the impossibility of success in a sudden attack today is to be not very exacting as to proofs, especially as an aggressor is not always bound to do his utmost to array the whole world against him from the outset. In a word, it is in no way proved that a nation now has to be insane before it starts a war. Certainly the manœuvres of countries such as Italy or Japan show clearly enough that they at least are not satisfied with the proofs. Those who rule out war on that order of reasoning make the evangelists of peace seem either frauds or fools.

Others think the best interests of peace are served by urging

[1] That was the attitude of Anatole France. In "Sur la Pierre Blanche" he wrote: "World peace will come some day not because men will be better men (there can be no hope of that) but because a new order of things, a new knowledge, new economic necessities, will force a state of peace upon them, just as hitherto human conditions have also been to the liking of men and kept them in a state of war."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the peoples to know each other better and to visit each other back and forth, assuring them that in this way they will eradicate the sense of their differences from their hearts and replace it with the sense of their human brotherhood. That seems to me very doubtful. One may quite well argue the contrary, that contacts with foreigners intensify differences. I recently read a book by a Lettish scholar which contended that the French and the Germans first became conscious of their antagonisms when they were fighting shoulder to shoulder in the Crusades.[8] What we must teach, rather, is that the way to abolish our mutual sense of differences is to feel the need of being superior to them — something that we can very well do, perhaps better do, by all of us staying at home. Peace is to be the product of a spiritual effort on the part of men, not of wholesale gallivantings over the surface of the globe. In any event, the "mutual understanders" would bring peace to men by mechanical agencies, making no demands on their inner strength of soul.

I must also label the fallacy in another doctrine. I hear most of our doctors in pacifism assuring the peoples that the formation of a united Europe will not hinder them from asserting their national individualities as in the past, that it will not prevent them from conserving their "distinctive physiognomies," from clinging to the moral values and ideals which have been peculiar to them and which distinguish them from other races. When Germany entered the League of Nations, the Foreign Minister of that country declared that in becoming members of the League "the peoples in no sense abandoned their national moralities." Such doctors generally add that the new Europe will be a "harmonization" of the various physiognomies, something like the harmony that is yielded by the different notes in the scale — forgetting, meantime, that the notes in the scale do not produce a harmony unless they are chosen in advance for a given effect, that left to themselves they produce discords.

The whole argument seems to me misleading. The new Europe, if ever there is one, will call for the outblossoming of a European soul, which will master and in large part extinguish national souls, just as the birth of France called for the birth of a French soul which stifled the souls of Brittany and Provence, and as the advent of Germany brought the advent of a German soul that did away with the souls of Saxony and Bavaria. To surrender the joys

[8] G. Zeller, "La France et l'Allemagne depuis dix siècles," p. 73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of possessing an individual temperament is an act of heroism which all human collectivities that have risen to political unity have had to perform; and the inhabitants of Europe will have to be just as heroic if they are to make Europe into something more than a mechanical assemblage of individualities always at each other's throats. In this argument, too, the idea is to assure the peoples that they can get peace without sacrificing anything they love, to avoid any appeal to them to exercise their will. Here again I hope that I shall not be misunderstood. I am not insisting that national differences be wiped out. They could not be, even if one wanted. The peoples, rather, should be urged to take their spiritual stand in a region of the soul where national differences become unimportant. Christian propaganda in the early days would be an excellent example. When Saint Paul taught that there were no longer to be Greeks or Jews or Scythians, but Christ alone in everything, he did not mean that ethnical differences were to come to an end, but that men were to strive to reach a state of mind where those differences would cease to count.

VI. MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF A EUROPEAN WAR

One may take it for granted that if war broke out in Europe now it would be, more emphatically than ever, a conflict between two principles, two conceptions of life, two orders of value. On one side would be the system which sets the greater store by values which are strictly ideal and disinterested: respect for truth and justice. That system, it must be confessed, is meagerly represented today in Europe. France holds to that system, theoretically at least. And on the other side would stand the system which lays primary or sole emphasis on practical values, the values of *strength*. The nation most representative of that system is Germany. It is easy to see that whatever the outcome of such a war, it would be disastrous for the idealistic system.

Suppose France the victor. In that case nothing is changed. France is not strong enough to annihilate her adversary. The latter still stands there, eaten with bitterness, shouting that its defeat is the greatest injustice in history, preparing for revenge, and again, for another period of years, holding a sword over the head of Europe. The conflict between the two principles is left where it was.

Suppose France the loser. In that case the idealistic principle is destroyed. Germany victorious would be wild enough, fanatical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enough, to take every advantage of her victory. That would mean a second disappearance of Athens from the world — and this time for good, not as it was in the days of the Romans, who began to worship Greece the day after their victory.

For that matter, the idealistic principle can be destroyed without any war, by the mere fact that a number of Frenchmen who hate that principle get the upper hand in the country and blot it out of French habits of thought; or, more simply still, by the fact of the French deserting it spontaneously, without anyone forcing them. Already there are Frenchmen who think Sparta admirable and Athens contemptible, to whom respect for abstract truth and abstract justice is a childish weakness from which serious people should recover; they think Nietzsche a far greater man than Descartes, and find Hitler the ideal type. That would mean a destruction of the French ideal by the French themselves. The torch of human civilization which was lighted in Greece with Socrates would have burned twenty-five centuries and then gone out, and humanity would revert to the cult of pure force — its true law, perhaps!

VII. EUROPE MUST NOT UNITE AGAINST ANOTHER CONTINENT

In one case the unification of Europe would have moral consequences hardly better than the moral consequences of war — in case Europe came together for the sole purpose of presenting a united front of force against another continent. That conception of European unity is undoubtedly present in the minds of a number of European writers.

At one of the sessions of the "Convention for the Promotion of a European Spirit" held in Paris last October under the chairmanship of Paul Valéry, and which I attended as a guest, an Italian Fascist declared that the world should have done with the universal values which the French Revolution had brought into vogue and which were "forever outworn." He was then asked to state his view as to the possibility of creating Europe (the purpose of the Congress which he was attending) if one were to banish the only principles that seemed capable of establishing unity among men. He answered that in his judgment Europe would come into being through the need which the European peoples eventually would face of combining against a common foe. It is only fair to add that the thought found little echo in the audience, most of the delegates thinking of creating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe by resurrecting devotion to universal ideals rather than by propounding a super-xenophobia aimed either at Asia or at the Americas.

But putting aside that fanatical view, whenever I appeal to the nations of Europe to abdicate their sovereignties as a necessary prerequisite to the real establishment of peace, I hear the answer that, "Europe, like every other nation, will come into being through the assertion of a single sovereignty, that is to say, European sovereignty." That, I reply, is just what it must not be. All lovers of peace must refuse to have it that way. There is precisely where they must do something different from what the founders of nations have done in the past. These asked people to abandon their individual sentiments inside the group which they desired to establish, and then to stop the process at the frontiers of that group, using all the energies of the individual sentiments which they had abandoned in order to distinguish their group from all other groups. Today the idea must be to keep the movement going, to think of the frontiers of Europe as only an imaginary stopping-place in a continuous evolution—something like one of those concentric circles which an illusion of our senses solidifies on the surface of a wave that nevertheless goes on vibrating. A united Europe will have no real civilizing value unless, far from being an end in itself, it is only a stage in the process of submerging in a divine Ideal all egos, whether of the person, or of country, or continent. I end where I began: peace is a moral problem. More than that, it is a religious problem.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ARMS MANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC

By J.

ON MAY 18, 1934, President Roosevelt sent a strongly worded Message to the Senate, recommending that it give generous support to the Special Committee which under the Chairmanship of Senator Nye has been charged with the investigation of the munitions industry. He further urged that the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, and expressed the hope that the General Disarmament Conference might find it possible to agree upon an international convention providing for more stringent regulation and control of the international traffic in arms than that agreed upon in 1925. Within an hour after the reading of this Message, Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, presented to the Senate the unanimous report of the Committee in favor of the ratification of the Convention of 1925, and introduced a Joint Resolution, which he stated had the support of the Administration, authorizing the President to prohibit the sale of arms and munitions of war to Bolivia and Paraguay; and Senator Nye moved that $35,000 be added to the appropriation for the expenses of his Committee.

The events of that day served to focus public opinion upon a question in which various organizations have for years been attempting to awaken public interest, and for which opinion had been prepared by the appearance within the past few months of a number of widely-read articles and books.[1]

It would probably be impossible to determine just when it was first realized that the private manufacture of arms and the international trade in arms constituted serious dangers to the peace of the world, and that governmental supervision and control of those whom the President in his Message called "manufacturers and merchants of engines of destruction" must be a fundamental element in any program designed to restrict or abolish armed con-

[1] Among the most recent books and articles, some frankly sensational, others more sober, have been: "Merchants of Death," by H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934); "Iron, Blood and Profits," by George Seldes (New York: Harper, 1934); "Arms and the Men," *Fortune Magazine*, March 1934 (reprinted in pamphlet form by Doubleday, Doran); "Slaughter for Sale," by John Gunther, *Harper's Magazine*, May 1934; "The Armaments Scandal," by Jonathan Mitchell, *New Republic*, May 9 and 23, 1934.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flict among the nations. It first became a matter of world-wide discussion immediately after the Great War when men were seeking every possible means to prevent the recurrence of such a conflict. The statesmen who drafted the Covenant of the League of Nations were well aware of it when they included in it the following provision:

> The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.[2]

Within little more than two months after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, a Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition was signed at St. Germain-en-Laye and Paris on September 10, 1919, by the representatives of twenty-eight powers. Frank L. Polk, Henry White and General Tasker H. Bliss signed for the United States, but the failure of the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles brought upon this Convention the same fate which met the other subsidiary treaties negotiated at the Peace Conference. It was not transmitted by the President to the Senate.

On numerous occasions from 1921 to 1923, the United States was urged by other signatory governments, and by the League of Nations, to ratify this Convention. They pointed out that as long as one of the principal manufacturing powers remained unfettered by its terms, other countries could not be expected to subject themselves to limitations which would result not in the control or the diminution of the trade in arms, but in the transfer of that trade to competitors of other nationalities to whom the Convention did not apply. The objections of this Government were, however, insuperable. The Convention was predicated upon the supposition that all the signatories would be members of the League, and certain functions of supervision and control were placed in the hands of that organization. Thus ratification by the United States was, politically speaking, impossible. When this situation finally became clear to the other signatories to the Convention, and when they had come to realize that there was no likelihood that the United States would in the near future reverse the position which it had assumed in respect to the League, European

[2] Article 8, Section 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

statesmen came to the conclusion that the Convention of St. Germain could never be put into effect.

The Council of the League on April 21, 1923, adopted the following resolution:

> The Council, on the proposal of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, requests its President to ascertain whether the Government of the United States would be disposed to state its views as to the manner in which it would be willing to coöperate with other governments in the control both of the traffic in arms and the private manufacture of arms.

The reply of the United States Government to the communication transmitting this Resolution was such as to discourage all but the most persistent. The Council, however, was not discouraged. On December 14, 1923, an invitation was sent to the United States to participate in preparing the draft of a new convention. In the interval between these two communications, certain sections of public opinion in the United States had been aroused by the apparent unwillingness of the Government to coöperate with other nations in dealing with a problem so vital to the peace of the world. Perhaps the emphatic expression of this opinion had some effect in changing the attitude of the Government. In any case, the invitation of the Council was accepted and representatives of the United States participated in the drafting of a new convention. A conference to consider this draft was called by the League to meet in Geneva on May 4, 1925. The American delegates were Theodore E. Burton, former Senator from Ohio, at that time a Member of Congress; Hugh S. Gibson, then Minister to Switzerland; Rear Admiral Andrew T. Long, Allen W. Dulles, and Brigadier General Colden L. Ruggles. Throughout the negotiations, there was an evident desire on the part of the delegates of the other Powers to produce a convention which would encounter no difficulties in being ratified by the United States. Mr. Burton, in the report of the American Delegation of December 16, 1925, stated:

> The delegates at the Conference impressed upon the American Delegation their view that any international convention for the control of the trade in arms would be ineffective unless adhered to by the United States, one of the important arms-producing Powers. With a view to facilitating American adherence, the Conference did not press for the inclusion of any provision for the supervision or control of the arms trade by an international commission, recognizing that such control would be inacceptable to this Government. Further, the various proposals advanced from time to time by the American Delegation received the full and sympathetic consideration of the Conference

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and in every case where American principles and interests were involved, solutions which the American Delegation considered acceptable were adopted. The American Delegation desire to record their recognition of this attitude and, in submitting the Treaty, to state that in their opinion the success or failure of the present Convention will in no small measure depend upon the position assumed by the American Government in the matter.

The Convention was transmitted by President Coolidge to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on January 11, 1926.

The signing of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 was hailed throughout the world as a great and signal victory. The evils arising from the private manufacture of arms and the international traffic in arms were now about to succumb to international supervision and control. Enlightened public opinion had triumphed — or so it seemed. But the proponents of the Convention were doomed, as a result of the indifference of the United States Senate, to a great disappointment. The Convention slumbered in the Committee on Foreign Relations from January 11, 1926, until May 18, 1934. It is difficult to determine why no action was taken on this Convention over such a long period. There are those who have not failed to discern in the inaction of the Senate the result of the nefarious machinations of American arms manufacturers. A much more probable explanation appears to be that, in the absence of an aroused public opinion in this country, the Senate did not feel impelled to act upon a Convention in which few of its members were particularly interested. No hearings were held by the Committee and no definite opposition developed. From time to time successive Secretaries of State attempted to prod the Committee into action. President Hoover sent a Message on January 10, 1933, urging that favorable action be taken. But this Message fell on stony ground. The immediate response of the Committee on Foreign Relations to the recent similar Message of President Roosevelt may probably be ascribed in no small part to the revival of public interest in questions relating to the munitions industry.

The ratification of the Convention by the United States would probably result in its coming into force within a reasonably brief interval. Other important Powers, remembering the Treaty of St. Germain, have waited action by the United States. The Convention provides that it will become effective when ratified by fourteen Powers. Twelve ratifications or accessions have already

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been deposited. Two other Powers have decided upon ratification, and one other Power upon accession, but ratification in these three cases has not been completed. Some of these ratifications are, however, conditional upon ratification by other specified powers. The Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended similar procedure for this Government by proposing a reservation to the effect that the Convention shall not come into force so far as the United States is concerned until it shall have come into force in respect to Belgium, the British Empire, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The important provisions of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 limit the export of arms to those arms intended for the direct supply of the government of the importing state (or with the consent of such government for the supply of a public authority subordinate to it), and set up a machinery of licenses or export declarations for all arms exported or imported, and provide for full publicity for the arms traffic.

Ever since the end of the World War there have been two main currents of opinion as to the proper means of dealing with the evils arising from the private manufacture of arms and the international traffic therein. Some believe that the remedy lies in governmental supervision and control and full publicity; others are convinced that nothing short of the complete suppression of the private manufacture of arms and the nationalization of the whole armaments industry and the international traffic in arms and munitions will eradicate the evils inherent in the present system. The Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, following in general the lines laid down in the Convention of St. Germain, was an attempt to deal with the problem by the former method. The proponents of the latter method are still actively working for a solution in conformity with their views.

At the very beginning of its deliberations the General Commission of the General Disarmament Conference appointed a "Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and the Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War" to canvass the opinions of the governments participating in the Conference, and to make recommendations with a view to the incorporation in a General Disarmament Convention of provisions dealing with this phase of the disarmament problem. The Committee met at intervals during 1932 and 1933 and discussed these matters at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great length. Of all the Committees of this almost hopelessly deadlocked Conference, this Committee was perhaps the most hopelessly deadlocked. Its reports "on the progress of the work" are reports of lack of progress. Questions are posed, radical divisions of views recorded, and no conclusions of any consequence arrived at. Underlying the innumerable subsidiary differences of opinion which developed during the discussions of the Committee, was the fundamental divergence between the advocates of supervision and control and the advocates of suppression and nationalization. In the forefront of those advocating the former method of approach were the delegations of the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Japan; the most energetic exponents of the latter method were the delegations of France, Poland, Denmark and Spain.

The position of the United States has remained unchanged since it was expressed by Mr. Burton during the negotiation of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, in part as follows:

> Many of those in Europe and America with whom I have coöperated for years past in movements for peace think that the solution of their problems rests in the prohibition of private manufacture. They argue, that so long as private manufacture continues, there will be a powerful industrial interest, the prosperity of which will be promoted by war, and this they consider to be a barrier in the way of peace. They consider also that these private manufacturers have also been extremely skilful in the circulation of propaganda unfavorable to peace. Thus, they say, the manufacture of arms, munitions and implements of war should be restricted to Governments.
>
> Let me point out to you the fallacy of this argument. The private manufacture of arms and munitions is flexible and adapted both to peace and to war. It may consist of the manufacture of explosives and material for industrial purposes, of sporting arms which have nothing to do with war, to which can be added in time of conflict the manufacture of military arms. Take my own country as an example; the manufacture of munitions and military arms was negligible before the late Great War, but, during that period, private industry increased to enormous proportions; it has now fallen back to what it was before.
>
> Government manufacture and control, on the other hand, are inflexible and look to a state of war. It involves the maintenance of a very considerable force, always engaged in the manufacture of implements of destruction. If that force is disbanded the nation is helpless, and there is always a strong interest in favor of maintaining in any form of Government activity a large force, expanding its operations to the maximum. Thus, I say that, at least in a country like the United States, the idea that the private manufacture of arms should be prohibited, and that such prohibition would promote peace, is a chimera. *More than that, why should a Conference be called for the prohibition of* private manufacture and leave the Governmental or public manufacture

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alone? Shall the respective Governments of the world, whether warlike or peaceful in their intentions, build huge structures to make arms, and at the same time prohibit the private manufacture? What of the private manufacturers, many of whom have the most pacific intentions? What have they done that there should be this discrimination against them? What hope have the lovers of peace in prohibiting private manufacture, if Governmental manufacture may still go on to an enormous and unlimited extent?

The opponents of nationalization of the munitions industry contend that such action would probably result in an increase in the production of arms and munitions and in an increase in the stocks maintained by the governments of the world. They argue that the governments of non-producing countries would be obliged to establish arsenals in order to supply their legitimate needs, and that their inability in an emergency to purchase arms and munitions from private producers abroad would probably lead them to maintain very large stocks on hand. They contend further that such a system would strengthen the strong and weaken the weak. The great majority of the nations of the world would be placed at the mercy of the ten or a dozen nations favored by nature with supplies of raw materials and possessed of the necessary industrial organization. There are many also who are strongly opposed to nationalization of the munitions industry because such a system would put governments into business on a scale unknown at present outside of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

As far as any tendency can be discerned in the recent discussions at Geneva, it would appear to be a tendency toward governmental supervision and control rather than toward nationalization. As the former solution is less extreme than the latter, there would appear to be more likelihood of its being agreed upon as a compromise, if any agreement is to be reached, than that the proponents of governmental supervision and control should be won over to the thesis of nationalization. Such an agreement might embody a reiteration of the provisions of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, modified in some non-essentials which have been subjected to criticism, together with provisions similar to those contained in the Draft Convention submitted to the Council of the League by a Special Commission in 1929. This Draft Convention provides for the setting up of a system of licenses for arms manufacture and a system of full publicity for the armaments industry, similar to the system of licenses and publicity provided for the traffic in arms by the Convention of 1925.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Government of the United States has been more reluctant to accept the principle of supervision and control of the manufacture of arms than it was to accept this principle in respect to the international traffic. Until November 18, 1932, our delegates at Geneva had always met the proposal that governmental supervision and control be established by international agreement with the statement that the Constitution of the United States prevented the Federal Government from entering into a convention involving the control of manufacture in the several States. On that date, Mr. Hugh Wilson announced at a meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference that the United States was prepared to accept supervision of private manufacture provided that state manufacture was also supervised. This change of position had been foreshadowed by Mr. Stimson, who several days before was quoted in the press as stating that the Government had reached the conclusion that the position that the Federal Government lacked constitutional power to enter into such a convention was not well taken. In this statement, he referred to the case of Missouri *vs.* Holland as supporting the position that this Government could enter into such a convention and, having done so, would possess the constitutional authority to enact and enforce legislation pursuant to that convention. This statement in conjunction with the statement in President Roosevelt's Message of May 18, 1934, that it was his "earnest hope that the representatives of the nations who will reassemble at Geneva on May 29 will be able to agree upon a convention containing provisions for the supervision and control of the traffic in arms much more far reaching than those which were embodied in the Convention of 1925" would appear to indicate clearly that the Government of the United States is prepared to enter into an international convention providing for the most stringent supervision and control, both of the manufacture of arms and of the international traffic in arms, by the establishment of a system of licenses accompanied by full publicity.

It has been recognized by all students of the problem that no effective control of the munitions industry can be established except by international agreement. Nevertheless, some of the nations have independently enacted domestic legislation of the nature of that contemplated by the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 and other proposals which have been made at Geneva. Great Britain and Sweden, for instance, require licenses for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

export of arms and munitions, and permission to export is frequently withheld. Authority to prohibit the export of arms in particular cases is vested in the Executive of the governments of all of the important producing countries except Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and the United States.

The United States has lagged far behind other nations in legislation on this subject. Our Government has on several occasions expressed pious hopes and made pious gestures. The Department of State on December 27, 1923, issued a statement to the press, defending the position of this Government in regard to the Convention of St. Germain, and adding:

> The Executive Branch of the Government is not in a position to intervene in transactions which are wholly within the law; but not desiring to encourage other Powers to arm themselves for conflict, which is deemed contrary to the spirit of the country, this Government, in addition to adopting a strict policy with regard to the sale of surplus government army stores, has replied to the recent inquiries which it has received that it does not encourage the shipment of war material to the troubled areas of the world. This stand has been taken although this Government was not unmindful of the fact that intending purchasers would no doubt resort to other markets to supply their wants. It may also be added that under present conditions the Department would not favor the flotation of a foreign loan in this country for which the proceeds would be utilized for armament.

There is no evidence that the announcement of this policy had any practical effect in so far as the export of arms and munitions by private companies and individuals was concerned. Aside from the laws of the Federal Government and of the several States designed to prevent the sale of arms to criminals and minors and to protect the public against explosions, the only legislation relating to the traffic in arms is a series of Joint Resolutions which have been brought to public attention by recent debates in Congress.

The first of these Joint Resolutions was that approved on April 22, 1898,[3] which conferred upon the Executive the power to prohibit the export of war materials "within his discretion and with such limitations and exemptions as would seem to him expedient." Although this Resolution was a war measure passed in connection with the war with Spain, it remained on the statute books for fourteen years and the power conferred by it was used on October 14, 1905, when President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation[4] in which "for good and sufficient reasons unto

[3] 30 Stat. 739.
[4] 34 Stat. 3183.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

me appearing" he forbade the export of arms to any port in the Dominican Republic. This resolution was amended by the passage of the Joint Resolution of March 14, 1912,[5] as follows:

> Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the joint resolution to prohibit the export of coal or other material used in war from any seaport of the United States, approved April twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, be, and hereby is, amended to read as follows:
>
> That whenever the President shall find that in any American country conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export except under such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe any arms or munitions of war from any place in the United States to such country until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress.
>
> Sec. 2. That any shipment of material hereby declared unlawful after such a proclamation shall be punishable by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both.

By the Joint Resolution of January 31, 1922,[6] this authority was extended to include any country in which the United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction. These countries are, at present, China, Morocco, Egypt, Ethiopia, and some of the states of Arabia. Pursuant to the authority conferred by these two Resolutions, restrictions upon the export of arms have been proclaimed as follows: Brazil (proclaimed October 22, 1930; revoked March 2, 1931); China (proclaimed March 4, 1922; still in effect); Cuba (proclaimed May 2, 1924; revoked August 29, 1924); Honduras (proclaimed March 22, 1924; still in effect); Mexico (proclaimed March 14, 1912; revoked February 3, 1914; proclaimed October 19, 1915; revoked January 31, 1922; proclaimed January 7, 1924; revoked July 18, 1929); Nicaragua (proclaimed September 15, 1926; still in effect).

In enforcing the restrictions proclaimed under the Joint Resolutions of March 14, 1912 and January 31, 1922, the Secretaries of State have established a system of licenses for each individual shipment. These licenses have been granted or withheld in their discretion in accordance with the conditions existing at the moment in the countries for which the shipments were destined.

The principle underlying these resolutions was confirmed by the Convention relating to the Rights and Duties of States in the

[5] 37 Stat. 630.
[6] 42 Stat. 361.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Event of Civil Strife, signed at Havana on February 20, 1928, under which the United States, as a party to the Convention, is obligated to prevent the export of arms intended for the use of rebels against the authorities of such Governments as have ratified that Convention.

It will be noted that the Joint Resolution of January 31, 1922, refers exclusively to "conditions of domestic violence." On January 10, 1933, President Hoover, in a Special Message, recommended that the authority of the Executive in this matter be extended to cover international conflicts. In pursuance of this recommendation, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate unanimously reported the so-called Arms Embargo Resolution, of which the vital portion reads as follows:

> That whenever the President finds that in any part of the world conditions exist such that the shipment of arms or munitions of war from countries which produce these commodities may promote or encourage the employment of force in the course of a dispute or conflict between nations, and, after securing the coöperation of such governments as the President deems necessary, he makes proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export, or sell for export, except under such limitations and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of war from any place in the United States to such country or countries as he may designate, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress.

This Resolution was passed without a dissenting vote by the Senate on January 11, 1933. A few days later, however, Senator Bingham of Connecticut moved to reconsider, explaining that it would take several hours for him to set forth his objections on constitutional grounds to the Resolution. As it was near the end of the session and as the Senate calendar was crowded, he found no opportunity to state his objections and no further action was taken by the Senate.

During the same session of Congress, the Resolution was debated at length by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At a series of hearings, it was supported by the Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, and representatives of his department, and strenuously opposed by the representatives of a number of arms manufacturers. These latter attacked the Resolution as unconstitutional, as potentially harmful to American trade and as constituting a menace to the national defense. It was, however, voted out by the Committee with an amendment limiting its application to the Western Hemisphere. In view of the effective opposition of Senator Bingham to further consideration of the Resolution in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Senate, it was not deemed worth while to bring the amended Resolution to a vote in the House.

At the special session of Congress, which was called by President Roosevelt shortly after his inauguration, the Resolution was revived with the support of the new Administration. The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House again discussed it at length and held further public hearings. The discussions now centered upon a statement which Mr. Stimson had made in support of the Resolution and, in particular upon the following portion of his statement that "one of two conditions would exist," namely that —

a. The world would coöperate in refusing supplies to both nations. This would certainly involve no breach of neutrality by the United States as the movement would be general and the nations united in a common front.

b. There might be a situation in which as a result of investigation and consultation on a large scale there was a clear definition agreed upon by all the coöperating powers that one side or the other was the aggressor. It is becoming evident in recent years that this condition is much easier to realize than used to be believed. The world-wide publicity afforded since the Great War on every international incident and army movement, and the means of investigation by international commissions which is rapidly gaining ground, all show that there are situations today in which there can be a general verdict far beyond previous anticipation. The verdict of the League of Nations on this point, for example, as shown by recent events, is a perfectly practicable procedure. If the League or any other comprehensive group of important states had mutually arrived at such a verdict, the participation of the United States in a general arms embargo would be not merely practical and sound but practically necessary to preserve our national dignity and standing as a peaceful nation.

This statement was hailed with enthusiasm by several well-known international lawyers who sensed in it an indication of a more coöperative attitude on the part of the United States, and it immediately drew the fire of other distinguished authorities on international law, including John Bassett Moore. The Arms Embargo Resolution suddenly became the center of a debate on the policy which the United States should adopt in relation to the whole structure of the machinery for peace which has been built up since the war. Out of the welter of arguments covering the Covenant of the League, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, Washington's Farewell Address, and the doctrine of neutrality as applied during the Napoleonic Wars, the chief point at issue clearly emerged. It was as follows: Was the President, in exercising the authority conferred upon him by the Resolution, to be bound to apply re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strictions on the export of arms equally to all parties to an armed conflict, or might he be permitted discretion to apply them to a so-called "aggressor nation" in case aggression had been judicially or quasi-judicially determined, and in case the Government of the United States concurred in the decision, at the same time permitting the unrestricted sale of arms and munitions to the nations engaged in resisting the aggressor? The Democratic majority of the Committee, complying with the recommendations of Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt and their respective Secretaries of State, voted in support of the Resolution conferring discretionary power upon the President. The Republican minority presented an adverse report. After prolonged debate, the Resolution was carried in the House by an almost strictly partisan vote.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations adopted the position of the Republicans in the House and reported the Resolution to the Senate on May 30, 1933, with the so-called Johnson Amendment as follows:

> Provided, however, That any prohibition of export, or of sale for export, proclaimed under this resolution shall apply impartially to all the parties to the dispute or conflict to which it refers.

On the same day the Secretary of State was reported in the press as having stated that the Johnson Amendment did not conform to the views of the President or of himself, and, probably as a result of this statement, the Resolution was not brought to a vote in the Senate during the special session.

On February 28, 1934, the Resolution, with the addition of the Johnson Amendment, was unexpectedly called up in the Senate and passed without a dissenting vote. As the two Houses were in disagreement in regard to the amendment, it was returned to the House where at this writing it still reposes on the Speaker's desk. The Administration has, on several occasions, reiterated its opposition to the amendment. It has been pointed out that Mr. Norman H. Davis, on May 22, 1933, made a statement before the General Commission of the General Disarmament Conference in which, on behalf of the United States, he declared:

> In addition I wish to make it clear that we are ready not only to do our part toward the substantive reduction of armaments, but if this is effected by general international agreement, we are also prepared to contribute in other ways to the organization of peace. In particular we are willing to consult the other states in case of a threat to peace with a view to averting conflict. Further than

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that, in the event that the states, in conference, determine that a state has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations, and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these states may thus make to restore peace.

The passage of the Resolution may not be necessary in order to permit the Government of the United States to carry out the terms of Mr. Davis's offer, although without the passage of such a Resolution the President would have no authority to prevent shipment of arms to both parties of a conflict and the shipment of arms to an aggressor nation might possibly be considered as action tending to defeat collective effort. The passage of the Resolution with the Johnson Amendment would obviously run counter to the principles and spirit underlying Mr. Davis's offer, as the prohibition of the shipment of arms to the nations engaging in collective action against an aggressor would undoubtedly tend to defeat such collective effort. From statements made in recent Congressional debates, it may be inferred that the proponents of the Johnson Amendment intended it as evidence of their disapproval of the disarmament policy of the President.

In view of the inability of two successive Administrations (of different political complexions) to secure the passage of the Arms Embargo Resolution, the prompt and unanimous action of Congress on the Resolution empowering the President to prohibit the sale of arms and munitions of war to Bolivia and Paraguay is little short of astounding. It was introduced in the Senate by Senator Pittman on May 18 and in the House by Mr. McReynolds on May 21. The respective Committees voted it out unanimously, and it was passed by the House without a dissenting vote on May 23, and by the Senate without a dissenting vote on May 24. At this writing, it seems probable that the President will within a few days approve the Resolution and issue the necessary Proclamation to make the prohibition effective. It is true that by the terms of this Resolution any prohibition on the sale of arms and munitions would apply equally to both parties to the conflict and that, therefore, the controversy which has raged about the Johnson Amendment did not arise. The Resolution has, however, the same "unconstitutional" character and offers the same "menace" to the national defense which were so eloquently denounced by the representatives of arms manufacturers in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public hearings on the Arms Embargo Resolution. This time no representatives of those manufacturers appeared at the Capitol. It may be surmised that they have sensed the trend of public opinion within the last few months and that they will no longer oppose, at least openly, legislation designed to control their activities in the public interest.

When Senator Nye introduced his Resolution, calling for a Senate investigation of all aspects of the munitions industry and the traffic in arms, it was freely predicted that he could not possibly secure favorable action by the Senate on such a Resolution. He has been quoted as having said at that time that, although he was introducing the Resolution in all good faith and would make every effort to secure its passage, he nevertheless had almost no hope of success. The Resolution has been passed. A Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry has been formed, consisting of seven Senators, with Senator Nye as Chairman. The President, in his Message of May 18, recommended that the Senate give its generous support to the Committee and promised the full coöperation of all the Executive Departments. The Committee is effecting an organization and has begun its labors.

It is to be hoped that the Nye Committee's investigation will be objective and thorough. It has an opportunity to present for the first time to the American people the facts in regard to an industry of which the activities are of the highest interest to the nation, and, on the basis of these facts, it will be in a position to recommend dispassionately and authoritatively legislation and policy in a field in which wise action by the American Government is imperatively necessary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TSARIST AND SOVIET POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

By Fedor S. Mansvetov

I AM not a Bolshevik. Moreover, I am an enemy of the Bolsheviks, having fought them with a rifle in my hands as well as in the field of ideas. Nor am I a monarchist. I do not favor a restoration of the pre-revolutionary order of things. I fought the Tsar's Government also, with ideas as well as other instruments. Further, I am resolutely set against all those, whether emigrées or foreigners, who maintain that Russia is dead, that it is only a cemetery where shadows of men wander about, dreaming of the past, hating the present, and looking toward the future with anguish in their souls. But I also reject the exaggerated claims of the communists and of other foreigners who maintain that in the whole world it is Russia only which has found the true road toward the Golden Age of humanity, when war will be no more, when man will not oppress his fellow-men, when all will live like brothers or, still better, like gods. I belong to those who try to examine the various tendencies of my country, rejecting nothing that is healthy and progressive. Thus I rejoice at every success, whatever the form — the dam of Dnieprostroy, the new novel of a Soviet writer, a successful expedition into the Arctic Ocean — even a successful move of Soviet diplomacy. And I also suffer in sympathy with my people who bear the great burdens imposed upon them by a militaristic state.

This much of a sketch of my personal background seems indispensable before I turn to the subject of this article — the objects, tendencies and mistakes of Russian and Japanese foreign policy in the Far East.

I

All through the centuries, life for the Russians has been hard — unremitting struggle against the warlike tribes cast out from Asia into Europe, and a no less hard struggle with a harsh and scanty nature. Only recently have the riches of the eastern steppes and plains, of the Don coal basin, of the Urals, of Caucasia, of Siberia and the Far East been placed at the disposal of the Russian people. Because of geography and the character of her history, Russia developed a centralized military government. The Tsar's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government and his wars devoured whatever the people created. All through the centuries, every Russian — from the peasant to the highest court noble — was only a tiny screw in the great mechanism of the state. His life, his property, belonged to the Moloch of the military machine. The state had full possession of every man, from the day he was born to his death.

The process of emancipation was slow and bloody. In the sixties of the last century, as a result of tremendous efforts, a few breaches were made in the military fortress. The bloody convulsions of the "First Revolution" of 1905–7 were the next step. And in the third year of the World War, which had placed upon the vast but poverty-stricken country an incredible burden of material and human sacrifice, still another effort was made toward freedom. The age-long evils which had poisoned the life of the people were torn up by their roots. A new illusion appeared, namely that at last the nation had found the straight and beaten road to freedom.

But the results of ages of subjugation to the state, the psychology of the little screw in a military machine, could not be cast off in one brief moment. The new forms, outwardly so little resembling the old, held much — too much — of the old life.

This does not mean that the Russian people do not keep on developing. Fighting hunger and disease, caught in the fetters of a government that is militarized and centralized as of old, they yet march forward. Only those who are tired or who have been cast aside by life look back and sigh for the past. The great mass of the people look only forward, always seeing freedom and social justice just ahead. Not only life under the Tsars, but even the events of that bright unforgettable moment in 1917, the year of liberation, are now mere history. As always, the ideal lies ahead.

II

In the Far East the Soviets inherited an intricate situation.

About the middle of the nineteenth century the Russian people, having in its natural eastward expansion occupied the almost boundless expanses of Siberia, reached their natural borders. Siberia's southern boundaries are huge mountain chains and impassable, almost uninhabited deserts. The northern boundaries in Europe as well as in Siberia are the Arctic Ocean. The mighty river Amur separated the Russian possessions from the sparsely populated Chinese province of Manchuria. Russia obtained a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

free exit to the Pacific Ocean and became the neighbor of a quiet and unaggressive country, China. She obtained all but inexhaustible expanses to absorb the excess population of European Russia; a frontier which for decades did not have to be guarded; a trading route to the most populous nation in the world; and an outlet to the world of the future — the Pacific basin.

It seemed as though after many centuries of struggle to attain its natural frontiers the country would finally get the opportunity to attend to its own business. The Black, Baltic and White Seas afforded an outlet to the west and south, the land frontiers on the west extended much further than the country needed. And certainly the country craved and deserved a rest. The majority of the population lived on the borderline of poverty and starvation, industry was lacking, transportation was poor, literacy was the exception. A brilliantly educated higher society and a talented literature, theatre and music were but a thin film upon the body of an exhausted, starved, illiterate, enslaved people. But for the government and the court nobility to occupy itself with internal affairs would have been to abandon their *raison d'être*, to lose caste, to merge themselves in the mass of the population. That is how the expansionist policy of the Imperial Russia of the last period grew up, despite the fact that it had all it needed in the way of land and mineral riches, and though its real duty was to develop a literate population and give it the means to live.

This "imperialism" of Tsarist Russia had nothing in common with the imperialism of Great Britain, Germany and other western countries. That was an expansion of the culture and wealth of nations living in insufficient territories. Capital grew, industry grew, the population grew, and all demanded an outlet. Hence the policy of conquest and the seizure of colonies. But when the last Russian Emperor seized Manchuria and the Liao-Tung peninsula, when he fought for Korea at the end of the last century and the beginning of the twentieth, he had, in order to reach those regions, to build a railroad for thousands of miles. That railroad passed through the richest of plains, virgin plains that had never known the farmer's plow, and through mountains filled with coal, gold, oil and other forms of subsoil wealth, the exploitation of which had not even been started. And in order to build the ill-fated Manchurian railway, part of which had to be turned over to Japan, every cent of the sum needed had to be borrowed abroad.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The results are known: a war with Japan in 1904–1905; the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives; the loss of billions of gold rubles; the alienation of the sympathies of the whole world; diminished prestige throughout Asia. The money and human energy lost upon this adventure would have sufficed to cover Siberia and the Far East with a network of railroads, to improve its harbors, and start it towards a prosperous modern life. As for the Emperor and the upper nobility, the adventure spelt the loss of their last prestige within the country itself. Russia in the twentieth century was not the same as it had been before. The people had begun to understand their own interests. The convulsions of the "First Revolution" were over, the throne somehow held out, but its foundation was undermined; the collapse of the Monarchy was already predetermined, even the tragic death of the Emperor and his family in 1918.

As it turned out, however, the lesson of the Russo-Japanese War was of no profit to the Tsarist Government. Thwarted in its large-scale "imperialistic" policy in the Far East, it continued the same policy on more restricted lines. Northern Manchuria, transformed by Russian (though borrowed) money and Russian energy into a thriving country, rapidly filled up with Chinese immigrants. It was regarded as a colony, but to an impartial observer it was obvious that China and not Russia was getting the most from the investment. In Mongolia, taking advantage of China's weakness, the Russian Government wove a net of intrigues until it succeeded in transforming so-called Outer Mongolia into an "autonomous state" where Russia did whatever she pleased. But the expansion in the direction of Mongolia did not have, and still does not have, any roots in the interests and needs of Russia. Mongolia, a poor desolate country, sparsely populated by nomads, did not furnish any outlet for Russian products nor was its territory needed. Just when it was seized, it lost its old importance; the establishment of steamship communication between Europe and China and the building of the great Trans-Siberian Railway deprived the old caravan route through Mongolia of any real importance.

III

The legacy in the Far East which was bequeathed to the leaders of the democratic revolution of 1917 and afterwards to the Bolsheviks was a difficult one to handle. The short-lived

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Provisional Government (Prince Lvov–Kerensky) was preoccupied with internal affairs and the World War, and could not give any real attention to Far Eastern policy.

The appearance of the Soviet Government as a factor in the Far East began with the now famous appeal issued by Karakhan to China and the manifestoes to the enslaved nations of Asia issued in 1919. Karakhan's note declared that the Soviets renounced the old imperialistic policy of the Tsars. Russia gave up its concessions and privileges with regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway. The note declared that New Russia was bringing to the enslaved nations of Asia peace, freedom, and assistance in their struggle against European and American imperialism.

Karakhan's note and manifestoes were of no practical significance at the moment, since the nations of Asia were cut off from Soviet Russia by vast territories which were in the hands of Admiral Koltchak and General Denikin, but the sentimental impression was tremendous. And as the Soviet troops moved closer to the old frontiers of Russia — in Caucasia, Turkestan, Siberia and the Far Eastern provinces — the prestige of the Bolshevik Government grew like a snow avalanche. It was the first time that the nations of Asia had heard such ideas and words from a European statesman. Never was the prestige of the Soviets and of Russia so high among the masses of the Chinese nation as in 1920. That prestige could be destroyed only by the Soviet Government itself. And this it did. The old fruitless Tsarist imperialism was transformed into a Red imperialism which was just as little grounded upon the real needs of the country as the old policy had been, even though camouflaged under the high-sounding name of "Socialistic World Revolution."

The Soviets showed great caution in dealing with Japan. They remembered the experience of the Russo-Japanese War and their recent lesson in the war with Poland. The Soviet armies, victorious in civil war, carefully avoided any possibility of armed conflict with the Japanese armies during the latter's evacuation of Siberia.

But China, defenseless China, to its own and Russia's misfortune, became the object of experimentation on a vast scale. The high promises of Karakhan's note and manifestoes were forgotten. By exerting pressure upon the Manchurian and Chinese Governments, playing upon their mutual hostilities, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviets got back the Eastern Chinese Railway almost upon the old "imperialist" conditions. Interference in the internal affairs of China was practiced wholesale. The bribery of statesmen and entire political groups began to take place on a scale surpassing anything that an old Russian diplomat like Count Witte ever dreamed of. Money flowed in to set up communist cells in China. The Communist Party of China became fully subject to the Soviet Government. As a branch of the Comintern, it became a mere political, military and espionage organization working for the Soviets.

Under the pretext of fighting the Whites, the Soviet Government occupied Outer Mongolia in 1921–22 and formed the "independent" state of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic. In that country of nomads, the Soviet brand of "socialism" with all its attributes — Tcheka, executions, hunger — was firmly implanted. In consequence, the Mongolian, who had always been rather friendly to the Russian population, became violently hostile. Conspiracies and rebellions are now the rule. A favorable ground is furnished for interference by Japan and even England.

The culmination of this imperialistic policy of the Soviet Government was the punitive expedition which it sent into northern Manchuria in 1929. The interference of the Soviet railway authorities in local Chinese life had been a source of constant friction. Availing itself of one of those conflicts, the Soviet Government, without declaring war on China, moved troops into Manchuria. These obtained brilliant victories over the disorganized Chinese. The governments of China and Manchuria were forced to capitulate and accede to all the Soviet demands.

The impression produced upon China was shocking. The legend of the Revolutionary Russia, liberator of the enslaved nations of the East, was definitely ended. Russia took its place again among those predatory states which fatten upon the living body of China. All the various parties and governments of China, many communist leaders included, came to regard Russia as definitely hostile. Under conditions of civil war, parties and at times whole provinces may be forced to look to Soviet Russia for supplies or arms. But when this happens it is done as a means of intrigue, of playing one enemy against the other. The attitude of the Chinese as a whole towards Revolutionary Russia does not differ from its attitude toward other imperialist countries which have their "interests" and "spheres of influence" in China.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the punitive expedition of the Red Army into Manchuria had another significance, which is even of greater importance at the present moment. It gave a precedent to Japan and afforded her the opportunity to conduct war against China for nearly two years without any official declaration. It gave Japan the opportunity to strike at Shanghai, to form an "independent" Manchukuo, to occupy a number of strategic positions in Northern China from which it commands the approaches to the ancient Chinese capital. And, finally, it gave Japan the opportunity to begin preparing its own "independent" Mongolia — at first in Inner Mongolia, then in Outer Mongolia — and so to form a direct threat to Russia's easternmost provinces by flanking them on both sides, from Manchuria and from the two Mongolias.

In 1921 I saw with my own eyes how Red army detachments, disguised in Mongolian clothes, were sent into Mongolia to enact the part of a "rebelling Mongolian proletariat" and to form the "independent" Mongolian Peoples' Republic. If Japan's aggressive policy does not spend its force in the occupied provinces of China, or if it is not checked by pressure from without, we shall soon witness another act in the "liberation" of Mongolia. In Inner Mongolia we shall see Japanese soldiers disguised in Mongolian dress rebelling against the age-long "oppression" of China, and the people of Outer Mongolia rebelling against "imperialistic" Red Moscow. And finally, maybe, we shall see Russian fascists impersonating an angry Russian nation rebelling against Red tyranny.[1]

IV

In presenting the Far Eastern situation from the point of view of essential Russian interests, I have hardly touched upon the main question of Russo-Japanese relations. This seemingly strange omission can be accounted for very simply. The Russian and the Japanese peoples have not met face to face, and there is no conflict of vital interests which should serve as a cause for war. Therein lies the tragic nature of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and of the possible Russo-Japanese war of the future.

From the Russian point of view, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was conducted by the government only; the people did

[1] Already there are attempts by a group of Russian fascists (fortunately small) to create an "independent" Far Eastern Republic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not understand and never accepted it. Nor did they need anything which victory might have brought them. The vast territory of Manchuria and Korea, the warm coast of the Pacific, the Asiatic market, were not necessary for the Russian peasant, the Russian worker or the Russian capitalist. And today, weakened by the Great War, the civil war and the Bolshevik experiments, Russia stands even less in need of new territories and markets. She is a country with a prevailingly agricultural population, and for many years she will remain sparsely populated. She needs markets for her agricultural exports, but China cannot furnish them. The production of the young but growing Russian industry is entirely absorbed by inner consumption, and will be for some time. In the field of economics and finance, the interests of Japan and Russia have no contradictions. Russia is an agricultural country, without capital, and faced with the great problem of utilizing her vast natural resources. On the other hand, Japan is over-populated and industrialized. She needs markets for her manufactured products and spacious lands for her surplus population.

The question of Japan's growth and expansion, today and in the future, is of great importance. On the shores of the Pacific lives a great proportion of the population of our planet, and in the future it well may be the focus of human activities. But most of the problems and difficulties connected with the Pacific area have very little bearing upon the actual interests of Russia. The Pacific interests of Russia are two: 1. The Far Eastern provinces are a place for the colonization of surplus population from European Russia, and they have mineral, agricultural and marine wealth to be exploited. 2. They furnish a natural means of egress for Siberia, and for all of Russia, to the Pacific Ocean. Upon these two restricted facts the policy of Russia in the Far East should be based.

The inevitable expansion of Japan — for colonization purposes toward the Pacific Islands, Australia, and Central and South America, for economic purposes toward China and India — does not really cross Russian interests. It presents difficulties, maybe disastrous ones, to the United States, Great Britain, France, Holland and other nations having possessions in the Pacific area. But Russia is not directly concerned.

There remains one question, and that is whether the Russian Far Eastern provinces are vitally necessary to an overcrowded and growing Japan. I believe that the natural direction of Japa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nese expansion is and will remain towards China, the islands of the Pacific Ocean, Australia, and South America. Russia's riches in the Far East cannot be the objective of Japanese annexationist policy because expansion in the areas now owned by Russia cannot be backed up by colonization. The climate is Russia's best line of defense. A vivid example of this is provided by Japan's thirty years of experience in possession of Korea. Further, Russia's maritime provinces are her only outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and even the most extreme Japanese chauvinist understands that the seizure of that region at a moment when Japan felt strong would not solve the problem forever. The forces of the 170 million people making up the Russian nation would some time or other break through the door that had been closed to them.

There are, indeed, some conflicts of interest between Russia and Japan, but they are of such a nature that in our time they cannot become a legitimate *casus belli*. I shall enumerate some of them.

The first concerns the Korean border. Russia does not need Korea. But upon Russian territory adjoining Korea there live about 100,000 Koreans (some say as many as 180,000), chiefly peasants. The Koreans in Russia were always well-to-do and had more freedom than their kinsmen in Korea. The type of régime introduced by Japan in Korea, and the resultant opposition of the Korean people to the Japanese, has increased the current of emigration into Russia. This has now led to an irredentist movement. The better life becomes for the Koreans living on Soviet territory, the more will Japan find that irredentist movement inconvenient.

The second concerns Sakhalin Island. The coal, oil and other forms of wealth in that part of Sakhalin belonging to Russia used to be of great interest to Japan. But the climatic conditions of northern Sakhalin preclude there ever being any considerable wave of Japanese immigration, and as a result Japanese interest has waned. Given normal relations between the two countries, the question of the exploitation of the sub-soil wealth of Sakhalin can be solved without difficulty.

Finally, of great importance to both countries, and to Japan especially, are the fisheries of Kamchatka, Sakhalin and the mouth of the Amur. This is the richest region in the world, both as regards the quantity and the quality of its fish. But no questions arise in this connection which seem likely by themselves to become a sufficient cause for war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V

Under the pressure of facts, the foreign policy of the Soviet Government has become more realistic. The mad idea of attempting to produce a world revolution with the resources of a starved and backward country has gradually been abandoned, at first for tactical reasons and now for reasons of principle. But certain old traditions still live and are active. The success of the Five Year Plan in providing military equipment, the militarization of the population, successes in the field of foreign politics (particularly the achievement of recognition by the United States), have resuscitated the idea we heard about in 1920 of "feeling with the bayonet" — this time not Europe, but Japan. Trotsky's idea that Japan is on the eve of a revolution is shared by many prominent communists, and Stalin himself accepts it to some degree. It is not impossible that in order to ward off a domestic explosion the Soviet Government will either have to make concessions in the direction of liberalizing its régime or resort to a foreign war.

As I have already indicated, I am opposed to any kind of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Russia. But the situation in regard to Soviet foreign policy is different. It was right and proper for the United States Government to demand that the Soviet Government make an end of the propaganda work of its agents in America. The United States has an opportunity to take a similar step by using its influence to stop the work of the Comintern in China. Such a step, if realized, will tell immediately upon the normalization of the internal affairs of China. Still more important, the United States can make known to the Soviet Government that it is opposed to the idea of a war between Russia and Japan, and that it certainly has no intention of taking part in such a war. The Soviet idea of "feeling Japan with the bayonet" might cost Russia the loss of the Far East. To America it might mean the loss of a natural ally in the person of Russia, and the possible partitionment of China.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MIGRATION POLICIES AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

By A. M. Carr-Saunders

IN 1889 the International Emigration Conference affirmed "the right of the individual to the fundamental liberty accorded him by every civilized nation to come and go and dispose of his person and destinies as he pleases." Within the last few years the International Labor Office has published "Migration Laws and Treaties" in three volumes. The existence of this enormous work, which analyzes the most recent legislative and diplomatic action of the various countries of the world in relation to the control of migration movements, shows how far we have departed from the ideal of 1889. That ideal was in accordance with the dominant philosophy of the last century which held that on moral grounds the individual was entitled to freedom of movement, that on economic grounds labor, if free, would flow where it was required, and that in this manner the natural resources of the world would be exploited for the common good. If our fathers were right in their economic views, their sons have taken measures inimical to their own prosperity. Since the entire world has become entangled in the economic depression, it is worth while examining all the possible contributory causes of the catastrophe. It is not inappropriate therefore to ask whether recent restrictions on freedom of movement are not among them. The ethical aspect of the matter would take us too far afield and cannot be examined here.

Of migrations in the distant past we know very little; we can dimly discern the flow of streams of people, but we can ascertain next to nothing about the causes of these movements. From the middle of the seventeenth century onwards we are increasingly better informed. The work of Professor Walter F. Willcox and other scholars has given us a sketch of the growth of the population of the world; we know that it has multiplied some four times in the last three hundred years, and that the European races have had a share of the increase more than proportionate to their numbers, though the increase of the chief races of Asia has also been on a very large scale. The European races alone, however, overflowed their ancient frontiers; having taken possession of vast and virtually empty territories they set about to people and exploit

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them. It is this experience which is profitable to analyze, and it is in connection with the more complete exploitation of the new European overseas possessions that the first great problem of world migration arises. Up to the present, with the exception of some recent continental movements, the Asiatic peoples remain where they were three hundred years ago. But there are huge under-developed regions inhabited by colored races not so very far away from the mainland of Asia. The possibility of movement from the crowded countries of Asia to these regions constitutes the second great problem of world migration. For reasons of space this paper must be confined to the first of these problems, though it may be possible to suggest that some of the conclusions derived from a study of the first are also relevant to the second.

Fixing our attention upon the movement from Europe, we find that, up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, economic motives played but a small part among those which led men to migrate. As the century advanced, economic considerations came to dominate over the desire for civil and religious liberty, and it is generally true to say that in the second half of the century non-economic motives were of little or no importance. During the earlier decades, movement was at certain times and places hindered by restrictions, and at others favored by bounties and free passages. But during the later decades, movement was in general neither obstructed nor aided by governments. Thus the century as a whole, and especially the second half, was a period such as our fathers wished to see — a period when men were free to move and were guided wholly or chiefly by economic considerations. What was achieved under these conditions?

Migration statistics are still far from satisfactory though, thanks to the work of the International Labor Office, we are far better informed about movements in our time than our fathers were about movements in theirs. Owing to the efforts of various students, the broad outline of events from 1800 up to the war has been reconstructed. Sundbärg's figures for the gross overseas emigration from Europe show that, while the total volume tended to grow throughout the period, there were booms in emigration separated by lean times, each boom being on a greater scale than the preceding one. Four main booms can be discerned: in the early fifties, around 1870, around 1900, and in the years before the war. By thus fixing our attention upon the phenomenon as a whole, that is, upon the gross movement from Europe, the disturbing ef-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fect of local and temporary actions of governments, in relation to helping or hindering movement, are rendered of little account. We find that there is a broad coincidence between migration booms and times of economic prosperity in the receiving countries, and that since as the century advanced the whole world tended to become prosperous or the opposite simultaneously, migration came to coincide with prosperity in the countries of emigration as well as in those of immigration. If allowances are made for other disturbing factors, such as wars and revolutions, the coincidence becomes more marked. Since the United States took two-thirds of these migrants, a study of immigration into that country can be used to test these conclusions. We are indebted to Dr. Harry Jerome for a penetrating investigation of American experience, especially during the period 1890–1914. He found a close similarity between volume of immigration and cyclical variations in employment opportunity in the United States. But he also observed that the coincidence was not perfect. During times of rising prosperity there was usually a lag in the corresponding fluctuation of immigration. Again, in times of least employment there was usually some net gain by immigration.

There are therefore grounds for saying that, when the conditions desired by the advocates of free movement prevailed, labor flowed in general where it was wanted and when it was wanted. Moreover, under these conditions the new European overseas estates were being rapidly peopled and exploited. During the forty years between 1881 and 1921 the average annual rate of increase was 2.3 percent for New Zealand, 2.2 percent for Australia, 1.9 percent for the United States and 1.8 percent for Canada. That these rates indicate relatively rapid expansion may be grasped from the fact that only within recent years has the average annual rate of increase of Japan, to which so much attention is directed, much exceeded 1 percent. But from 1921 to 1926 the annual average emigration from Europe did not reach half the pre-war figure, though, taken as a whole, this epoch was not one of economic depression. Does this mean that we have abandoned a system under which the peoples of European origin were able to cope efficiently with the great task of developing their new possessions for the benefit of all?

Before attempting to answer this question it is well to utter a warning against exaggerating the merits of the former system. As mentioned above, Dr. Jerome has pointed to certain imperfec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions. Apart from this it is probable, and indeed up to a point certain, that the old system worked with much waste. That same philosophy of which we spoke in the opening paragraph also favored free competition in commercial enterprise. We are all familiar with the eulogies that have been pronounced upon the results of the progress of nineteenth century industry; we can recall the pictures that have been painted of the rapidity with which every useful invention was exploited for the benefit of the public. But we are also aware of the demonstration that this system did at the same time involve waste on a considerable scale. Similarly it is certain that, although there was this coincidence between fluctuations in immigration and fluctuations in opportunities for employment, the migration of individuals acting on their own initiative, often with little or no guidance, must have meant much movement on the part of people wholly unsuited to their new environment, and much waste on the part of those who took time to find what they were suited to do in the new country of their choice.

The next step is to examine the present situation; it may be that it is unlike the past and that in consequence it requires new methods. That is to say, it cannot be taken for granted that the system, which worked at least fairly well before the war, will work equally well under prevailing conditions. We may first, however, take note of a point of view which leads those who hold it to conclude that immigration is of little or no use to a country which wishes to increase its population. The reference is to the famous theory of General Walker. He held, it will be remembered, that immigration made no real addition to the population of a country because the birth-rate was depressed by an amount which corresponded to the volume of immigration. It would seem that this theory is still influential, at least among politicians. But it has often been disproved; recently it has been confuted by Professor Warren Thompson and Dr. Whelpton in their admirable volume "Population Trends in the United States." It follows that, if the new countries desire to continue to increase their populations at an average annual rate of 2 percent or thereabouts, they must continue to rely on immigration; indeed they must rely more on immigration in the future than in the past because their own contributions by way of natural increase are declining.

The next question is the extent to which migration movements are still desirable. It is impossible to contemplate the countries

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peopled by persons of European race without being struck by the grossly unequal distribution of population — densely populated Europe, the sparsely populated new countries. But to speak of a country as densely populated does not imply that there are too many inhabitants. In fact it is impossible to say whether a highly industrialized country like Great Britain is over-populated in the strict economic sense. The number of people which it is desirable on economic grounds to have in a country, which enters as largely as Great Britain does into world trade, depends upon factors, such as tariffs, which affect the amount and direction of international trade. Such a country may be over-populated one day and under-populated the next. What can be asserted of Great Britain is that it is congested, which means that on sociological grounds there are enough, if not too many, inhabitants. It is easier to assess the position of a country like Poland which is mainly agricultural. Official Polish figures in 1921 put the surplus population per square kilometer as 5.5 persons. This would mean a total surplus of some three millions in 1931, and the population is now increasing by about 400,000 a year. It is even less easy to say anything about the population-carrying capacity of the new countries. But it can be asserted without fear of contradiction that, if they are to make the most of their great possessions, they will need to augment their numbers for many decades to come. Therefore within the world of Europe and its derivatives there are countries which would gain by emigration and countries which would gain by immigration.

So far we have not come across any changes in conditions which might suggest the need for changes in methods. We have now to take note of a very profound change. The dominant mode of exploiting the new overseas estates in the nineteenth century was by grants of free or cheap land. This has come to an end. In consequence, any further increase of population must be accommodated either by intensification of agriculture or by expansion of industry and commerce. Unregulated individual migration, whatever its defects may have been, was clearly better suited to the needs of a country adding to its farm acreage than to a country engaged in what we may call internal expansion. Pioneering on the frontier is an individual matter; the intensification of the existing economic structure is less so. The intensification of agriculture normally results from the pressure of the natural increase of population; to bring it about otherwise demands planning and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organization. As to the growth of industry, the increase in the size of the unit is worthy of note because the nature of the operations of large industrial units demands planning, including the selection and collective recruitment of labor. Connected with the growth of and changes in industry is the rise of protective labor associations which seek to safeguard the welfare of their members against the immigrant. Unless steps are taken to remove the fear that immigrants will undercut wages, these associations will oppose immigration. Further, it is not only in countries of immigration that conditions have changed. In countries of emigration, more especially in the highly organized countries of northern and western Europe, the mass of the people, largely as a result of education, demand a greater degree of personal consideration than before. It is not, as is sometimes mistakenly suggested, that they have grown soft; the war disproved that suggestion clearly enough. It is that they are not so willing as before to jump into the migrant stream and allow themselves to be floated somewhere by the play of uncontrolled forces. The metaphor can be carried further. We may say that, whereas formerly there was a fair chance of climbing out at some point on to the bank and taking possession of a piece of land to cultivate, this is no longer so. In fact, they would like a craft provided for them which will land them at some definite point for some definite purpose.

The situation has thus undergone profound changes, and the neglect of this fact must vitiate any proposals the object of which is to set the sluggish stream flowing once more. To propose a mere return to freedom of movement is to forget that, even under favorable circumstances, it worked none too efficiently, and that recent changes have all been in the direction of rendering it a still less efficient instrument. The inference to be drawn from what has been said above is that no less amount of migration than before is desirable but that it demands planning and guidance. What then have the governments of the world done? What is the nature of their activities as shown by the three great tomes issued by the International Labor Office?

The most striking conclusion emerging from a study of all this activity is that most of it results in restricting migration movements. The total volume of immigration is cut down either by rigid numerical quotas, as in the case of the United States, or by the no less effective but more flexible methods used by the British Dominions. In addition there are special restrictions in respect of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the entry of certain races, groups or categories of persons; in these latter cases entry is either forbidden or prevented altogether. What are the declared motives which prompt action of this type? The Walker theory may not be without some influence. Rather surprisingly, however, purely economic reasons do not seem often to be alleged; it does not seem to be the case that advocates of this kind of legislation often believe that the countries attracting immigrants could not find employment for all who come. Purely economic reasons, however, are influential in times of depression; the New Zealand Immigration Restriction Act of 1931, which gives power to suspend British immigration so long as unfavorable economic conditions prevail, is an example of this. But they are unimportant in normal times. We do find one clearly expressed motive in the desire to exclude persons of bad character and of sub-normal quality, mental defectives and the like. But the amount of exclusion which can be justified under this head is small. It is nevertheless a perfectly proper ground for exclusion, and a point can be made against the dogmatic upholders of the theory of complete freedom of movement that they failed to recognize this fact. By far the most important of the declared reasons for restriction or exclusion is the necessity of ensuring that the immigrants will be assimilated. Governmental action with this end in view began far back in the last century when the United States and Canada, followed later by Australia, restricted and finally prohibited the entry first of Chinese and later of Japanese. The ostensible object of the American immigration laws is to achieve this end; it is no less true of the British Dominions. Again, it may be urged against the upholders of freedom of movement that they neglected this perfectly proper consideration. It is the duty of every government to attempt to ensure that the component elements of the population are of such a nature that the growth of a true community is possible. But while it is relatively easy to decide what people are undesirable as immigrants because they are of subnormal quality, there can be no harder task than to say who can be assimilated and who cannot. There are and can be no rules to which to appeal; assimilation largely depends on the mental outlook of the immigrants on the one hand and of the present inhabitants on the other, and this is likely to undergo continuous change. Experiment and observation alone can decide.

It is obvious that these declared reasons do not by themselves

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

account for so great a mass of restrictive legislation. The plain fact is that the assimilation difficulty is often used as a cloak under which mere dislike of foreigners may find expression, and this again is to be traced to the rising forces of nationalism. Again, as the new countries have become industrialized, protective labor organizations have grown up. These organizations fear that immigrants will undercut the wages of their members and therefore press for restriction, though for reasons of politics they seldom confess their true motives, preferring to employ the argument based on the difficulty of assimilation.

While matters have been going this way in countries of immigration, developments have been taking place in countries of emigration, notably in Italy. The new Italian emigration policy dates from 1927. The government has made emigration impossible for certain classes and only permits a restricted amount of emigration for other classes. Whereas formerly the Italian emigrant obtained concessions in the shape of cheap fares from his home to the port, it is now the Italian returning from abroad who is favored in this way. Not content with this, the government has taken under its wing the nine million Italians who are estimated to live outside Italy. A General Directorate of Italians Abroad has been set up to stimulate patriotism among Italian emigrants and to keep them attached to the homeland. It operates by organizing schools and fascist groups and by encouraging the visits of children of emigrants to Italy; it also works on the literary side in conjunction with the Dante Alighieri Society. It is obvious that in so far as such a policy is successful, so far is assimilation made a more serious issue. But when all considerations are taken into account, it cannot be denied, as a survey of legislative action before 1927 shows, that much restrictive action has been taken, ostensibly in the cause of assimilation, which was in fact dictated by racial prejudice or by other insufficient or unworthy motives.

There is little to be said for the actions of governments such as have been described above. A survey of modern conditions suggests that what is wanted is the control and guidance of the stream of migration. Control means restriction at certain times, but it also means expansion at others. The first complaint about action of this kind is that it results in nothing but restriction. The American immigration laws set a low and an absolute limit to the flow. The regulations in force in the British Dominions, though less

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rigid, aim chiefly at keeping down the number of immigrants. The second complaint is that it does nothing in the direction of guidance, that it is wholly unconstructive. It merely permits a limited amount of the old individual, hit or miss, migration.

Fortunately the arrangements that have been discussed do not constitute the whole contribution of statesmanship to the solution of the problem. The recent treaties between Germany and Poland and between France and several states point the way to better methods of dealing with the situation. In 1927, Germany came to an agreement with Poland which is remarkable on account of the high degree of organization with which the movements permitted are carried out. Germany discovered that, in spite of widespread unemployment, she still needed for several months in each year a large number of Polish agricultural workers. The complicated arrangements for supplying this labor may be briefly summarized by saying that, to begin with, German farmers apply for permits to employ Polish labor. These applications are reviewed in the light of the condition of the German labor market and a certain number of permits are granted. The total is communicated to the Polish authorities, together with suggestions as to where the labor should be recruited and how it should be allocated. The Poles may make counter-suggestions. At length it is agreed to recruit so many persons in particular places for particular purposes; each migrant is provided with a standard form of contract; elaborate arrangements are made for transport and for the settlement of such disputes as may arise. The system is said to have worked very well.

The arrangements made by France with several countries are of even greater importance because so many immigrants remain permanently. It is estimated that there are some three million foreigners in France and that up to eighty thousand a year became naturalized. The Foreign Department of the Ministry of Labor and the Agricultural Labor Department supervise the operation of the treaties. They fix the number permitted to enter and draw up standard contracts. Under these arrangements large agricultural districts in the southwest of France, which were becoming depopulated and derelict, have passed into the hands of foreigners who have initiated a rural revival. It is said that foreigners form forty percent of all coal miners in France and the large majority of all who are engaged in extraction in French iron mines.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The notable thing about these arrangements is that the economic situation is kept clearly in view and an attempt made to provide for it. There is, of course, no reason why, in so doing, regard should not be had to considerations of assimilation, if the movement is intended to be permanent. Indeed it would be obviously proper to do so. What the governments of France and Germany are trying to do is to assess the need for labor and to provide it in sufficient quantity and suitable quality and thus to avoid waste. The government is not itself engaged in attempting to exploit its territory; it is merely setting out to enable its citizens to do so. The experience of Australian governments, so illuminatingly described by Mr. Eggleston in the second series of "The Peopling of Australia," is a warning to governments against the taking of this task upon their own shoulders. For this purpose governmental machinery is inefficient and clumsy. Moreover, governments tend to begin or to continue development when the season is not propitious because they are not sensitive to the economic barometer. The private citizen and private corporation, on the other hand, are far better placed to know when development is justified, and it is the task of the government to fulfil their needs by organizing the inflow of the necessary labor.

Two features of these arrangements deserve special attention. Collective recruitment of foreign workers for particular purposes plays a large part. It may be that a particular industry or a given corporation envisages development and looks round for the necessary labor. This implies that some degree at least of intelligent planning is at work and that the action of the governments concerned is of the nature of directing a stream of migration of the right size where it is wanted. Again, the standard contract is of great importance. It removes the legitimate fear experienced by labor organizations that wages will be undercut. If labor still objects, the true motives for opposition become apparent; these are either race prejudice or a desire to hold up the community to ransom by creating an artificial shortage of wage earners. It also does something effective to reassure the better class of intending emigrant. He knows that there will be work for him of a certain kind and what he will get for it.

Statesmanship has therefore not been found entirely bankrupt when called upon to cope with the changed conditions of the migration problem. Experiments have been made with a new mechanism which are full of promise. This mechanism, it should

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be observed, does not take the form of general legislation, which is an unsuitable method of dealing with migration, but of bilateral treaties. So far little use of the bilateral agreement has been made to facilitate overseas movements, but there is a valuable precedent in the treaty between Poland and Sao Paulo. That treaty contains the interesting provision that the Sao Paulo Department of Labor is to inform the Polish Emigration Office of the intention to establish new agricultural settlements so that arrangements may be made to put into force the organized recruitment of selected Polish settlers contemplated in other parts of the agreement. Within the British Empire a little progress has been made towards attempting to meet the needs of the Dominions in an orderly fashion. But collective recruitment for purposes other than government schemes, of which some criticism was made above, has so far played but a small part. Nevertheless, there are now proposals, such as the projected development of Northern Australia under some form of chartered corporation, which show that experiments will probably soon be made in this direction.

The conclusions drawn from study of the problem of migration among peoples of European origin are not without some relevance to the problem of colored migration. This second problem is also a concern of the white races inasmuch as they control most of the under-developed lands to which the crowded peoples of Asia might go. The assimilation issue is here also very much alive, as Indian movements into South Africa bear witness. The responsibility of the white races in the matter is heavy, since the colored peoples, to whose homes Asiatic races might go, are quite unable to protect themselves; it would constitute a serious charge against the European Powers, who have assumed control of these peoples, if they permitted a state of affairs to arise in which racial conflicts were inevitable.

Leaving the assimilation matter aside, any examination of the question shows that it is no mere matter of opening and closing doors. The under-developed lands are in one sense fully occupied — but under a system of extensive cultivation carried out by more or less primitive methods. Everyone is aware of the racial strife in Palestine consequent upon immigration. That country also provides an excellent example of the difficulty arising from the present methods of using the land. The British Government, being anxious to ascertain what amount of migration to Palestine should be permitted, sent Sir J. Hope Simpson to make an en-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quiry. He reported that the present average Arab holding was insufficient to maintain the cultivators at a decent standard of life. It follows that, if room is to be found on the land for new arrivals, the existing agricultural practices of the Arabs must be replaced by a system which will permit of more intensive cultivation and thus provide support for a family on a smaller area at a higher standard. Generally speaking, the same is true of those underdeveloped countries to which Asiatic peoples might go. That means that, if the European governments, who are responsible for these territories and for the welfare of the existing inhabitants, decide to permit immigration, they must be prepared to undertake the tremendous task of adapting the present form of land utilization so that the methods of cultivation may provide adequately both for the present inhabitants and for the newcomers. In other words, the solution of this aspect of the world migration problem is not to be found in the mere raising of restrictions, but demands continuous skilled guidance and control. So once again we conclude that constructive government action is necessary in the field of migration problems.

To an economist the problem of migration is the problem of directing the flow of labor in such a manner that it fulfils, both as regards quality and quantity, the needs of countries of immigration. Failure to solve the problem will meet with more than an economic penalty, that is, a penalty which deprives the countries concerned of a degree of material welfare to which they would otherwise have attained. Under-developed countries are potential danger spots. So long as development continues at a reasonable rate, all may be well. But tension is introduced into international relations if development is held up. The situation, which would arise if the European inhabitants of some well endowed but sparsely populated region neither added to their numbers by natural increase nor permitted immigration, could not endure. Sooner or later the tension created would lead to some upheaval. Moreover, those who try to solve the problem find themselves dealing with all the most intractable features of the world situation, racial prejudice, territorial jealousy, sovereignty and flag-waving. The problem cannot be shelved; it presses for attention. From a long view, it is no great exaggeration to say that it is more important than disarmament. If the problem is solved amicably and rationally, it will not matter very much whether there are armaments or not, because the chief sources of international ten-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion will have disappeared. If it is not solved, it will not much matter about armaments because, if there are none, men will fight with their fists.

At first sight it might seem as though the international migration conferences held since the war had achieved no more than international conferences concerned with other matters. Indeed, a pessimist might argue that the Havana conference of 1928 marked a descent from the level of the Rome conference of 1924. From all accounts the Havana conference does seem at times to have been rather a bear garden. But at Havana the delegates did not confine themselves to discussing small matters; they touched upon fundamental issues such as assimilation and the absolute right of those who control any territory to say who shall enter. No one who knows what international jealousies are should be surprised if at times the delegates pulled faces at one another. An optimist might say that to touch these matters at all was a step forward. However that may be, we can at least take comfort from two events. The nations have agreed to keep more detailed figures of migration movements. This is not a trivial matter; the rational solution of these problems demands accurate data as a prerequisite. Secondly there are the bilateral agreements which show the sort of way in which the problem may perhaps be handled. It is worthy of note that some of these agreements have been made between countries which notoriously do not love one another overmuch.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM HAITI

By Ernest Gruening

THE American Government's official view regarding events in Haiti — the view which guided the policy of the State Department from 1915 to within the last few weeks — was that government had broken down in Haiti, that Haitian finances were in chaos, that foreign creditors were pressing, and that the United States was forced to intervene to straighten out the tangle. This invasion, *vi et armis*, was presented as altruistic, the extension of a helping hand to the helpless and hapless Haitian people.

The writer's contention as set forth in these pages [1] was, on the contrary, that the pressure of powerful private American interests with claims against the Haitian Government furnished the chief motivation for the intervention, and that these interests were able to utilize the naval and diplomatic forces of the United States to gain their ends. Summarized, this interpretation of the Haitian episode is that these claimants sought financial control of Haiti by the United States with a view to securing settlement of their claims, and failing in this endeavor through negotiation, succeeded in bringing about armed intervention. Then, by "military pressure," to use the exact words of Admiral Caperton, a treaty was imposed which gave the United States military and financial control and a pledge to settle foreign claims. Subsequently, when the Haitian Congress refused to adopt a constitution prepared in Washington, granting foreigners the right to own land for the first time in the history of Haiti, and placing the Marines' courts-martial above the Haitian courts in matters affecting the occupation, the Congress was dissolved by Generals Cole and Butler. The protocol arranging the settlement of claims and the contract for a loan to pay the claims were similarly imposed. The loan for $40,000,000 (of which $23,660,000 of six percent bonds was actually floated), dated 1922 and due in 1952, carried the further extraordinary provision that during the life of the loan United States financial control would continue. This was in effect an extension of the treaty for possibly sixteen years, and it was done without the consent of the United States Senate. As for the Haitian Congress, it was not permitted to re-assemble, and government in Haiti continued to be, in the phrase of one of the United States financial advisers, Mr. Arthur C. Millspaugh, a "dictatorship by collusion."

In 1930 the mounting resentment of the Haitians at this chain of events culminated in riot and bloodshed. President Hoover, unexpectedly facing revolution where all had been reported serene, sent the Forbes Commission to investigate. This commission discovered that public opinion was highly inflamed, demanded amplified powers, obtained them, and reëstablished constitutional government in Haiti. The first free elections since the beginning of intervention were held, and a Senate and House of Deputies, and then a President, were chosen. The commission recommended military evacuation at an early date, prior even to the expiration of the treaty on May 3, 1936, and immediate preparation for such withdrawal. This preparation, in the form of

[1] "The Issue in Haiti," by Ernest Gruening, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Haitianization" of the various services which had gradually been taken over by American officials, was indeed imperative, as many of these officials had apparently been acting on the assumption that the occupation would be permanent.

The Hoover Administration, while agreeing to this program as far as the military and civilian services were concerned, was adamant on the question of the financial services. It insisted on retaining fiscal control in Haiti, not merely until the expiration of the treaty, but for the life of the loan — this control being administered at the Haitians' expense. A "treaty of friendship" negotiated along these lines between the Haitian executive and the American Minister, Mr. Dana Munro, and dated September 3, 1932, was hailed by the State Department as a happy solution of the Haitian episode. Nevertheless, twelve days later the treaty was rejected by the Haitian national assembly without a dissenting vote, the opposition being based on the continuation of the financial control beyond the expiration of the treaty of 1915.

The writer's article in the January 1933 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS concluded with a plea that the incoming Roosevelt Administration reverse the policy of the preceding Administrations and put into practice the attitude expressed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS in July 1928.[2] In that article Mr. Roosevelt had criticized our Latin-American policy, had urged instead the application of the Golden Rule in our dealings with the republics of this hemisphere, and the starting of a fresh chapter in those relations.

During the first part of the Roosevelt Administration no change was noticeable in the policies of the Department of State. President Roosevelt was deeply absorbed in major domestic issues and Secretary Hull, just back from the London Conference, had not yet been able to familiarize himself fully with the manifold problems confronting the Department. An "executive agreement" continuing our fiscal domination in Haiti made its appearance, dated August 7, 1933. The new arrangement was apparently designed to obviate submission to the Haitian Assembly. Protests from Haitian senators and deputies — the Assembly was not then in session — were heard, as well as from various persons and groups in the United States who felt that the rôle of the United States Government as a collector for bondholders was in conflict with the professions of the "New Deal." However, the Administration publicly re-affirmed its policy, the President on November 28 last appending his signature to a reply to a letter from President Vincent of Haiti, declaring: "I may say that in my judgment this Government is under an unescapable obligation to carry out the Treaty of 1915 and the Protocol of 1919, and in the Agreement of August 7, 1933, it has made appropriate provision to that end. Except for this obligation, upon which the bondholders are entitled to insist, my Government would be only too glad to discontinue at once its connection with financial administration in Haiti."

This declaration seemed to signify that for some years to come a corps of American officials, drawing their salaries out of the Haitian treasury, would be superintending the collection of customs and other revenues, and that Haiti could not modify its tariffs or its taxes, or make any special appropriations outside of the budget, without the fiscal adviser's consent.

[2] "Our Foreign Policy: a Democratic View," by Franklin D. Roosevelt, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1928.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Six months later this policy was reversed. As this is written, plans are under way for a complete evacuation — financial as well as military — not later than November 1, 1934. The explanation of this change is that the larger purposes and policies of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull are now being put into execution. Mr. Hull had begun personally to study the question in connection with his preparations for the Montevideo Conference. He reopened it immediately upon his return to Washington in January. President Vincent was invited to come to the United States to carry on the negotiations. The results, specifically, are as follows:

A new treaty — a brief document — cancelling the existing one, and making reference to a contract between the Haitian Government and the Bank of Haiti, will become effective immediately upon ratification by the Haitian Assembly and the United States Senate. Under the new arrangement, the Bank of Haiti (which has been since the early days of the occupation a branch of the National City Bank of New York), will take care of the service of the debt. This now consists of approximately $11,000,000 of six percent bonds, over half of the 1922 loan having already been amortized. Service by the bank will be on the basis of a private contract, similar to the arrangement in existence for some years by which the bank has served as the depository and treasury for the Haitian Government. With the signing of the contract and the ratification of the treaty the various American Treaty officials hitherto engaged in financial control, customs collection and supervision cease these functions.

But there is even more. Haiti will acquire the National Bank of Haiti by purchase. The price of $2,000,000 is to be paid, part in cash, part in notes, over a period of four years. The present management of the National City Bank, under the leadership of Mr. James H. Perkins, has acted wisely and understandingly, going far thereby to atone for less praiseworthy acts of previous bank officials that played so important a part in bringing about American intervention in Haiti. Until the payments for the bank are completed, as well as during the service on the debt, a majority of the directorate of the bank will represent American financial interests. Of six directors, during this transition period, two will be Haitian (one of them the Secretary of State for Finance, *ex officio*), two will represent the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council, and two will be nominees of the present fiscal control. This arrangement is proper and protects all the interests involved, Haitian and American.

Thus the protracted Haitian episode is being brought to an end in a creditable and generous fashion. The change in the Administration's policy harmonizes its conduct in Haiti (hitherto a paradox) with its trail-blazing policies elsewhere in Latin-America — the pledge of non-intervention, the continentalizing of the Monroe Doctrine in President Roosevelt's Woodrow Wilson Day address last December 28, and the abrogation of the Platt Amendment. Mr. Roosevelt has, in short, validated his unofficial declaration of principles made in FOREIGN AFFAIRS six years ago when his entry into the White House was not foreseen. He has applied the Golden Rule, and has started a new chapter in the relations of the United States with our sister countries in this hemisphere. He has, in the brief space of fifteen months, put into practice his inaugural pronouncement concerning the rôle of our country as the good neighbor. The writer believes that this bread of good will cast upon the waters that wash the shores of our two western continents will return a hundred-fold.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE TRADE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

By William O. Scroggs

WITHIN the past year the expansion of Japanese exports has become more and more of an international issue. Japan enjoys a competitive advantage not only from low wages, modern equipment, centralized organization and efficient management, but also, at least temporarily, from the steady depreciation of her currency. Under these conditions Japanese goods are capturing markets where a short time ago they attracted little attention. During 1933, when world trade was severely depressed, Japanese exports showed a gain in value of 34 percent over 1932 and of 74 percent over 1931.

The trend of Japan's export trade during the past three years is shown by the charts on the opposite page. Chart I, showing export values by months in terms of Japanese currency, obviously does not give an accurate picture of the actual increase in the quantity of exports, because with the depreciation of the yen prices have been rising. Japan suspended the gold standard in December, 1931, and by the end of 1933 domestic prices in that country stood at approximately 15 percent above the 1931 average.

Changes in the price level make it exceedingly difficult to measure the real gain in the export business of Japan. Reducing the currency values of exports to a gold basis only complicates the problem. When this is done for Japanese exports, the figures for 1933 are 4.2 percent less than those for 1932, and such a result is clearly inconsistent with the facts.

A better picture of what the Japanese have been doing may perhaps be obtained from Chart II, showing the cargo tonnage of their exports. The total tonnage of products as different as silk, crab meat, buttons, electric light bulbs and floor coverings is not a satisfactory measure of a country's trade; but such data are useful for checking purposes when figures of value begin to lose their original meaning. The Japanese export tonnage figures for 1933 show a gain in round numbers of 20 percent over 1932 and of 30 percent over 1931. Some of these "cargo tons" are measures of weight (2,240 pounds) and some are measures of volume (40 cubic feet). Adding pounds and cubic feet together may not accord with the most approved arithmetical standards, but it is sometimes done by competent statisticians, and the results of such an operation are presented in the accompanying chart for whatever they may be worth.

An illustration of the effects of exchange and price fluctuations on foreign trade data appears in recent official figures. According to the Department of Commerce, our imports from Japan (in dollar values) were 4.2 percent less in 1933 than in 1932. On the other hand, figures from Tokyo (in yen values) show that we imported 10 percent more from Japan in 1933 than in 1932.

Japan's trade gains have been relatively greatest in the Latin American countries. But the total amount of trade affected here is small. From 1932 to 1933, Japanese exports to South and Central America increased respectively 207 and 220 percent. These gains seem large when compared with increases of 45 percent for Great Britain and 81 percent for France; but the absolute increase for these two countries in 1933 was nearly as great as the total Japanese exports to all Central and South America in that year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I. VALUE OF JAPANESE EXPORTS

(*in millions of yen*)



II. VOLUME OF JAPANESE EXPORTS

(*in thousands of tons*)



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IMMIGRATION AND LABOR IN PALESTINE

By Sir Andrew McFadyean

PALESTINE is a most interesting international phenomenon. For one thing, it is the last colonial land — and the only land to be colonized since the world became more or less set in its new industrial form. Further, it is populated by two races of unequal numerical strength and governed by a third, appointed by the League of Nations and therefore in the position of world trustee, which has little direct interest but overwhelming indirect interest in the country's orderly administration and peaceful development.

Any study of the present problems of Palestine must start from the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and at the outset we had better remind ourselves of its terms: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country."

This historic declaration was embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres and in the League of Nations Mandate under which the country is governed. Particular attention should be drawn to Article 6 of the latter document, couched in the following terms: "The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage . . . close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."

A study of the pronouncements of the Arab Executive will show that their views could not be met without infringing the terms of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate. For what the Arab extremists object to is the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Extremes breed extremes. And so we find Jewish extremists, the so-called Revisionists, the adoption of whose views would require an abandonment of the principles which protect Arab interests in Palestine. The Revisionists are relatively few in number, and like most extremists vocal out of proportion to their real strength and importance; they find no support in the large body of Jewish inhabitants, and no considerable accession of strength to their ranks need be feared provided that the Mandatory Power not merely carries out its duties impartially but manages to impress all concerned with the fact that it is doing so.

One sometimes hears the suggestion that the British Government is influenced in its treatment of Palestinian problems by its position as the greatest Moslem Power in the world, and the consequent necessity of being specially tender — and by implication unduly tender — of Arab susceptibilities. If this view were accepted it would lead to the conclusion that the administration of Palestine under the Mandate was incompatible with major British interests and should be surrendered. There is no reason to accept it; nothing in the policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which has been pursued in really difficult circumstances cannot be quite simply explained without looking for illegitimate motives. The overriding duty of the Mandatory Power is to maintain law and order. Unless it is successful in doing so it clearly cannot carry out the terms of the Mandate.

Palestine is a small country — about the size of Wales — with about one million inhabitants, of whom roughly three-quarters are Arab and one-quarter Jewish. Its natural resources are very limited, and its economic development will necessarily be slow — inevitably too slow to satisfy either the *perfervidum ingenium* of the minority of its inhabitants, or the sympathies of those of us outside Palestine who would be glad to see the country absorbing larger numbers for whom many parts of Europe have become prisons of cruelty and humiliation. A country of its size and character cannot support a sudden and unlimited influx of new inhabitants; the urgency of the external Jewish problem merely accentuates the necessity for controlling immigration. But plainly if the terms of the Mandate are to be observed the maximum number possible must be allowed entry, and the formula devised to meet the situation is contained in the principle that immigration will be permitted within the limits of the economic absorptive capacity of the country.

The formula is an elastic one; there are no tests by which the absorptive capacity of a country can be exactly computed. Can a better criterion be chosen than the varying shortage or excess of labor available? If we adopt it, however, we have not automatically disposed of all our difficulties. When there is great unemployment, immigration will certainly be stopped for the time being. This must not be taken as an acceptance of the view that the existence of a considerable number of unemployed is a clear indication of excess immigration; it is easy to imagine circumstances in which unemployment might be caused by a shortage of immigration, and could only be decreased by an increase in the flow. However that may be, it may be regarded as certain that unemployment would be considered by the Administration as a danger signal calling for a restriction of immigration, even if there were plausible grounds for supposing that unemployment had been caused by a precedent restriction; we may be satisfied if the Administration will adopt the converse of that attitude and allow greater freedom of immigration when the labor demand exceeds the supply.

That the Administration does not whole-heartedly adopt this view is evident from a consideration of the existing situation. What are the salient facts? First, that there was a large wave of immigration in 1933, followed by general prosperity in a time when the rest of the world has been in the doldrums. Secondly, that there is no Jewish unemployment, but a pronounced shortage of labor, evidenced by rising wages. Thirdly, that the Administration has refused to admit for the moment more than a relatively small fraction of the immigrants for whom permits are demanded by the Jewish Agency.

This situation is dangerous, politically and economically. Jews both inside and outside Palestine are tending to feel that the formula of economic absorptive capacity is being misinterpreted against them, at a time when Jewish difficulties are such as to command the sympathy of all humane persons. There may be difficult problems of administration in face of Arab unrest, but the situation will not be eased if Jewish unrest is created by what are considered to be concessions extorted by Arab opposition to the key principles

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Mandate. From the economic standpoint, a persisting shortage of labor will result in competition for the existing supply, which will drive wages, already high enough, up to a point at which existing enterprises will find it scarcely possible to make both ends meet, while new enterprises for which there is room will be definitely excluded. This process might continue until the present momentum had spent itself, when a general loss of confidence and slowing down of activity would ensue; there might be general unemployment, caused, if the above analysis is correct, by the Administration's restrictions — but accepted by the Administration as a proof that they were right on economic grounds to restrict immigration. If unemployment supervenes when immigration is restricted, it is hard not to argue that unemployment would have attained even more serious dimensions if more people had been allowed in.

What, so far as an outside observer can judge, are the considerations which have actuated the Administration in determining its present policy? In the first place, the problem of law and order does exist. There was a serious outbreak in 1929, which originated in a religious question, but was undoubtedly political in its real nature; it was accompanied by a serious loss of life. There was a minor outbreak, fresh in public recollection, towards the end of last year, for which Arab agitators were alone to blame and for which Jewish immigration was the pretext. It is for the Administration to ensure that there is no repetition of the events of 1929, and the responsibility is a heavy one. It is probably more keenly felt owing to the significant fact that the last outbreak was much more a demonstration against the authorities than against the Jews. This is not intended to imply that the authorities are more anxious about their own safety than about the safety of the Jewish population, which would be the reverse of the truth. It is impossible, however, not to believe that Arab violence directed specifically against the Administration policy must tend to make that policy more conservative. But in any case there is force in the argument that Jewish interests will not be advanced, or not most quickly advanced, if the feelings of the Arabs inside and outside Palestine are inflamed to such a pitch that the maintenance of peace becomes impossible without the imposition of a régime of repression which would bring both Mandate and Mandatory into discredit and put back the Jewish clock.

That is perhaps the political background to the policy now being pursued by the authorities. From the economic standpoint, we may surmise that they are not unnaturally alarmed at the prosperity which they see around them; it seems too good to be true. We have so long been obsessed with the idea that the world is suffering from over-population — an idea which many of us believe to be entirely erroneous — that it is almost impossible not to have the feeling that the prosperity which Palestine has been enjoying as a direct result of the importation of labor and capital will be imperilled if that importation continues uninterruptedly. We are always tempted to think of such economic questions in terms of a static world; we minimize the extent to which an enlarged population, owing to its interchange of services as well as of commodities, tends to be self-supporting. And it is easy, and within limits true, to argue that the economic absorptive capacity of the country cannot be judged on the basis of immediate needs alone; in certain circumstances there might be a temporary need for more labor, the satisfaction of which would lead to a subsequent surplus.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Considerations of this character are probably operating subconsciously on the Administration mind. There are three other factors which have influence.

The first is the number of illicit immigrants, that is to say of Jews who come to Palestine as tourists with a three months' permit which does not entitle them to accept work, but who find an opening during their visit and settle down without permission. Illicit immigration is a very real problem, and it is exceedingly difficult for an outside observer to make up his mind on its rights and wrongs. There is no excuse for evading the law — except, perhaps, that successful evasion shows that the law was harsh and unduly restrictive, and that the administrative machinery for regular admission is sometimes like the mills of the gods — grinding slowly and exceeding small. If only there could be a conspiracy of silence — of course there cannot — one can imagine few more satisfactory ways of dealing with the problem than of conniving at illicit immigration. You would have a constant trickle of immigration, and fewer recurrent and ostentatious waves; and no perplexing question of absorptive capacity would be involved, as an illicit immigrant only remains because he has been absorbed. As things are, we must expect the Administration to set its face against illicit immigration, and to create considerable soreness by acts of expulsion which have no strictly economic justification.

The second factor is the alleged existence of Arab unemployment. The word "alleged" is employed advisedly. It is not intended to suggest that there is no Arab unemployment, but that it cannot be estimated with any approach to scientific accuracy, and that the question of what constitutes unemployment for an Arab is not easy to answer, in the absence of statistics of employment over many years, without falsifying the terms of the problem. If the suggestion is that any proved surplus of Arab labor should be absorbed before further Jewish labor is allowed to immigrate, that would be impossible of acceptance. It brings us, however, to the crux of the Arab-Jewish question, and it is worth while to dwell upon its implications. There is one final answer to the argument that it is the *duty* of Jews in Palestine to fill a declared shortage of Jewish labor by recruiting Arab labor — whether surplus or not. It is that to admit the argument would be to abandon all hope of developing a Jewish National Home. There is a constant infiltration of Arab labor, on which there can scarcely be a practical check, from neighboring Arab lands. It will increase as the country's prosperity increases. The crossings of the River Jordan are barred for eastward Jewish traffic; but there is traffic westwards for the Arabs of Transjordan. Now Transjordan, while it is part of the mandated territory and under the same Administrator, does not fall within the terms of the Balfour Declaration. The Jews are not permitted to develop Transjordan; its Arab inhabitants are free to come into Palestine to take advantage of opportunities of employment which do not exist in their own country and which have only been created in Palestine by Jewish capital and Jewish enterprise. The one-way traffic across the Jordan is a more than sufficient set-off against illicit Jewish immigration.

The third factor which moulds the Administration policy, we may suspect, is the purchase of Arab land by Jews. The "landless" Arab is a good political counter, and a real social and economic difficulty which can only be solved by social and economic measures. He is probably not an avoidable difficulty,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though he should be a curable one. If the authorities feel that the development of Palestine as a Jewish National Home connotes further purchase of land, they are almost certainly right. So long as land is more valuable to a Jew than it is to an Arab, land will be sold to the Jews. There must be innumerable cases where land which was worth a couple of pounds a *dunum* in Arab hands is now worth anything up to twenty in Jewish hands. Its transfer could be generally prohibited only in terms which would be tantamount to a repudiation of the terms of the Mandate. If we assume that this difficulty did not exist, can it be supposed that in the long run mere economic forces would permit of a régime which left land in the possession of those who can wring a single pound per *dunum* out of it, if scientific exploitation can make it yield anything up to twenty times as much? Granted that the economic test is not necessarily final in social questions. But — and this is a more general reflection — we are not faced here with a conflict between one form of civilization which is worth preserving and a more material one which can only win at the sacrifice of higher non-economic values. The clash in Palestine between Jew and Arab is not analogous, for instance, to the conflict between an industrial and an oriental civilization which is being fought out in the Far East.

In considering the question of land transfers we must distinguish between the large landowner and the small cultivator. The former has no objection to selling his land to Jews at a price which makes him rich beyond his wildest dreams before the Promised Land was fertilized by Jewish capital. This does not mean that he will not a few days later be propagating hate and unrest. If he is a man of enterprise he invests the proceeds of his sale either in the more intensive cultivation of part of the land which he has retained or in some industrial undertaking. He discovers that he has to pay for Arab labor much more than he was accustomed to in the good old days before the country was prosperous, and finds to boot that it is not so docile. This economic ground is the explanation of much of the political unrest fomented by the richer class of Arab. It is entitled to no sympathy, for it is a rebellion against the one tendency which promises salvation — a raising of the Arab standard of living.

The smaller cultivator is a more difficult problem. Even though he also obtains a high price for land, the proceeds often leave him with little surplus by the time he has paid off the burden of past debts. The most ardent Arab sympathizer will admit that the Arab usurer is a canker in Arab economic life, and that it will take years of education in habits of thrift and enterprise to eradicate him or at least make him socially innocuous. Individuals will therefore suffer until something of the same spirit of communal coöperation and enterprise as is found in the Jewish community has been instilled into the Arab population. It would plainly be unreasonable to expect the existing Jewish population, struggling to establish itself, to devote any of its present limited resources of energy and capital to the direct and conscious education of the Arab. In the meantime, if the problem is looked at not in terms of individuals but of classes, it must be admitted that the opportunities of work available to the Arab and the economic return for it have increased immeasurably in the last ten years. The prosperity of a Jewish settlement overflows its boundaries and fertilizes all the Arab communities in its neighborhood; Jewish enterprise and labor give rise to secondary demands for labor and services from which Arabs largely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

benefit, even though individuals may be the victims of what is now called technological unemployment.

How are the difficulties to be resolved? It is hard to escape the conviction that in the end the Jewish population of Palestine will mould the country's destinies. But that does not give us any very clear picture of the road to be travelled. What are the processes by which the Jewish National Home will be built on the rock? The answer given will depend on one's conception of the ultimate economic relationship of Jew and Arab.

Let us begin by taking two extremes which must, on a cool calculation of probabilities, be rejected. It is conceivable, though improbable, that the Arab will gradually be ousted from Palestine, and that at the end of the process it will be a purely Jewish country. Again, it is possible, and it is actually suggested as probable by some whose opinion is entitled to great respect, that there will ultimately be a complete fusion between the two races — a racial fusion reached through intermarriage. This idea will be received skeptically even by those who believe that intermarriage is one of the solutions of the Jewish problem so far as it exists in the world at large. The cultural differences between the two races in Palestine are too great to permit of fusion, which would, moreover, effectively defeat the ideal of a national home.

Let us now consider in more detail what appear to be the only two practicable alternatives. We can envisage a Palestine in which the races will be divided horizontally — the Jews directing and owning such industry as the country proves capable of developing, and intensively exploiting part of the land, but leaving most of the manual work and almost all the heavy unskilled work to the Arabs. This division of labor was to be found in the earliest stages of colonization. But it would be fatal to the development of the Jewish National Home, and the leaders of Jewish opinion in Palestine are absolutely right in setting their faces against such a differentiation of function. It would not be fusion but a perpetuation of a division in its worst possible form; it would be racial division coinciding with, and therefore intensified by, a social class division. It is the recognition of this danger which explains, and largely justifies, the Jewish unwillingness to employ Arab labor on a large scale, or at any rate to accept the view that it is a Jewish duty to absorb Arab labor before importing further Jewish labor. Reasons were given above for believing that the acceptance of this view would put an end to further immigration. The construction of a national home requires that those who live in it should be prepared to supply part of the menial labor required to run it. Are not the architects of that home wise and farsighted when they insist that the Jewish population of Palestine shall not be a facsimile of the Jewish population in Europe and America, but shall contain farmers and laborers and all sorts of people who work with their hands as well as those who work mainly with their heads?

We are thus brought to the other practical alternative — a complete economic fusion, in which both Arabs and Jews, according to individual capacity and taste, fill indifferently all the various functions required by modern economic life. Such complete economic fusion is not attained simply by Jews consenting to do all kinds of manual work; that might lead to a complete Jewish economy and a complete Arab economy existing side by side, touching but never becoming an integrated whole. If this danger is to be obviated, we

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ought now to consider from another angle the question of the employment of Arabs by Jews. It was stated earlier that it was no Jewish *duty* to employ Arabs; but it might be to their *interest*. There has been and still is a tendency on the part of Zionism not merely to discourage but actively to obstruct the employment of Arabs in Jewish industry and agriculture. An attempt has been made to show the reasons which went far to justify this attitude in the early stages; when Jewish labor was scarce and dear out of all proportion to Arab labor, the only way both to attract Jewish labor and make openings for future inhabitants of the home was to resist the temptation to make greater immediate profits by utilizing the cheapest labor. But the dilemma is clear; if an artificial restriction of the employment of Arab labor is required, that is a plain indication that it is more economic to employ Arab than Jewish labor; in the long run, however, no industrial undertaking can continue indefinitely to exist under competitive conditions if it persists in swelling the costs of production by paying more than the market requires for its labor. It is a standing invitation to others to exploit the situation by employing the cheaper labor. There is no hope for Jewish labor in the last resort unless Jewish wages (allowance being made for differing efficiencies) are in a natural equilibrium with Arab wages. How is this equilibrium to be established? Not, if Jewish opinion can help it, by depressing the Jewish workman's standard of living to that of the Arab workman. The alternative is to raise the Arab standard. Histadruth, the official labor organization, is alive to the problem, and though not encouraging the direct employment of Arabs, does all that it can to organize Arab labor in unions as one way of improving its wages and working conditions. More, however, is needed; the Arab standard of life can never be raised by refusing to employ Arabs. It would be asking too much to suggest that Jewish leaders in Palestine should conduct an active campaign for the employment of Arab labor. On the other hand the time has come when they can with safety remove one obstacle which they have deliberately erected against such employment. The Jewish National Fund owns a large amount of land, including a considerable area in the potentially industrial part of Haifa Bay. Leases of any part of this land contain a clause absolutely prohibiting the employment of Arab labor by the lessee. The policy which dictates this clause seems, as a permanent policy, quite impracticable. In the meantime it gives Arab agitators a convenient stick with which to beat Zionism. From the Jewish point of view, coöperation with Arabs will be easier when the Jews are numerically stronger and feel their future better assured, but the time has already come when they can be more active in helping the operation of a process which should ultimately lead to the economic, and thus to the political, integration of the two peoples.

It is perhaps fitting to conclude with a reflection of a rather different character, respecting the duty and interest of the Mandatory Power. If the Jews are debarred from developing purely Arab lands, it is surely a duty of others to make an effort to ensure that somewhere, and above all in Transjordan, economic life shall be made attractive to Arabs in a country of their own, so that Palestine shall cease to be so powerful a magnet. The Mandate presents the Mandatory with inherently difficult tasks; this seems to be one of the obvious ways of simplifying them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

NOTE — FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 45 East 65 Street, New York City.

General: Political and Legal

THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM. By CLARK FOREMAN. New York: Norton, 1934, 154 p. $1.75.

A review of the doctrines of capitalist and socialist internationalism, followed by an analysis of the new systems of autarchy, the new ideas of internationalism which they imply, and the prospect of adjustments along these lines.

PROPERTY OR PEACE? By H. N. BRAILSFORD. New York: Covici Friede, 1934, 327 p. $3.00.

How property has prostituted and demoralized democracy and how it has made impossible the construction of a sound international system.

A PRIMER FOR TOMORROW. By CHRISTIAN GAUSS. New York: Scribners, 1934, 308 p. $2.50.

A thoughtful critique of our civilization, by the Dean of Princeton University.

QUO VADIMUS? By ALFRED ZIMMERN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1934, 43 p. 80 cents.

A lecture reviewing the world scene and the urgent problems of our civilization.

DO WE WANT FASCISM? By CARMEN HAIDER. New York: Day, 1934, 288 p. $2.00.

A timely book. Half of it reviews fascist doctrine and the rise of fascist movements in Italy and Germany. The other half is devoted to the United States, and attempts to answer the question whether we are drifting towards fascism.

THE METHOD OF FREEDOM. By WALTER LIPPMANN. New York: Macmillan, 1934, 117 p. $1.50.

A program for adapting the methods of democracy to the complicated duties of the modern state.

MUST WE HAVE WAR? By ASCHER HENKIN. Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1934, 244 p. $2.50.

A review of the peace problem. The author analyzes the biological and psychological ideas making for war, and examines the present institutional system and its defects.

NATIONALE FRIEDENSPOLITIK. By HEINRICH ROGGE. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1934, 708 p. M. 14.

The author underlines his belief that the new Germany wants peace, and a foreword by von Papen says the same thing. But, as the author then sets out in great detail, real peace is impossible so long as one great nation is deprived of the rights and honor which the others enjoy.

LA GÉNÉRATION DU SACRIFICE. By SAINT-RENÉ MARTIN. Paris: B. E. P., 1934, 224 p. Fr. 15.

Contains a penetrating investigation of political and financial internationalism.

L'ÉGLISE ET LA GUERRE. By GEORGES GOYAU. Paris: Flammarion, 1934, 252 p. Fr. 12.

The problem reviewed by a leading authority on the modern church.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO. By Sánchez de Bustamante y Sirvén. Havana: Carasa, 1933, 754 p.

The first volume of a general treatment, with detailed discussion of the League and the Pan-American Conference, by an eminent Cuban jurist.

DICTIONNAIRE DIPLOMATIQUE. Edited by M. A. F. Frangulis. Paris: Académie Diplomatique Internationale, 1933, 2 v.

Contains a mass of information on international problems, systematically arranged, with bibliographies.

GRUNDRISS DER ALLGEMEINEN STAATSLEHRE. By O. Koellreutter. Tübingen: Mohr, 1933, 284 p. M. 9.

One of the first general treatments of political science from the Nazi standpoint.

LES SANCTIONS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC. By Otto Bruck. Paris: Pedone, 1933, 284 p.

A scholarly study of the development and theory of sanctions, with some criticism of the system in its present form.

SANCTIONS AND TREATY ENFORCEMENT. By Payson S. Wild. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934, 231 p. $2.50.

A scholarly investigation of the question of treaty revision and of the history and present status of sanctions.

THE WORLD COURT, 1921–1934. By Manley O. Hudson. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934, 302 p. $2.50.

The fourth, revised edition of a valuable handbook.

DER VOELKERBUND UND DAS INTERNATIONALE ZOLLWESEN. By Martin Köpping. Berlin: Siwert, 1934, 106 p.

A competent review of the efforts of the League to regulate the tariff situation.

HISTOIRE DU DÉSARMEMENT. By Gunji Hosono. Paris: Pedone, 1933, 263 p.

A well-documented history of demilitarization and neutralization, as well as of the disarmament moves before and since the war.

THE AIR MENACE AND THE ANSWER. By Elvira K. Fradkin. New York: Macmillan, 1934, 331 p. $3.00.

A straightforward and non-technical survey of the present state of chemical warfare and military aviation and of their possibilities for future slaughter.

MERCHANTS OF DEATH. By H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934, 308 p. $2.50.

One of the best and most reliable of recent *exposés* of the unsavory and dangerous traffic in arms.

IRON, BLOOD AND PROFITS. By George Seldes. New York: Harper, 1934, 397 p. $2.50.

A less sober examination of much the same material.

NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES. By C. A. Macartney. New York: Oxford University Press, 1934, 553 p. $7.00.

This is a documented study published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The author has for years been secretary of the Minorities Committee of the British League of Nations Union. A goodly part of the book is devoted to background material — the evolution of the national state and the development of ideas of nationality, as well as the growth of national movements in central and eastern Europe. The rest of the book analyzes the minorities treaties of the post-war period, the procedure before the League, the value and working of the guarantees.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATIONALE MINDRETALSSPØRGSMAAL I MELLEMEUROPA. By Andres Grau. Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1933, 187 p. Kr. 5.50.
The first of three volumes on the national minorities of Central Europe.

HANDBOOK OF REVOLUTIONS. By Roger Shaw. New York: Review of Reviews, 1934, 175 p. $1.00.
Twenty revolutions, from earliest times to the present.

THE RACIAL MYTH. By Paul Radin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934, 150 p. $1.50.
A concise history of the theory of race superiority, giving the *pros* and *cons* of the argument, by an American anthropologist.

AN ATLAS OF CURRENT AFFAIRS. By J. F. Horrabin. London: Gollancz, 1934, 168 p. 3/6.
Maps, with brief comment, to guide the newspaper reader through some of the mazes of contemporary political and economic problems.

General: Economic

THE STATE AND ECONOMIC LIFE. Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1934, 422 p. 15 s.
A symposium of the views expressed by distinguished economists from many nations at the International Studies Conference held in London in May 1933 under League auspices. The discussion falls under two main heads, "Measures Affecting International Trade" and "State Intervention in Private Economic Enterprise."

A BUSINESS MAN'S VIEW OF THE WORLD CRISIS. By L. Potter. London: Williams and Norgate, 1933, 151 p. 3/6.
After surveying the main course of events, the author outlines the bases of a system which adherents of private enterprise can oppose to socialistic theories.

PROFITS AND POLITICS IN THE POST-WAR WORLD. By R. D. Charques and A. H. Ewen. London: Gollancz, 1934, 288 p. 5/.
The sins of bankers and industrialists in the various countries since the World War.

LE PROBLÈME DES DETTES DE GUERRE. By Victor de Marcé. Paris: Alcan, 1934, 216 p.
A weighty plea for cancellation, by a professor at the École des Sciences Politiques.

RIPARAZIONI E CRISI. By Luciano Giretti. Turin: Sismondi, 1934, 172 p.
A competent popular review of the effects of reparations upon world economy.

International Relations of the United States

DA WASHINGTON A WILSON. By Enrico Catellani. Turin: Bocca, 1933, 158 p.
An interesting interpretation of changing American attitudes towards Europe.

WOODROW WILSON: THE CARICATURE, THE MYTH, AND THE MAN. By Edith G. Reid. New York: Oxford University Press, 1934, 242 p. $3.50.
A general biography by a personal friend.

THE TWO AMERICAS. By Stephen Duggan. New York: Scribners, 1934, 277 p. $1.75.
A stimulating volume, intended for the layman, on the geographical, social and economic factors in American relations, and on the distinctions between the various Latin American countries. There are chapters on the Monroe Doctrine and intervention, as well as on the forces of Pan-Americanism and anti-Americanism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON OUR WAY. By Franklin D. Roosevelt. New York: Day, 1934, 300 p. $2.50.
A collection of messages, speeches and other statements relating to the New Deal and the policies of the present Administration.

THE MENACE OF RECOVERY. By William MacDonald. New York: Macmillan, 1934, 410 p. $2.50.
A critique of the New Deal.

THE AMERICAN FARMER AND THE EXPORT MARKET. By Austin A. Dowell and Oscar B. Jesness. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1934, 269 p. $2.00.
A basic study of the whole farm problem, its relation to general recovery, the possibilities of the home market, the pros and cons of self-sufficiency, etc.

THE MAINSTAY OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM. By Cassius M. Clay. New York: Macmillan, 1934, 269 p. $2.50.
Another discussion of the farm problem, in its general and economic setting.

The World War

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE WORLD WAR. By Charles M. Seymour. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1934, 417 p. $3.00.
A series of lectures delivered at the Page School of International Relations by a leading American authority on the subject. Specifically, he discusses the question of how Wilson, determined at first to stay out of the war, was finally driven to the conclusion that the United States must take a hand. "It was the German submarine warfare and nothing else that forced him to lead America into war."

HISTOIRE DE LA GRANDE GUERRE. By Raymond Recouly. Paris: Éditions de France, 1934, 400 p. Fr. 15.
A lively general narrative, by a well-known French journalist who saw much of the back-stage of the war.

DER WELTKRIEG. By R. Stratz. Berlin: Scherl, 1933, 435 p. M. 3.80.
Another general popular treatment.

VERDUN, 1914–1918. By J. Pericard. Paris: Librairie de France, 1934, 532 p. Fr. 210.
An exhaustive study of all the battles around Verdun, lavishly equipped with photographic material, maps and charts.

L'EFFORT BELGE EN FRANCE PENDANT LA GUERRE. By A. Chatelle. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1934, 320 p. Fr. 100.
On the whole this is probably the best general account of the Belgian contribution to the campaigns in France.

FRANKREICHS SCHWERSTE STUNDE. By R. Bathe. Potsdam: Protte, 1933, 142 p. M. 2.80.
A study of the French mutiny in the spring of 1917.

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1914. By Nicholas N. Golovine. Fort Leavenworth: General Staff Press, 1934, 410 p. $3.00.
An important critical account, by a former director of the Russian staff college.

COI LEGIONARI CECOSLOVACCHI AL FRONTE ITALIANO E IN SLOVACCHIA. By G. Gotti Porcinari. Rome: Ministéro della Guerra, 1934, 136 p. L. 5.
One of the excellent monographs published by the Italian War Ministry.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FANTI D'ITALIA IN MACEDONIA. By G. Galli. Milan: Marangoni, 1934, 305 p. L. 10.

An interesting Italian contribution to the story of the Macedonian campaign.

COLONEL LAWRENCE: THE MAN BEHIND THE LEGEND. By B. H. Liddell Hart. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934, 391 p. $3.75.

A well-known military writer goes over the ground made familiar by Lawrence's "Revolt in the Desert" and by Graves' "Lawrence and the Arabian Adventure." The book is distinguished by the rather fuller account of Lawrence's early life and of his career as an enlisted man in the air service since the war.

LA CAMPAGNE DE L'IRAK. By M. Moukbil Bey. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1934, Fr. 20.

The Mesopotamian campaign as seen by a Turkish officer critical of the Germans.

LA GUERRE SOUS LES MERS. By Edmond Delage. Paris: Grasset, 1934, 256 p. Fr. 15.

A critical account of the submarine war, by an author already known for his studies of the Dardanelles and Jutland fighting.

Western Europe

TEMPÊTE SUR LE MONDE. By Leon de Poncins. Paris: Beauchesne, 1934, 268 p. Fr. 15.

A rather sensational picture of the crisis, which is described as far more than economic and really a threat to our whole civilization.

LA FIN D'UN MONDE ET LE MONDE NOUVEAU. By Louis de Launay. Paris: Tallandier, 1934, Fr. 18.

A general medley: end of the bourgeoisie, the march of communism, the danger of the new frontiers, the decay of the Anglo-Saxon race, the fetish of republicanism.

L'EUROPA D'OGGI. By G. B. Angioletti. Lanciano: Carabba, 1934, 344 p. L. 12.

An interesting general survey of conditions and problems.

THE NEW DEAL IN EUROPE. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1934, 318 p. $2.00.

A discussion of the ways in which Europe has tried to weather the crisis through planning, the corporative state, the National Socialist experiment, etc.

CRISIS GOVERNMENT. By Lindsay Rogers. New York: Norton, 1934, 166 p. $1.75.

A concise and interesting survey of recent political evolution in Europe and America — the crisis of democracy, the growth of dictatorships, the international anarchy.

RED THUNDER. By Roy S. Durstine. New York: Scribners, 1934, 231 p. $2.50.

An American advertising man in Russia, Germany and Austria.

IN ALL COUNTRIES. By John Dos Passos. New York: Harcourt, 1934, 273 p. $2.50.

A well-known radical novelist's keen though inconclusive notes in Russia, Spain, Mexico and other countries.

STŘEDNÍ EUROPA. By Josef Hanč. Prague: Svaz Narodníko Osvobození, 1933, 193 p. Kč. 10.

An able analysis of Central European problems with emphasis on the economic aspects, by a Czech diplomat.

SOUVENIRS. By Charles de Benoist. Paris: Plon, 1934, 532 p. Fr. 36.

The concluding volume of the reminiscences of a French diplomat, containing his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

account of a mission to Rome during the war, his experiences at the Peace Conference and his critique of French politics.

LE PEUPLE ROI. By Virgile Rossel. Paris: Rivière, 1934, 157 p. Fr. 12.
Provocative essays on the virtues and weaknesses of democracy.

ARISTIDE BRIAND NAZAIRIEN. By Pierre Armor. Paris: Figuière, 1934, 192 p. Fr. 12.
A biographical sketch of a statesman of an era that already seems long past.

ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L'ALLEMAGNE. By Robert Redslob. Paris: Plon, 1933, 252 p.
An interpretation of the spirit of Alsace.

LES OPINIONS POLITIQUES DES PROVINCES FRANÇAISES. By B. M. E. Leger. Paris: Gamber, 1934, 268 p. Fr. 25.
A pioneer work, being an analysis of the elections of 1928 and 1932.

LA REVOLUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA. By J. Kom. Barcelona: Edeya, 1934, 334 p. Pes. 4.
The revolution in its historical perspective.

QUATRE ANS À ROME. By Baron Beyens. Paris: Plon, 1934, 308 p. Fr. 18.
Further reminiscences by a famous Belgian diplomat. He discusses here the years 1921–1926, the rise of fascism, the beginnings of Pius XI, etc.

RIFORMA CONSTITUZIONALE. By S. Panunzio. Florence: Nuova Italia, 1934, 125 p. L. 7.50.
An authoritative study of the Italian corporations and the Senate.

LA CENTURIA ALATA. By Italo Balbo. Milan: Mondadori, 1934, 392 p. L. 50.
The winged century — a study of the achievements and prospects of aviation, by Italy's leading airman.

DIECI ANNI DE FASCISMO NELLE COLONIE ITALIANE. By A. Giaccardi. Milan: Mondadori, 1934, 129 p. L. 3.
A general survey of the fascist accomplishment in the colonial field.

EVENTI ECONOMICI, 1934. By A. de Stefani. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1934, 320 p. L. 15.
The latest collection of essays by the former Minister of Finance.

L'ÉCONOMIE CORPORATIVE FASCISTE EN DOCTRINE ET EN FAIT. By L. Franck-Rosenstock. Paris: Gamber, 1934, 432 p. Fr. 30.
An exhaustive investigation of the historical background and evolution of the corporative system.

THE VATICAN: YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW. By George Seldes. New York: Harper, 1934, 445 p. $3.75.
A popular study of the problems, internal and external, of the Catholic Church.

DIE SCHWEIZ IM UMSTURZ. By René Sonderegger. Zurich: Reso-Verlag, 1933, 132 p. Fr. 2.50.
Vigorous criticism of Swiss political life, with a plea for a more effective democracy.

DER KAISER. Edited by Franz Everling and A. Günther. Berlin: Traditions-Verlag, 1934, 250 p. M. 4.80.
A coöperative work which aims to put the former Emperor in a most favorable light.

GUILLAUME II ET SON TEMPS. By Marcel Barrière. Paris: Livre Français, 1934, Fr. 25.
A general biography, well-balanced and fair.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DEUTSCHLAND IN DER WELTPOLITIK. By G. Wirsing. Jena: Diederichs, 1933, 264 p. M. 3.80.

Germany's foreign policy since her withdrawal from the League. The author foreshadows a new European federation to save the continent from liberalism, capitalism and communism.

AUS MEINEM DIPLOMATENLEBEN. By K. Graf von Pückler. Schweidnitz: Heege, 1934, 232 p. M. 8.

A diplomat's experiences before and after the war in Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome and London, with a plea for Anglo-German understanding.

DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN SEIT DEM WELTKRIEG. By F. W. von Prittwitz und Gaffron. Leipzig: Teubner, 1934, 34 p. M. 1.

A lecture on German-American relations, by the former ambassador at Washington.

HAKENKREUZ GEGEN OESTERREICH. Vienna: Staatsdruckerei, 1933, 43 p.

The official Austrian account of Nazi activities.

LES PONTS FRANÇAIS SUR LE RHIN. By A. Goellner. Paris: Rousseau, 1933, 192 p.

A strictly legal study of the status of the French Rhine bridges.

GLEICHES RECHT UND GLEICHE SICHERHEIT. By Karl Schwendemann. Berlin: Waidmann, 1934, 156 p.

An expert's popular review of the problem of equality and security.

THE LONG ROLL ON THE RHINE. By E. Alexander Powell. New York: Macmillan, 1934, 231 p. $2.50.

A picture of the Nazi revolution and an estimate of the aims of the new régime, by an indefatigable American publicist who seldom gets below the surface.

GERMANY PREPARES FOR WAR. By Ewald Banse. New York: Harcourt, 1934, 357 p. $3.00.

The well-known neo-Bernhardian appeal.

LA GUERRE ALLEMANDE. By Colonel Henri Mélot. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1934, Fr. 15.

The author takes the preceding title seriously and embroiders on the theme of the German menace.

THE TRAGEDY OF A NATION. By Prince Hubertus Loewenstein. London: Faber, 1934, 373 p. 7/6.

A keen review of the period from 1918–1934, with reference to the failure of democracy, by a Catholic idealist.

DER SELBSTMORD EINER REPUBLIK. By G. Bernhard. Prague: Orbis, 1933.

The former editor of the *Vossische Zeitung* explains the failure of the liberal régime by its own shortcomings and by the neglect of the other Powers.

ADOLF HITLER: THE DRAMA OF HIS CAREER. By James Murphy. London: Chapman and Hall, 1934, 174 p. 3/6.

A very favorable interpretation of the Leader, with stress on his pacific pronouncements.

GERMANY REBORN. By Hermann Goering. London: Mathews, 1934, 160 p. 2/6.

Direct and vigorous, but unrevealing and disappointing.

BLUT UND EHRE. By A. Rosenberg. Munich: Eher, 1934, 381 p.

The speeches and essays of the Nazi foreign policy expert, covering the years from 1919–1932.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DEUTSCHLAND IN DER WELTKRISE DES LIBERALISMUS. By E. Kautter. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933, 307 p. M. 5.40.

The Nazi mission in the dying world of liberalism.

GERMANY'S THIRD EMPIRE. By A. Moeller Van Den Bruck. London: Allen and Unwin, 1934, 268 p. 10/6.

A translation of the programmatic book of a decade ago which the Nazis claim foreshadowed their régime.

HISTOIRE DU NATIONAL-SOCIALISME. By Conrad Heiden. Paris: Stock, 1934, 412 p. Fr. 18.

A welcome French translation of what is perhaps the best single history of the Nazi movement. The German edition is now unobtainable.

GEBURT DES DRITTEN REICHES. By Conrad Heiden. Zurich: Europa, 1934, Fr. 5.

A condensed sketch of the same movement by the same author.

BEVOR HITLER KAM. By R. von Sebottendorf. Munich: Denkula, 1933, 267 p. M. 4.80.

Primarily documentary and other source material on the origins of the party.

EIN JAHR NATIONALSOZIALISMUS IN REGIERUNG UND GESETZGEBUNG. By H. Dommisch and P. Blankenburg. Langensalza: Beetz, 1934, 108 p. M. 2.

The authors review the legislative and constitutional changes of the first year.

HITLER OVER EUROPE? By Ernest Henri. London: Dent, 1934, 307 p. 5/.

The translation of a detailed and biting critique of the Nazis.

NAZISM: AN ASSAULT ON CIVILIZATION. Edited by Pierre Van Paassen and James W. Wise. New York: Smith and Haas, 1934, 325 p. $2.50.

A collection of articles the nature of which is indicated by the title.

THE HOUR OF DECISION. By Oswald Spengler. New York: Knopf, 1934, 259 p. $2.50.

The German original of this provocative essay has already been noted.

DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER KOMMENDEN VERFASSUNG. By H. Nicolai. Berlin: Hobbing, 1933, 87 p. M. 2.80.

The author, a leading constitutional authority of the new régime, outlines the centralized German state of the future.

CHRISTENTUM, KAPITALISMUS UND SOZIALISMUS. By Friedrich Karrenberg. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1933, 344 p.

A critique of the social teachings of Protestantism and Catholicism in modern times.

THEOLOGICAL EXISTENCE TODAY. By Karl Barth. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1933, 85 p.

The famous German theologian comes out frankly against the Nazi "German Christian" group. A book which has attracted much attention in England.

THE BURNING OF THE REICHSTAG. By Douglas Reed. London: Gollancz, 1934, 352 p. 12/6.

An account of the trial, detailed and fair, by one of the Berlin correspondents of the London *Times*.

I WAS A GERMAN. By Ernst Toller. New York: Morrow, 1934, 294 p. $2.75.

A great human document, being a picture of life at the front and in the German revolution, by an eminent German dramatist and humanitarian.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMAN BUSINESS CYCLES, 1924–1933. By Carl J. Schmidt. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934, 283 p. $2.50.

A scientific, statistical study of great value, with much information on general economic conditions in post-war Germany.

DAS BAUERNTUM ALS LEBENSQUELL DER NORDISCHEN RASSE. By H. Darré. Munich: Lehmann, 1933, 475 p. M. 10.

The Minister of Agriculture advocates a re-distribution of landed property in favor of the peasants, who, he says, must be the bulwark of the new Reich and the race which it represents.

LEBENSKAMPF DER OSTMARK. By H. Kyser. Bielefeld: Velhagen und Klasing, 1934, 267 p. M. 4.80.

A general narrative of the German struggle in the eastern marches after the war.

DEUTSCHLAND GREIFT ÜBER DEN ÄQUATOR. By E. Barth von Wehrenalp. Berlin: Etthofen, 1933, 299 p. M. 2.85.

The author reviews the development of the former German colonies.

LA FIN DES HABSBOURG. By Jerome and Jean Tharaud. Paris: Flammarion, 1934, 128 p. Fr. 3.75.

A dramatized account, by two well-known French writers.

Eastern Europe

HISTOIRE DES PAYS BALTIQUES. By J. Meuvret. Paris: Colin, 1934, 195 p. Fr. 12.

A brief survey of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland.

IGNACE PADEREWSKI, MUSICIAN AND STATESMAN. By Rom Landau. New York: Crowell, 1934, 327 p. $3.00.

A warmly sympathetic and appreciative biography.

POLAND'S ACCESS TO THE SEA. By Casimir Smogorzewski. London: Allen and Unwin, 1934, 468 p. 16/.

A welcome translation of what is perhaps the best and most detailed exposition of the Polish case.

LA CONDITION JURIDIQUE DU CONSEIL DU PORT ET DES VOIES D'EAU DE DANTZIG. By Nicolas de Weck. Paris: Boccard, 1934, 277 p. Fr. 30.

This scholarly legal study of the important Port Council of Danzig contains an admirable historical review of the situation.

THE CRUCIFIXION OF LIBERTY. By Alexander Kerensky. New York: Day, 1934, 406 p. $2.75.

In this new volume of memoirs Kerensky has much to say of the revolutionary background of Russian history and of his own early life. He evidently does not now consider the old régime to have been as bad as it was pictured in 1917. In any case, it was pure liberalism compared to the present dictatorship. Russia was a real part of Europe and was fast progressing in the direction of freer institutions. In the discussion of his own career Kerensky presents an apology for his action, both in the Kornilov affair and in his treatment of the Bolshevik menace.

RUSSIA. By Pelham H. Box. London: Arrowsmith, 1934, 150 p. 3/6.

A little volume in the "Modern States" series, dealing chiefly with the history of Russia in recent times, from a Lenin-Stalin viewpoint.

DIE SOWJETUNION. By O. von Niedermayer and J. Semjonow. Berlin: Vowinckel, 1934, 151 p. M. 4.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A geo-political study of the people, the administration, the military system, the communications and the economic system. Contains admirable bibliographical notes.

DURANTY REPORTS RUSSIA. By Walter Duranty. New York: Viking, 1934, 413 p. $2.75.

A good selection from the reports of the dean of foreign correspondents in Russia. A vivid picture of the last twelve years of Bolshevik rule.

MODERN RUSSIA AS SEEN BY AN ENGLISHWOMAN. By Cicely Hamilton. London: Dent, 1934, 263 p. 7/6.

A fair and interesting travel book, giving a generally unfavorable view of affairs.

TRIP TO RUSSIA. By Leonard K. Elmhirst. New York: New Republic, 1934, 213 p. $1.00.

An account of travels in the rural parts of Russia.

WINTER IN MOSCOW. By Malcolm Muggeridge. Boston: Little, Brown, 1934, 247 p. $2.50.

An unvarnished and stinging account of Bolshevik rule, by the disillusioned former correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*.

IL PRINCIPIO RAPPRESENTATIVO NELLO STATO SOVIETICO. By Amor Bavaj. Rome: Anonima Romana Editoriale, 1933, 235 p.

A heavily-documented and scholarly study of the representative system in Russia before and since the Bolshevik revolution.

FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN. New York: International Publishers, 1934, 490 p. $1.50.

A collection of speeches by communist leaders, delivered more than a year ago and hence already somewhat outdated.

INDUSTRIALIZED RUSSIA. By Alcan Hirsch. New York: Chemical Catalog Company, 1934, 309 p. $3.00.

A complete and impressive survey of the present state of industrial development in Russia, by an American who was chief consulting engineer to the chemical industry.

RUSSIAN ENGINEER. By John Westgarth. London: Archer, 1934, 223 p. 8/6.

A picture of incompetence and misplaced zeal, by a British engineer who was two years in the Russian service.

LA VIE D'UNE PEUPLE. By Roger Tisserand. Paris: Maisonneuve, 1933, 298 p.

A dispassionate picture of the present-day Ukraine.

PROBLEMA UCRAINEANĂ ÎN LUMINA ISTORIEI. By Nistor I. Ion. Cernaŭti: Glasul Bucovinei, 1933, Lei 140.

A general history of Ukrainian-Rumanian relations.

BUDOVÁNÍ STÁTU. By Ferdinand Peroutka. Prague: Borový, 1933, 524 p. Kč. 70.

An able Czech journalist reviews the revolution of 1918 and revalues its heroes.

VERS L'UNION BALKANIQUE. By A. P. Papanastassiou. Paris: Dotation Carnegie, 1934, 284 p.

A useful description of the four Balkan Conferences, held from 1930 to 1933, and of the problems with which they dealt.

THE NATIVE'S RETURN. By Louis Adamic. New York: Harper, 1934, 376 p. $2.75.

A vivid and interesting picture of Jugoslavia by an American writer who is full of feeling for "the old country," if somewhat naïve in some of his political appraisals.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LA POLITICA ESTERA DELLA ROMANIA NE QUARANTENNIO PRE-BELLICO. By Cialdea Lilio. Bologna: Cappelli, 1932, 296 p.

A richly documented scientific study of the pre-war policy of Rumania.

IULIU MANIU. By Sever Stoica. Cluj: Istitutul de Arte Grafice, 1933, 163 p. Lei 100.

A sympathetic political biography of the Transylvanian leader, now head of the National Peasant Party.

EVOLUȚIA PARTIDELOR NOASTRE POLITICE IN CIFRE SI GRAFICE, 1919–1932. By Ivan Marcel. Sibiu: Krafft, 1933, 34 p.

Valuable statistics on recent Rumanian elections.

LES LUTTES DES ROUMAINS TRANSYLVAINS POUR LA LIBERTÉ ET L'OPINION EUROPÉENNE. By George Moroianu. Paris: Gamber, 1933, 286 p.

A Transylvanian reviews the struggle from the eighteenth century to the time of the union with Rumania.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, 1867–1914. By O. F. Christie. London: Routledge, 1934, 368 p. 12/6.

A sequel to the writer's "Transition from Aristocracy." Stimulating if sometimes rather debatable generalizations.

FOUR AND A HALF YEARS. By Christopher Addison. London: Hutchinson, 1934, 297 p. 18/.

The first volume of the memoirs of a British cabinet minister and close collaborator with Lloyd George. The period here covered is that from 1914 to 1916.

UPHILL: THE FIRST STAGE IN A STRENUOUS LIFE. By John E. Wrench. London: Nicholson, 1934, 328 p. 8/6.

The first part of the memoirs of one of Northcliffe's associates.

B. U. F. OSWALD MOSLEY AND BRITISH FASCISM. By James Drennan. London: Murray, 1934, 293 p. 7/6.

Exuberant and flowery, though not uninteresting.

BEHIND THE SMOKE SCREEN. By Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves. London: Faber, 1934, 352 p. 15/.

By the former director of flying operations: a keen discussion of modern air strategy together with bitter criticism of government neglect and a plea for air preparation.

EMPIRE UNITY AND DEFENCE. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. London: Arrowsmith, 1934, 300 p. 10/6.

Somewhat extravagant proposals for imperial unity in foreign policy and defense.

THE NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR. By Bernard Acworth. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1934, 319 p. 8/6.

The author, who minimizes the air danger and stresses the importance of the navy, is critical of British naval policy and emphasizes the soundness of blockade strategy.

BRITAIN, THE WORLD AND THE WAR GOD. By Sir George MacMunn. London: Low, 1934, 176 p. 5/.

Primarily an effort to arouse Britain to the need for preparedness.

VOM FREIHANDEL ZUM SCHUTZZOLL. By H. H. Joosten. Nordhausen: Müller, 1933, 154 p. M. 2.80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The author is interested chiefly in the evolution of British opinion from Manchester doctrine to the theory of protection.

THE IRISH STRUGGLE AND ITS RESULTS. By Louis F. A. Paul-Dubois. New York: Longmans, 1934, 160 p. $5.00.

The French original of this excellent history of Ireland from 1914 to 1926 has already been noted.

ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES. Montreal, 1933, 441 p. $2.50.

A collection of academic essays on various aspects of Canadian economic life.

DIE SÜDAFRIKANISCHE UNION. By Ernst Cohn. Berlin: Bossack, 1933, 148 p.

A dissertation analyzing South Africa's constitutional position in the Empire.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME PROBLEMS OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM. By Kenneth O. Warner. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1934, 323 p. $1.75.

A scholarly monograph on the relations of the states and the commonwealth, with emphasis on economic matters.

AUSTRALIA IN THE WORLD CRISIS. By Douglas B. Copland. New York: Macmillan, 1934, 224 p. $2.50.

A successful scheme of planning, reviewed and analyzed by a leading economic adviser of the Australian government. A useful book.

AUSTRALIA IN THE WORLD DEPRESSION. By E. Ronald Walker. London: King, 1933, 219 p. 10/6.

A concise exposition of the national and international factors in Australia's economy.

THE NEW INDIAN CONSTITUTION. By A. Krishnaswami. London: Williams and Norgate, 1934, 230 p. 10/6.

A clear and sympathetic study of recent developments.

The Near East

HISTOIRE DE LA TURQUIE. By Léon Lamouche. Paris: Payot, 1934, 432 p. Fr. 30.

A conventional but well-informed general history of Turkey, by a Frenchman who has had long experience of the Near East.

AN EASTERN CHEQUER BOARD. By Sir Harry Luke. London: Lovat Dickson, 1934, 291 p. 12/6.

Reminiscences and observations, often amusing, covering many years of experience in Palestine and the Near East generally.

A YEAR'S EMBASSY TO MUSTAFA KEMAL. By Charles H. Sherrill. New York: Scribners, 1934, 277 p. $3.00.

Written by the former American representative at Ankara, this book is in part a study of modern Turkey, but primarily a glowing biography of the Turkish president.

TURKIJE ZOOALS HET WAS EN IS. Zutphen: Thieme, 1934, 262 p. Fl. 3.90.

A study of Turkish economic life before and since the war, with some keen observations of the danger to Turkey of an exaggerated nationalism.

LES NATIONALITÉS DETAHCÉES DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN. By Paul Ghali. Paris: Domat-Montchrétien, 1934, Fr. 70.

An analytical study of the new Asiatic states.

PALESTINE. By Norman Bentwich. London: Benn, 1934, 302 p. 21/.

Another volume in the "Modern World" series, supplying an up-to-date survey of conditions, by the former attorney-general for Palestine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LE TRAFIC DU CANAL DE SUEZ. By Raymond C. Julien. Paris: Sirey, 1933, 369 p. Fr. 60.

A technical study, by a member of the Canal Company's staff, of the changes in traffic occasioned by world economic conditions.

LORD OF ARABIA, IBN SAUD. By Harold C. Armstrong. London: Barker, 1934, 306 p. 9/.

A well-known writer on Near Eastern affairs produces a decidedly appreciative biography of the remarkable Wahabi ruler.

LE PÉTROLE EN PERSE. By A. Zangueneh. Paris: Domat-Montchrétien, 1934, Fr. 30.

A detailed account of the present situation in the Persian oil industry.

Africa

THE AFRICAN TODAY. By Diedrich Westermann. New York: Oxford University Press, 1934, 343 p. $2.50.

The best general account of present African conditions, written by the director of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures.

AN AFRICAN PEOPLE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By L. P. Mair. London: Routledge, 1934, 316 p. 12/6.

A careful scientific study of the Baganda.

AN AFRICAN SPEAKS FOR HIS PEOPLE. By Parmenas G. Mockerie. London: Hogarth Press, 1934, 95 p. 3/6.

A memorandum from a Kenya tribe and an important native presentation of the case against the administration.

SOMETHING NEW OUT OF AFRICA. By H. W. New York: Pitman, 1934, 227 p. $5.00.

Flying experiences in the Sudan.

LA CONQUÊTE PACIFIQUE DU MAROC. By René Cruchet. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1934, 320 p. Fr. 20.

Another glorification of the French accomplishment in Morocco.

LA NUOVA ITALIA D'OLTRE MARE. By Angelo Piccioli. Milan: Mondadori, 1933, 2 v. L. 200.

A thoroughly documented study of the Italian colonies under fascist rule, with numerous illustrations and maps.

LE CAMEROUN. By J. Wilbois. Paris: Payot, 1934, 256 p. Fr. 15.

The work accomplished by France in the former German colony as seen by a well-known sociologist.

DIE WIRTSCHAFTSGEOGRAPHISCHE ENTWICKLUNG DES EHEMALIGEN SCHUTZGEBIETES DEUTSCH-SÜDWESTAFRIKA. By Arnold Kremp. Stalluponen: Klütke, 1933, 145 p.

A doctoral dissertation on the recent economic development of Southwest Africa.

The Far East

THE MESSAGE OF ASIA. By Paul Cohen-Portheim. London: Duckworth, 1934, 252 p. 8/6.

A stimulating writer surveys oriental culture and ends on a note of rapture and mystery.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EMPIRE IN THE EAST. Edited by Joseph Barnes. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1934, 322 p. $3.25.

A really important collection of essays on various aspects of the Far Eastern affairs, written by experts.

WORLD TIDES IN THE FAR EAST. By Basil J. Mathews. New York: Friendship Press, 1934, 190 p. 60 cents.

The dangers threatening China and Japan from communism, nationalism, mechanization, etc.

THE PAGEANT OF CHINESE HISTORY. By Elizabeth Seeger. New York: Longmans, 1934, 386 p. $3.00.

A popular history, with emphasis on cultural aspects.

CHINA. By L. A. Lyall. London: Benn, 1934, 383 p. 21/.

An admirable recent volume in the "Modern World" series.

CHINA'S GEOGRAPHIC FOUNDATIONS. By George B. Cressey. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934, 139 p. $4.00.

An essay on demography as well as geography.

THE CHINESE PERIODICAL PRESS. By Roswell S. Britton. Shanghai: Kelley and Walsh, 1933, 151 p. $7.50.

Primarily a descriptive study covering the period from 1800 to 1912; an important contribution to the study of western influence in China.

THE MONGOLS OF MANCHURIA. By Owen Lattimore. New York: Day, 1934, 311 p. $2.50.

A fundamental book on a little-known subject. The author sketches the history of the tribes, describes them and discusses their position in the present Manchukuo.

LA POSITION ET LES DROITS DU JAPON EN MANDCHOURIE. By C. Y. Ling. Paris: Pedone, 1933, 464 p.

An exhaustive historical and analytical study covering the period from 1895 to 1931. The author reaffirms that Manchuria is an integral part of China.

ISLAND INDIA GOES TO SCHOOL. By Edwin R. Embree, Margaret S. Simon and W. Bryant Mumford. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1934, 120 p. $2.00.

An account of the educational progress that has been made in Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Celebes, the Moluccas and New Guinea.

Latin America

MODERN HISPANIC AMERICA. Edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. Washington: George Washington University Press, 1933, 630 p. $3.00.

A collection of lectures delivered at George Washington University in 1932 by a group of American experts.

REVOLUTION À CUBA. By Alfred Fabre-Luce. Paris: Éditions de Pamphlet, 1934, 125 p.

A lively account of the revolution by a French publicist who was in touch with the various leaders.

DIE INDUSTRIALISIERUNG ARGENTINIENS. By Martin Richter. Grimmen: Grimmer Kreis-Zeit, 1933, 196 p.

A doctoral dissertation containing some useful material on the recent economic changes in Argentina.

IBERO-AMERICA Y ALEMANIA. Berlin: Heymann, 1933, 317 p.

A coöperative work published in the interest of Latin-American relations with Germany, by German and Latin-American experts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 270 Madison Ave., New York. *France:* Gerda M. Anderson, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIV^e^. *League of Nations, Int. Labor Office, Perm. Court of Int. Justice* and *Int. Institute of Agriculture:* World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. Since 1928 a list of Government documents has been printed in the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations.*

AGRICULTURE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE

COTTINI-AGOSTINELLI, Giacinto. L'Institut international d'agriculture. Le développement intégral de son activité (XIX planches hors textes en couleurs). Terni, Stabilimenti Poligrafici Alterocca, 1933. 80 p.

AIR NAVIGATION

AIR NAVIGATION. Arrangement between the United States of America and the Union of South Africa. Effected by Exchange of Notes Signed March 17 and September 20, 1933. Washington, 1934. 10 p. 23¼ cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 54.)

PILOT LICENSES to Operate Civil Aircraft. Arrangement between the United States of America and the Union of South Africa. Effected by Exchange of Notes Signed March 17 and September 20, 1933. Washington, 1934. 6 p. 23¼ cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 55.) 5 cents.

ARMAMENT

[The General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments adjourned July 23, 1933, to meet October 16, the principal states of Europe in the interval to attempt to settle their land armament problems. Germany announced its withdrawal October 14, after which date negotiations between the states were directed at finding formulas satisfactory to France and Germany. Such publications as have been made relate to that effort and the reconvening of the conference.]

CONFERENCE for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Documents concerning the Date of the Resumption of the Work of the Conference and the Correspondence between the President of the Conference and the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy. Geneva, 1934. 30 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, Conf. D. 166. 1934. IX. 1.) 35 cents.

——— Supplement to Documents Concerning the Date of the Resumption of the Work of the Conference and the Correspondence between the President of the Conference and the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy. Geneva, 1934. 6 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, Conf. D. 166 (a). 1934. IX. 2.)

FRANCE. Ministère des affaires étrangères. Pacte d'entente et de collaboration paraphé à Rome le 7 juin 1933. . . . Paris, Impr. des Journaux officiels, 1933. 30 p.

MEMORANDUM on Disarmament Communicated by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the Governments represented at the Disarmament Conference. [January 29, 1934.] London, 1934. 12 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 2 (1934). Cmd. 4498.) 2d. Continued by Cmd. 4559, February 14–April 17, 1934.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY

PARAGUAY. Ministerio de relaciones exteriores. Libro blanco. . . . Asunción, Impr. nacional, 1933. 2 vols.

BOUNDARY, AFRICA

EXCHANGE of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government regarding the Boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland with the Agreement of the Boundary Commission, Appendices and Map, London, November 22, 1933. London, 1934. 49 p., map. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 1 (1934). Cmd. 4491.) 1s. 3d.

BUOYAGE RULES, UNIFICATION

COMMUNICATIONS and Transit Organisation. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Unification of Buoyage Rules. Geneva, 1933. 9 p., diagrams, 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 465. M. 238. 1933. VIII. 3.)

——— ——— APPENDIX. Proposals and Observations of Governments. Geneva, 1933. 53 p., diagrams. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 465. M. 238. 1933. VIII. 3. Appendix.)

CALENDAR REFORM

SIMPLIFICATION of the Calendar. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventieth Congress, Second Session on H. J. Res. 334, A Joint Resolution requesting the President to propose the calling of an international conference for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simplification of the calendar, or to accept, on behalf of the United States, an invitation to participate in such a conference. December 20 and 21, 1928, January 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 18, and 21, 1929. Washington, 1934. iii, 536 p. 23¼ cm.

These hearings have been published after a delay of over five years.

CHINA

THE CHINA FOUNDATION for the Promotion of Education and Culture. Eighth Report. Peiping, 1933. 78 p., tables. 22½ cm.

REPUBLIC of China. Report of the National Flood Relief Commission 1931–1932. Shanghai [Comacrib Press], 1933. (ix) 304, (14) p. plates, maps. 26½ cm.

——— National Flood Relief Commission. Finance Department. List of Contributions Received from 20th August 1931 to 30th September 1933. 156 p. 26½ cm.

COMMERCIAL BANKS

COMMERCIAL BANKS. 1925–1933. Geneva, 1934. 336 p. (League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service. 1934. II. A. 5.) $2.50.

Continues Memorandum on Commercial Banks, 1913–1929; covers the systems of 40 countries.

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

LIGHTHOUSES Case between France and Greece. Permanent Court of International Justice, XXXIst Session. Judgment of March 17, 1934. Leyden, 1934. 60 double p. 24½ cm. (Series A./B., Fascicule No. 62.)

LEGAL STATUS of Eastern Greenland. Annexes to the Danish Case and to the Danish Reply. Permanent Court of International Justice, XXVIth Session. Judgment of April 5, 1933. Leyden, 1933. p. 1473–2036. 24½ cm. (Series C, No. 64.)

——— Annexes to the Norwegian Counter-Case and the Norwegian Rejoinder. Permanent Court of International Justice, XXVIth Session. Judgment of April 5, 1933. Leyden, 1933. p. 2037–2582, 24½ cm. (Series C, No. 65.)

——— Minutes of public sittings. Oral statements. Permanent Court of International Justice, XXVIth Session. Judgment of April 5, 1933. Leyden, 1934. p. 2583–3281. 24½ cm. (Series C, No. 66.)

——— Maps. Permanent Court of International Justice, XXVIth Session. Judgment of April 5, 1933. Leyden, 1934. 5 double p. maps. 24½ cm. (Series C, Annex to Nos. 62–67.)

GEOGRAPHIC NAMES

SIXTH Report of the United States Geographic Board 1890 to 1932. Washington, 1933. ix, 834 p. 23¼cm. 80 cents. (Paper cover.) Determines the preferred spelling and pronunciation of foreign and domestic geographic names.

HAITI

HAITI. Annual Report of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the fiscal year October 1932 to September 1933. Submitted to the Secretary of State for Finance, and the Secretary of State for Commerce of the Republic of Haiti, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America. S. De La Rue, Financial Adviser-General Receiver. Rex A. Pixley, Deputy General Receiver. J. C. Craddock, Director General of Internal Revenue. Port-au-Prince, Haiti [1933]. vi, 221 p. 23½ cm.

INLAND NAVIGATION

ORGANIZATION for Communications and Transit. Study of the International Régime of Inland Navigation in the Various Countries of America. Geneva, 1933. 12 p. 29½ cm. (League of Nations, C. 101. M. 36. 1934. VIII. 4.)

INTELLECTUAL COÖPERATION

BULLETIN de la Correspondance Scolaire Internationale publié par le Secrétariat du Comité permanent de la C. S. I. auprès de l'Institut international de coopération intellectuelle. Paris, 1930. 21½ cm. (Numéro 1-. Janvier 1930-.)

Issued as a periodical, irregularly.

ENTRETIENS. L'Avenir de la Culture. . . . Paris, 1933. 330 p. 22¼ cm. (League of Nations, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle.) 18 fr.

Papers by 22 persons.

HOLIDAY Courses in Europe 1934. Paris, 1934. viii, 80 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, Institut de Coopération Intellectuelle.)

PLAN de Travail 1934. Paris, 1934. iii, p. 670–745. 22½ cm. (League of Nations, Coopération Intellectuelle, 36.)

POUR une POLITIQUE Internationale de la Science. Paris, 1933. iii, p. 565–669. 22½ cm. (League of Nations, Coopération Intellectuelle, 34–35.)

LE RÔLE Intellectuel de la Presse. Sanin Cano, Henry de Jouvenel, Kingsley Martin, Paul

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scott Mowrer, Friedrich Seiburg. Paris, 1933. 231 p. 22½ cm. (League of Nations, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Cahiers 1.) 18 fr.

LA SÉCURITÉ Collective. Paris, 1934. iii, 68 p. 22½ cm. (League of Nations, Coopération Intellectuelle 37.)

LABOR CONFERENCE, INTERNATIONAL

17TH SESSION

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference. Seventeenth Session, Geneva, 1933. RECORD of Proceedings. Geneva, 1933. xxxi, 780 p. 31 cm.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference. Seventeenth Session, Geneva, 8th–30th June. REPORT to the Minister of Labour by the Delegates of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. London, 1934. 43 p. 24½ cm. 9d.

INTERNATIONAL Labor Conference. REPORT of United States delegation at International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8–10, 1933, to Secretary of Labor. Washington, 1934. Cover title, 9 p. (Serial no. R. 66.) [From *Monthly Labor Review*. Dec. 1933.]

18TH SESSION

EMPLOYMENT of Women on Underground Work in Mines of All Kinds. International Labour Conference, Eighteenth Session, Geneva, 1934. Sixth Item on the Agenda. Report VI, First Discussion. Geneva, 1933. 38 p. 24 cm.

MAINTENANCE of the Rights in Course of Acquisition and the Acquired Rights of Migrant Workers under Invalidity, Old-Age and Widows' and Orphans' Insurance. International Labour Conference, Eighteenth Session, Geneva, 1934. Fourth Item on the Agenda. Report IV, First Discussion. Geneva, 1934. viii, 224 p. 24 cm.

METHODS of Providing Rest and Alternation of Shifts in Automatic Sheet-Glass Works. International Labour Conference, Eighteenth Session, Geneva, 1934. Third Item on the Agenda. Report III. Geneva, 1934. 69 p. 24½ cm.

PARTIAL Revision of the Convention Concerning Employment of Women During the Night. International Labour Conference. Eighteenth Session, Geneva, 1934. Item VII on the Agenda. Report VII. Geneva, 1934. 28 p. 24½ cm.

REDUCTION of Hours of Work. International Labour Conference, Eighteenth Session, Geneva, 1934. First Item on the Agenda. Report 1. Geneva, 1934. 219 p. 24 cm.

MINORITIES

CONCLUSION of a General Convention on the International Protection of Minorities. Draft Resolution submitted by the Polish Government. Geneva, 1934. 2 p. 30 cm. (League of Nations, A. 7. 1934. I. 1.)

GERMANY. Auswärtiges amt. . . . Material zur behandlung der minderheitenfrage im Völkerbund 1932. Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1933. 32 p.

NAVIES

FLEETS (The British Commonwealth of Nations and Foreign Countries). Particulars of the Fleets of the British Commonwealth of Nations, United States of America, Japan, France, Italy, Soviet Union, and Germany, on the 1st day of February, 1934, distinguishing, both built and building, Battleships, Battle Cruisers, Cruisers, Cruiser Minelayers, Minelayers, Armoured Coast Defense Vessels, Monitors and Netlayers, Aircraft Carriers, Flotilla Leaders, Destroyers, Torpedo Boats, Submarines, Sloops, Coastal Motor Boats, Gunboats and Despatch Vessels, River Gunboats, and Minesweepers. London, 1934. 96 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 4514.) 1s. 6d.

OPIUM

ADVISORY Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs. MINUTES of the Seventeenth Session. Held at Geneva from October 30 to November 9, 1933. Geneva, 1933. 60 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 661. M. 316. 1933. XI. 6.)

——— REPORT to the Council on the Work of the Seventeenth Session. Held at Geneva from October 30 to November 9, 1933. Geneva, 1933. 22 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 642. M. 305. 1933. XI. 5.)

UNIFORM Narcotic Drug Act. Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by it Approved and Recommended for Enactment in all the States at its Forty-Second Annual Conference at Washington, D. C., October 4–10, 1932. Washington, 1933. 18 p. 23¼ cm.

SHIPPING

NOTES by the Economic Relations Section and the Communications and Transit Section on the Merchant Shipping Crisis. Geneva, 1934. 35 p. 29½ cm. (League of Nations, C. 99. M. 34. 1934. VIII. 3.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET UNION

THE ESTABLISHMENT of Normal Relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Address by the Honorable William C. Bullitt, American Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, before the Chamber of Commerce of Philadelphia, January 19, 1934. Washington, 1934. 8 p. 22½ cm. (The Department of State, Eastern European Series, No. 3.) 5 cents.

RECOGNITION of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Radio address by the Honorable R. Walton Moore, Assistant Secretary of State, November 22, 1933. Washington, 1934. 12 p. 22½ cm. (The Department of State, Eastern European Series, No. 2.) 5 cents.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

INTERNATIONAL communication. Regulation of rates for messages in international service, memorandum prepared by Irvin Stewart, of Treaty Division of Department of State; presented by Mr. Dill. February 6, 1934. Washington, 1934. 17 p. (S. Doc. 127, 73d Cong., 2d sess.) 5 cents (paper).

TRADE AGREEMENTS — UNITED KINGDOM

COMMERCIAL Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of FINLAND with Protocol, Helsingfors, September 29, 1933. London, 1934. 56 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 40 (1933). Cmd. 4472.) 1s.

CONVENTION between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the ARGENTINE Republic relating to Trade and Commerce with Protocol, London, May 1, 1933. London, 1934. 15 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 2 (1934). Cmd. 4492.) 3d.

SUPPLEMENTARY Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the ARGENTINE Republic relating to Trade and Commerce with Protocol, Buenos Aires, September 26, 1933. London, 1934. 62 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 3 (1934). Cmd. 4494.) 1s.

TEMPORARY Commercial Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of SOVIET Socialist Republics, London, February 16, 1934. London, 1934. 11 p. 24½ cm. (Russia No. 1 (1934). Cmd. 4513.) 2d.

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the NORWEGIAN Government relating to Trade and Commerce with Protocol and Exchange of Notes, London, May 15, 1933. London, 1934. 39 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 4 (1934). Cmd. 4500.) 9d.

LIST of Commercial Treaties, etc., with Foreign Powers, January 1, 1934. London, 1934. 51 p. 24½ cm. 9d.

TRADE AGREEMENTS — UNITED STATES

DUMPING (commercial policy). Antidumping legislation and other import regulations in United States and foreign countries, report prepared for Federal Trade Commission by Ellen L. Love, Export Trade Section of Commission, relative to antidumping legislation and other import regulations in United States and foreign countries. Washington, 1934. vii, 100 p. (S. Doc. 112, 73d Cong., 2d sess.) 10 cents.

EXPORT-IMPORT Bank of Washington. Executive order, authorizing formation of banking corporation to be known as Export-Import Bank of Washington. [Feb. 2, 1934.] Washington, 1934. 3 p. 4°. [No. 6581.] 5 cents (paper).

FACTORIES. American branch factories abroad, letter from Secretary of Commerce transmitting, in response to Senate resolution 138 (72d Cong.), report on American branch factories abroad, with analysis of returns from United States producers with investments of $50,000 or more in foreign production in 1932. January 23, calendar day January 25, 1934. Washington, 1934. 19 p. (S. Doc. 120, 73d Cong., 2d sess.) 5 cents (paper).

RECIPROCAL Trade Agreements. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives. Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session on H. R. 8430. March 8–14, 1934. Washington, 1934. iii, 539 p. 23 cm.

TARIFF BARGAINING. Radio Address by the Honorable Francis B. Sayre, Assistant Secretary of State, March 26, 1934. Washington, 1934. 9 p. 22½ cm. (The Department of State, Publication No. 574.) 5 cents.

WOMEN AND MINORS

ADVISORY Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People. Digest of the Comments by Private Organisations on the Report of the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East. Geneva, 1934. 20 p. 24½ cm. (League of Nations, C. T. F. E. 613. 1934. IV. 4.)

CHILD WELFARE Committee. Institutions for Erring and Delinquent Minors. Geneva, 1934. 253 p. 24½ cm. (League of Nations, C. 1. M. 1. 1934. IV. 1.)

COMMISSION of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East. Summary of the Report to the Council. Geneva, 1934. 41 p. 21 cm. (League of Nations, C. T. F. E. 606. 1934. IV. 3.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED